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Abstract
My dissertation aims to contribute the migration and education literatures, my
thesis contains two main topics and three papers. In the first two papers, I study
the job search process of rural migrants in urban labor markets when social net-
works present. Then, I analyse how social networks affect both migration decisions
and individuals’ labor market outcomes. In the last paper, I examine the determi-
nants of an individual’s college education decision, with particular attention to the
uncertainty faced by individuals.
The first paper examines the job search process of rural migrants, who have the
option of returning home. This paper focuses on analysing the effect of social net-
works on their labor market outcomes. I build a dynamic structural model of job
search for migrants. I estimate the model using “Rural Urban Migration in China"
dataset. The estimation results show that rural migrants with social networks
receive more job offers and that migrants with social networks also have higher
wages on average.
The second paper analyses the effect of social networks on both migration deci-
sions and individuals’ labor market outcomes. I develop and estimate a dynamic
model of return and repeated migration, social network investment decisions and
labor market transitions. The model distinguishes two channels through which so-
cial networks may affect migration decisions: (1) a direct effect on migration costs,
and (2) an indirect effect on labor market outcomes through the job arrival rate. I
estimate the model using panel data from the Chinese Household Income Project
(2007-2009). The estimation results show that social networks increase arrival
rates, and decrease migration costs. I also show that policies that directly lower
migration costs may be more cost effective at increasing rural-urban migration in
China than those focused on unemployment benefits.
In the third paper, we use economic theory and estimates of a semiparametri-
cally identified structural model to analyze the role played by uncertainty and its
interaction with credit constraints and preferences in explaining education choices.
We develop amethodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econome-
trician but forecastable by the agent and information unknown to both at each stage
of the life cycle. Usingmicrodata on earnings, we estimate amodel of college choice,
labor supply and consumption, under uncertainty with repayment constraints. We
find that 52% and 56% of the variances of college and high school log-wages respec-
tively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When
people are allowed to smooth consumption, college increases to nearly 58%.
Keywords: Internal Migration, Social Networks, Search, Education Choice,
Uncertainty, Borrowing Constraint
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Chapter 1
Do Networks Matter? Job Search
with Return Migration in China
1.1 Introduction
Nowadays, one of the largest internal migration in the human history is happen-
ing in China. From the investigation conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of
China (NBSC), more than 132 million people who were born in rural areas had mi-
grated in 2006 to urban cities, which is triple the number of migrating Europeans
to the United States since industrialization. Many scholars in China point out that
this number has been underrated. For instance, Cai (2010) estimated the number
of migrants to be 188 million. The recent report by National Bureau of Statistics of
China (2012) mentioned that the number of rural migrants was above 253 million.
There are two main features of rural-out migration in China: networks have
a significant correlation with the job search process, i.e., migrants with networks
have around 40% shorter unemployment duration than those without networks.
Another feature of Rural-Urban migration in China is that it is temporary. Mur-
phy (1999) shows that almost one third of migrants returned to their original lo-
cation in China. Deng et al (2009) mentions only 8.13% of rural migrants (State
Council Research Bureau 2006) declared that they planned a long term stay at the
destination city.
Rural migrants have become an enormous part of the labor market in urban
cities. Identifying the factors which affect rural migrants’ transitions into the ur-
ban labor market is necessary to understand the phenomenon of a rural migrants’
job search process. Also it would help to analyze related policy issues, such as the
crime control policy and new social welfare programs for rural migrants.
The paper develops a dynamic job search model. To capture the two features
of rural-out migration in China, first, this paper considers the effect of networks
on both job arrival rates and migrants’ wages; second, to model the behaviour of
1
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return migration, I allow individuals to have the option of return migration in this
paper. This model allows unemployed migrants to have the permanent possibil-
ity to quit searching for jobs and return to their home town. This environment
extends the job search framework of Van den Berg (1990) which does not assume
unemployed workers have the option to leave the labor market.
It is important to add the option of return migration when we consider the job
search of migrants. When we study the transition from unemployment to employ-
ment, it may cause a biased estimation if we fail to take the option of return mi-
gration into account. First, unemployed migrants with lower expected returns to
job search may quit job searching earlier than unemployed migrants with higher
expected returns of job search. Second, a higher option value of return migration
may urge migrants to go back more quickly than others with lower option values.
The transition from unemployment to return migration is not independent on the
probabilities of the transition from unemployment to employment, which cannot
be treated as an exogenous right-censoring of duration of unemployment.
In this paper, I also will examine the role of networks on job arrival rates and
wage distributions. From the data1, it is found that migrants with networks are
more likely to find jobs but they have lowerwages. Networks helpmigrants increase
the probability of receiving job offers. More information may also help migrants
to have a better match with firms. Also migrants with networks get higher wages.
This paper tries to analyze the effects of networks on job arrival rates and wage
distributions. It helps us to know more about how networks affect the labor mar-
ket outcomes, especially in developing countries.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a structural framework of the analy-
sis of the flow of migrants among different labor market states (employment, unem-
ployment, and return migration). It is also the first time to estimate the dynamic
job search process of rural migrants in China. This study could help the govern-
ment to build an efficient social welfare program for rural migrants. The empirical
results provide the structural estimates of the effects of networks on job search
and the empirical results also help us to understand how the option of returning
home affects rural migrants’ job search behaviors. Second, the data offers the best
statistics regarding migration in China. It is the nationalized data source, which
includes 9 provinces covering more than 50 percent of rural migrants in China.
The national data can provide more correct information of rural migrants’ perfor-
mances in urban cities.
Section I is the introduction of the article. Section II gives a short literature
review of related topics. I will introduce the model and the interpretation of the
dynamic process in section III. Section IV gives the information of data source and
the statistics of key variables. The estimation results are shown in the section V.
1I use first two round of Rural and UrbanMigration in China to estimate the model in this paper.
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Section VI concludes.
1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Search model
The seminal work of the search model is Kiefer and Neuman (1979), which was
the first to empirically investigate implication of the search model with constant
reservation wage , using reduced-form equations. Flinn and Heckman (1982) was
the first to structurally estimate the model. In the model, I consider the return
migration as an option of rural migrants when they are searching for jobs in the
urban market. Hence, the model I consider is related to the topic of job search with
nonparticipation.
The empirical literature which considers nonparticipation is based on the ap-
proach of treating transitions fromunemployment to nonparticipation as stochastic
occurrences. Banerjee (1984) analyzed a general framework which makes it pos-
sible to examine an individual’s inter-temporal discrete choice decisions. In that
work, an individual will choose to occupy one of the three labor market states at
each moment faced and their expectations about future changes in the environ-
ment. Mortensen and Neuman (1984) compare Banerjee (1984) and Flinn and
Heckman (1982), and then estimate the model of Banerjee (1984).
The recent work of Van den Berg (1990) and Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006)
consider estimating the structural search model with nonparticipation. Van den
Berg (1990) estimates a stationary search model with nonparticipation but in his
model he assumes the income flow after becoming nonparticipation is close to the
constant benefit level. This assumption helps him fix the transition rate from an
unemployment to nonparticipation state. In this paper, this assumption will be re-
laxed (i.e. the value of nonparticipation is not a function of benefit (cost) level). Fri-
jters and van der Klaauw (2006) consider job search with nonparticipation model
within the environment of non-stationarity. The path of reservation wages is de-
pendent on the value of nonparticipation, which is unobserved. They have to use a
simulated likelihood method to estimate the model.
1.2.2 Return migration
Most economic research treats migration as permanent decision (i.e., Chiswick
(1978) and Borjas (1999)). However, levels of return migration have been quite
high. For example, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) point out that the 1971 cohort
of immigrants to the US, almost fifty percent returned to their home country by
1979. Research which studies return migration is sparse. Galor and Stark (1990)
examinemigrants with the probability of returning prefer to savemoremoney than
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comparable native-born people. An important contribution to the theoretical expla-
nations of return migration is the work of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). They ar-
gued that return migration may have been planned as part of an optimal life-cycle
residential location sequence. Return migration also occurs because immigrants
based their initial migration decision on erroneous information about opportuni-
ties in the host country.
For rural-urban migration in China, the level of return migration is noticeable.
It is necessary to consider return migration when we analyze the behavior of mi-
grants. In the 1990’s, as the outflow of rural migrants increased, return migration
also became noticeable. About one-third of all migrants are estimated to return to
their original places (Murphy (1999)).
Hare (1999)’s paper is the first to consider return migration in China. She used
the MPH model with weibull distribution to estimate the duration of migrants in
cities. She found that more land allocations in rural areas would decrease the du-
ration in cities. More female workers in the household could increase the spell in
cities. Zhao (2002) found married migrants had a higher probability of return as
well migrants with a higher education level also had a higher likelihood to return.
Hare (1999) used the reduced form duration model and Zhao (2002) applied the
binomial logit model to estimate the relationship between key variables and the
return migration decision. Deng et al (2009) mentions only 8.13% rural migrants
(State Council Research Bureau 2006) declared that they planned a long term stay
at the destination city and they examine the land rights insecurity is the main rea-
son of temporary migration in China.
But all of them ignore the search process of migrants in cities. The decision
of return migration should be made after comparing the value of unemployment
with the value of employment. We did not have information about migrants’ perfor-
mances in destination labor markets in those two papers. It could be some reasons
which cause that the returned migrants have a higher value of returning or some
reasons which cause those returned migrants have lower job arrival rates, higher
search costs or lower wages. Hence, we need a model to give answers to the above
questions and to understandmigrants’ labor market performance in the urban city.
1.2.3 Social Network and Migration
The role of information on the destination labor market may be crucial for suc-
cess. The information problem for migrants may be bigger both in distance and in
culture. The opportunity cost of remaining in the host is lower for close by. For ex-
ample, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) find out immigrants to the US tend to return
to rich and to countries close to the US. Ethnicity is also important if immigrants
of a certain ethnic group systematically perceive a lower return than expected. Not
only for migration across countries, social networks but also play the most impor-
tant role for internal migration. Immigrants can get more useful information from
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their own social networks. Although the role of social networks on migration has
been widely studied (i.e Banerjee (1983),Banerjee (1984); Munshi (2003)), how net-
works influence unemployment, especially considering return migrations are very
scarce.
Recent studies about the Rural-Urban migration in China mainly focus on net-
work effects on migration decision-making (i.e Hare and Zhao (2000); Meng (2000);
Zhao (2003)). Zhang and Zhao (2011) examined the relationship between social-
family networks and self-employment and they find social-family networks would
helpmigrants to be self-employed in the destination cities. However, little is known
about the role of migration networks in determining labor market outcomes like
wages, job arrival rates, spells of job search. If we ignore networks’ effect, it is
possible that we may obtain a biased understanding of migrants’ behaviors in the
labor market.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Outline of the Model and Likelihood
In this section, I present the structural framework to model the transition from un-
employment to employment and to return migration. This model is based on the
work of the continuous time job search theory (Mortensen (1986)) and extends the
model of Van den Berg (1990) which estimate the job search model considering the
probability of nonparticipation. Here, I allow the value of return migration to be a
random variable, which does not need to be constant as it is assumed in Van den
Berg (1990). But in our framework, job arrival rates, wage distributions and the
distribution of values of return migration still do not change over the elapsed du-
ration of unemployment. This means our model is in the stationary environment.
After providing the outline of the model, the identification is discussed briefly.
In this model, unemployedmigrants search sequentially for jobs until a suitable
wage offer has been found or the value of return migration is large enough. Job
offers arrive randomly in time at rate λ. Wage is drawn randomly from a wage dis-
tribution F(w), which is assumed to be log-normal distribution; the value of return
migration is randomly drawn from the distribution G(η). During the unemploy-
ment time, migrants have to pay the cost of search c (i.e., the transportation fee
and the rent of apartment). In China, there is no law to require the local govern-
ment to pay unemployment insurance or benefits to rural migrants. In our data,
only less than 1% of rural migrants do receive unemployment benefits, so in this
paper, I only assume unemployment migrants have to pay the search cost and can-
not get any unemployment benefits.
The variables λ, c and w are measured per unit period (day). Each migrant aims
to maximize their expected discounted lifetime income. I assume once a job is ac-
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cepted it is kept forever at the same wage and if they make decisions to return, they
cannot search for jobs in the urban labor market any more. This assumption is not
too strong since there are quiet few on-the-job search behaviour for rural migrants.
I consider the model in the stationary environment, which means λ, c, F(w),
G(η) are independent of the unemployment duration. This assumption is not very
realistic. Because job arrival rates may decrease during the unemployment dura-
tion. Wage distribution and the distribution of values of returning would change
due to business cycle effects. In the data, I do not have the detailed information
including the reservation wage, social benefits across different unemployment du-
rations. This means that I cannot build up the non-stationary model. But the
duration of job search for rural migrants in China is quite short compared with job
search duration in European countries. The mean of unemployment duration of
rural migrants is around 28 days. In such a short time, the wage distribution and
the value of returning distribution can be treated as constant. This may not hurt
the understanding of the job search process of rural migrants very much.
In this paper, I use the optimal stopping search model to explain the job search
process. The search model also will help us to identify job arrival rates and distri-
butions of wages and values of return migration. I also can examine the effect of
social networks on labor market outcomes (i.e., job arrival rates, and wages).
In the model, an unemployed migrant who receives a job offer with probability
λ and has to decide whether to accept it, to return migration or to continue search-
ing in the hope of obtaining a better offer in the future. If the unemployed migrant
does not receive a job offer, he has to make a decision whether to continue search
or return home.
Let Vu denote the expected present value of unemployment, Ve denote the ex-
pected present value of employment and Vr denote the expected present value of
return migration. The Bellman equation for Vu satisfies:
Vu = c +
λ
1 + r
Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} + 1 − λ1 + r Eηmax{Vu,Vr} (1.1)
In continuous time of search set up, the Bellman equation 1.1 can be rewritten
as:
Vu = c +
λ
1 + r
Ew,ηmax{wr ,
η
r
,Vu} + 1 − λ1 + r Eηmax{Vu,
η
r
}
If the unemployed migrant receives a job offer, he compares three options: tak-
ing the job offer, continuing to search for a better one, and the option of return
migration. If the migrant does not receive a job offer, he compares the value of
continued unemployment with the value of return migration. From the Bellman
equation, it is easy to see if the expected value of unemployment exceeds the present
value of returnmigration, migrants will continue to search for a job. Once the wage
1.3. Model 7
offer is high enough (i.e., the value of employment is larger than the value of un-
employment and the value of return migration), migrants will accept the job offer.
The difference of this model as compared to others is that the optimal strategy
of an unemployed individual can be characterized by the value of unemployment
not by the fixed reservation wage. Because at each period, the value of return mi-
gration is randomly drawn from the distribution of the value of return, the reser-
vation wage is not a fixed number over the unemployment duration. That means at
each period, the reservation wage will reflect the information of the value of return
migration.(i.e., a higher draw of the value of return will cause a higher value of
reservation wage at that period.) In this sense, this model is different from other
stationary search models. The migrants’ decisions are based on the value of un-
employment and two random variables: values of wages and return migration.
The following theorem shows that the solution of the Bellman equation (3.1) has
an unique solution when the search cost exists (i.e., c < 0).
Theorem 1.3.1 The function φ(Vu) is monotonically decreasing. Furthermore, if
c < 0, the function φ(Vu) = 0 has an unique root.
where, φ(Vu) = c + λ1+rEw,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vn} + 1−λ1+rEηmax{Vu,Vn} − Vu2
The transition rate from unemployment into employment θue can be written as
the product of the job arrival rate and the probability of accepting a job offer:
θue = λPr(Ve > max{Vu,Vr}) (1.2)
Similarly, the transition rate from unemployment into return migration θur can be
described as the sum of two terms. The first one is the product of the job arrival rate
and the probability of returning. The second term is the product of the probability
without job offers and the probability of the value of returning is bigger than the
value of continue search:
θur = λPr(Vr > max{Ve,Vu}) + (1 − λ) Pr(Vr > Vu) (1.3)
Compared ourmodel with themodel of Van den Berg (1990), in Van den Berg(1990),
the data of nonparticipation is not available so he just assumes the transition from
unemployment into non-participation can be characterized by a Poisson process
with a parameterized transition rate ζ. In the model, based on the Heckman
and Singer (1984), I can identify the distribution of the value of return. While in
Van den Berg (1990), ζ is just a exogenous parameter. Also in Van den Berg (1990),
to make sure to get a fixed transition rate from unemployment to nonparticipation,
he assumed the value of nonparticipation equals to the benefits of unemployment.
While in this model, I do not need this assumption. Hence, this model has a weaker
assumption.
2The proof is in appendix A.
8Chapter 1. Do NetworksMatter? Job Search with ReturnMigration in China
Likelihood Function
The likelihood function is associated with the hazard function. As we all know,
the hazard function hi(t) is defined as:
hi(t) = lim
∆t→0
P(t ≤ T < t + ∆t|T ≥ t)
∆t
= lim
∆t→0
P(t ≤< t + ∆t ∩ T ≥ t)
P(T ≥ t)∆t
=
1
P(T ≥ t) lim∆t→0
P(t ≤ T < t + ∆t)
∆t
=
fi(t)
S i(t)
where fi(t) is density function of the events (i.e. accepting a job or return migra-
tion): fi(t) = lim∆t→0 P(t≤T<t+∆t)∆t and S i(t) is survival function: S i(t) = e
− ∫ t0 hi(u)du.
Hence the density function of duration t can be written as:
fi(t) = hi(t)S i(t)
Accepting a job offer and returning migration are two competing risks, so the
hazard function for each individual should be the sum of those two transition rates.
hi(t) = θi,ue + θi,ur. Then the density function of employment is :
fi,ue(t) = fi(t)
θi,ue(t)
hi(t)
= hi(t)e−
∫ t
0 hi(u)du
θi,ue(t)
hi(t)
= θi,ue(t)e−
∫ t
0 (θi,ue(t)+θi,ur(t))du
Due to the property of stationarity, the transition rate is independent with the
unemployment duration. So the density of employment can be written as:
fi,ue(t) = θi,uee−(θi,ue+θi,ur)t (1.4)
Similarly, the density of return migration is:
fi,ur(t) = θi,ure−(θi,ue+θi,ur)t (1.5)
The likelihood function of this model3 is
L =

employed θi,uee−(θi,ue+θi,ur)t
return θi,ure−(θi,ue+θi,ur)t
unemployed e−(θi,ue+θi,ur)t
(1.6)
The density function f (t) and transition rates θ are the functions of the value of
unemployment Vu. Once the value of unemployment for each individual is deter-
mined, the value of likelihood can be calculated.
3The details of likelihood in the Appendix B
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1.3.2 Some Remarks on the Identification
In this section, the identification of the structural elements of the model is briefly
discussed. These structural parameters are the wage offer distribution F(w) with
the variance σ2w, the job arrival rate λ, the distribution of the value of return mi-
gration, G(η).
From the accepted wages after an unemployment spell, I can identify the wage
distribution which satisfies F(w|Ve > max{Vu,Vr}). The variance σ2w is determined
based on the assumption of the shape of wage distribution. In this paper, I assume
F(w) follows the log-normal distribution.
The transition rates θue, θur can be identified from the observed unemployment
durations. Because I assume the shape of the wage distribution is log-normal, job
arrival rates λ can be identified separately from the wage distribution.
The distribution of return migration is identified from the duration of the tran-
sition from unemployment state to return migration.
Finally the discount rate r cannot be identified in this model. I assume r =
0.000083 in this paper to target the annual interest rate is 3%.
1.3.3 Parametrization
This model can be estimated in continuous time if we know the value of unemploy-
ment. The theorem 1.3.1 shows the solution of the nonlinear equation is unique,
which means that we can solve Bellman equation numerically and then estimate
the model.
The job arrival rate is parameterized by:
λ =
eX
′
λβλ
1 + eX′λβλ
The wage distribution comes from the F(xw, ) and the variance σ2w of the wage
distribution. Here I assume the wage distribution is log-normal distribution with
mean x′wβw
ln(w) = x′wβw + 
The search cost function is specified as −ex′cβc. Based on the spirit of Heckman
and Singer(1984), I treat the distribution of the value of return migration as a dis-
crete distribution (η1, η2, η3) with zero mean. Hence, the whole parameter space is
βλ, βc, βw, σ2w, η1, η2, η3 and the probability p1, p2, p3.
The estimation procedure is two steps. Firstly, when given the initial guess
of parameters, I solve the inner loop which is the non-linear Bellman equation for
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each individual, to calculate eachmigrant’s value of unemployment. Secondly, with
the value of unemployment for each individual in hand, I can calculate the likeli-
hood for each individual. The outer loop is estimated by the method of maximizing
likelihood estimation.
1.4 The Data and Some Empirical Facts
This study uses the first two waves of panel survey data which is Rural-Urban Mi-
gration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI). This database is planned to be a five-
year panel survey in China and Indonesia with the goal of studying issues such as
the effect of rural-urban migration on income mobility and poverty alleviation, the
state of education and health of children in migration families.
The first wave of the survey was conducted in 2008. In China, three represen-
tative samples of households were surveyed, including 8000 migration households
in 15 cities4, a sample of 8000 rural households in 9 provinces and a sample of
5000 urban households in 9 provinces. In this paper, the empirical analysis uses
the information from the migration and rural samples. The 15 cities cover most
of the migration destinations in China. Eight of these cities are in coastal regions
(Dongguan, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Shanghai, Shenzhen and
Wuxi); five of them are in central inland region (Bengbu, Hefei, Luoyang, Wuhan,
and Zhengzhou); and two of them are in the west (Chengdu and Chongqing). Fig-
ure 1.1 gives the map of the 15 cities. These 15 cities are included in the same
9 provinces as rural and urban samples. In 2000 to 2005, more than 68.38% of
migrants moved into those 9 provinces and while 52.10% of migrants moved out
of those 9 provinces (NBS 2002, 2007). Table 1.1 shows the detailed information
of the flow of migrants in China from 1990 to 2005. Figure 1.2 is generated based
on the numbers in Table 1.1. We can find the dark green areas are the locations
where rural people migrate out and the dark brown areas are the places which are
the destinations of rural migrants. The data used by this paper cover most places
where migrants move out and move in.
The migration survey includes detailed information about the respondents’ per-
sonal characteristics, educational background, employment situation, health sta-
tus, children’s education, social and family relationships, major life events, income
and expenditure, housing and living conditions. In terms of basic information of
a household member, we know the person’s age, gender, education level, number
of children, current address and the original home town address, the time of first
4The 15 cities are Bengbu, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Lu-
oyang, Nanjing, Ningbo, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Wuhan, Wuxi, and Zhengzhou
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Figure 1.1: Sample Cities in China
Figure 1.2: Migration flows in China From 2000 to 2005
migration, the search duration of first job, the wage of first job, the duration of stay-
ing in the city, monthly rent of house, monthly payment for transportation. Also, I
know who provided the information before first time migration and we know who
the migrant’s most important contacts are and whether they live in the same city,
and whether the migrant’s parents and sibling also live in the same city.
Table 1.2 gives the key variables of this analysis. In this paper, I restrict the
migrants who are older than 15 and younger than 65. The health variable is a self-
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reported variable which shows whether the migrant thinks he (she) is healthier
than those within his(her) same cohort.
This paper considers return migration as one option choice for all migrants and
the rural survey provides information to identify people who returns from migra-
tion destinations. Because the rural survey questionnaire only has information
about current migration. This forces us only to consider people who first migrated
in 2007 and in 2008.
In this paper return migrants are rural migrants who returned their home and
then stay in their counties for at least three months. The definition of migration
is the destination out of their own counties. Networks are defined in two ways: 1)
migrants have relatives or friends living in the destination cities; 2) migrants who
are provided the job information in destination cities. There would exist selections
based on social networks. This chapter mainly focuses on the correlation between
social networks and labor market outcomes. The next chapter will correct the se-
lection of social networks.
The information of transportation and rent can only be found in the migrate
data source. I calculate both the means of transportation and housing rent for
each province and use those means as the proxy numbers for the samples from ru-
ral data. The dummy variables of transportation and rent are the indicators if the
values of transportation or rent are proxy by the mean.
Almost half of migration households are missing (3912 households) in the first
wave so 3912 new households are now included in the second wave. Because both
first and second wave questionnaires ask key information in this empirical analy-
sis, the missing data does not impact this research very much. In this paper, I only
focus on first time migrants. This means I only use one year information, which is
cross sectional data.
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Table 1.1: Interprovincial Migration in China, 1990-2005(In Thousands)
1990-1995 migration 1995-2000 migration 2000-2005 migration
In Out Net Net(%) In Out Net Net(%) In Out Net Net(%)
1 Guangdong 1947 221 1726 16.2 1 Guangdong 11501 438 11063 34.3 1 Guangdong 11996 1715 10281 27
2 Shanghai 726 122 604 5.7 2 Shanghai 2168 163 2005 6.2 2 Zhejiang 5062 1041 4021 10.6
3 Beijing 694 117 577 5.4 3 Zhejiang 2715 970 1745 5.4 3 Shanghai 3025 375 2650 7
4 Jiangsu 969 450 519 4.9 4 Beijing 1890 174 1715 5.3 4 Jiangsu 3290 1328 1963 5.2
5 Xinjiang 566 150 416 3.9 5 Xinjiang 1142 217 925 2.9 5 Beijing 2246 330 1916 5
6 Liaoning 435 197 239 2.2 6 Fujian 1346 625 722 2.2 6 Fujian 1934 802 1132 3
7 Tianjin 223 62 161 1.5 7 Jiangsu 1908 1241 667 2.1 7 Tianjin 908 107 802 2.1
8 Shandong 527 382 145 1.4 8 Tianjin 492 104 388 1.2 8 Xinjiang 577 182 395 1
9 Fujian 344 220 125 1.2 9 Liaoning 755 380 375 1.2 9 Liaoning 674 416 257 0.7
10 Hebei 503 417 87 0.8 10 Yunnan 733 398 335 1 10 Hainan 191 158 33 0.1
11 NeiMongol 275 249 27 0.3 11 Hainan 218 130 88 0.3 11 Ningxia 74 68 7 0
12 Shanxi 158 140 18 0.2 12 Shanxi 383 334 49 0.2 12 Tibet 26 31 -6 0
13 Tibet 38 28 10 0.1 13 Ningxia 129 87 41 0.1 13 Qinghai 74 85 -12 0
14 Hainan 104 102 2 0 14 Tibet 71 35 35 0.1 14 NeiMongol 394 417 -23 -0.1
15 Ningxia 49 54 -6 -0.1 15 Shandong 904 878 26 0.1 15 Yunnan 469 601 -132 -0.3
16 Qinghai 51 77 -25 -0.2 16 Qinghai 77 123 -46 -0.1 16 Shanxi 210 345 -135 -0.4
17 Yunnan 207 242 -35 -0.3 17 Hebei 770 872 -102 -0.3 17 Shandong 924 1123 -199 -0.5
18 Zhejiang 466 514 -49 -0.5 18 NeiMongol 325 441 -116 -0.4 18 Jilin 218 532 -315 -0.8
19 Shaanxi 163 265 -101 -1 19 Jilin 254 529 -275 -0.9 19 Gansu 118 494 -376 -1
20 Hubei 271 382 -111 -1 20 Shaanxi 423 719 -296 -0.9 20 Hebei 612 990 -378 -1
21 Gansu 140 251 -112 -1 21 Gansu 204 561 -357 -1.1 21 Shaanxi 255 827 -572 -1.5
22 Jilin 150 295 -145 -1.4 22 Heilongjiang 301 940 -639 -2 22 Heilongjiang 195 1020 -825 -2.2
23 Guizhou 152 402 -250 -2.3 23 Chongqing 448 1103 -655 -2 23 Chongqing 427 1437 -1010 -2.7
24 Jiangxi 125 514 -389 -3.6 24 Guizhou 261 1232 -970 -3 24 Guizhou 531 1766 -1235 -3.2
25 Heilongjiang 224 614 -389 -3.7 25 Guangxi 287 1838 -1551 -4.8 25 Guangxi 397 2123 -1726 -4.5
26 Guangxi 120 554 -434 -4.1 26 Hubei 606 2210 -1604 -5 26 Jiangxi 499 2476 -1977 -5.2
27 Henan 270 740 -470 -4.4 27 Henan 470 2309 -1839 -5.7 27 Hubei 501 2715 -2214 -5.8
28 Hunan 215 704 -489 -4.6 28 Jiangxi 236 2681 -2445 -7.6 28 Hunan 501 3328 -2827 -7.4
29 Anhui 155 744 -589 -5.5 29 Anhui 313 2893 -2579 -8 29 Henan 280 3433 -3154 -8.3
30 Sichuan* 395 1457 -1062 -10 30 Hunan 363 3261 -2899 -9 30 Anhui 671 3836 -3165 -8.3
31 Sichuan 590 4396 -3806 -11.8 31 Sichuan 763 3941 -3178 -8.4
9189 9189 0 32282 32282 0 38042 38042 0
1. Before 2000, Chongqing is a city of Sichuan province. The data of Sichuan from 1990 to 1995 includes the information of Chongqing.
2. Source from NPSSO(1997), SC and NBS (2002,2007)
3. Net%=Net migration/National total of migration×100%.
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Table 1.2: Key variables
Variables:
Gender Male=1, indicator
Age Age, between 15 and 65
Marriage Marriage indicator
Minority Race indicator
Education Years of formal education not including training
Health Scale variable from 1 to 5
Network Indicator:=1 if have networks, =0 if without networks
Rent rent payment for apartment(per month)
Transportation transportation fee (per month)
Duration T T = min{T1,T2,T3}
T1 : time for job search and find a job
T2 : time for job search and then return to hometown
T3 : right censored
Cause D = 1: if immigrant finds a job
= 2: if immigrant returns to hometown
= 3: if right censored
Table 1.3 presents the summary of key variables. From Table 1.3, we can find
there are more male migrants than female migrants, especially in the group of mi-
grants without networks. The average age of migrants is 26 years old. Because
compulsory education in China takes nine years, most rural people migrate out
after finishing the nine year compulsory education. An interesting finding is that
the monthly wage is higher for those migrants without networks than those with
networks. At the same time, there are more single migrants without networks.
As we expected, migrants without networks take longer to search jobs. From the
labor market states, we can find migrants with networks are more likely to be em-
ployed. When I divide the full sample based on the different labor market states
(employment, unemployment, and return migration), there are several distinctive
findings: more female migrants are in a state of unemployment; the migrants who
have returned and are unemployed are older and less educated compared with the
migrants who are employed; the marriage rate is very high among the group of
returned and unemployed migrants.
The most interesting finding is that return migrants have the lowest rate of
networks (0.23) and unemployed migrants have the highest rate of networks (0.66).
It is possible that there exists selection across different labor market states based
on the networks. Hence, social networks would be an important factor to affect
individuals’ labor market transition. For example, networks could help migrants
to have a higher job arrival rate, which would impact migrants’ decision on return
migration. If we ignore the variable of networks, we may underestimate the likeli-
hood of employment for those migrants with networks. Similarly, we will get biased
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Table 1.3: Sample Summary
Network Labor Market Status
Full Sample Network=1 Network=0 Employed Return Unemployed
Male 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.28
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45)
Age 26.09 26.47 25.62 25.55 32.77 34.09
(10.35) (10.92) (9.60) (9.98) (11.68) (14.78)
Education 9.44 9.26 9.66 9.55 8.09 7.49
(3.02) (2.93) (3.11) (2.98) (3.13) (3.46)
Health 1.76 1.78 1.73 1.75 1.78 2.09
(0.71) (0.73) (0.69) (0.71) (0.68) (0.86)
Wages 1282.80 1233.09 1348.01 1282.80
(792.74) (683.69) (912.54) (792.74)
Marriage 0.32 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.61 0.66
(0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
Minority 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.15)
Disabled 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.20)
Duration 27.95 20.99 36.46 10.25 240.86 317.89
(74.43) (62.58) (86.01) (23.11) (90.37) (174.85)
Hours 53.55 56.56 49.88 57.62
(21.41) (20.11) (22.38) (16.06)
Rent 132.62 130.34 135.40 181.43 145.56 153.33
(165.35) (188.00) (132.52) (148.84) (55.77) (158.20)
Transportation 33.67 32.61 34.98 31.86 33.74 23.26
(36.42) (42.62) (26.93) (27.44) (7.81) (28.43)
Network 0.55 0.57 0.23 0.66
(0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (0.48)
Observation 3096 1703 1393 2874 175 47
1. Hours are working hours per week.
2. Health is a self-reported variable which is scaled from 1 to 5. 1 is the best and 5 is the worst.
3. Cause describes reasons to exit the current state: d=1 if immigrants find a job and d=2 if immigrants return to their hometown
4. Wage, rent, transportation are monthly. The unit of duration is day.
5. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Sample Summary for Male
Male Network Labor Market Status
1 0 Employed Return Unemployed
Age 26.10 26.37 25.78 25.57 34.47 26.23
(10.72) (11.34) (9.94) (10.35) (12.11) (16.21)
Education 9.64 9.57 9.72 9.73 8.19 9.38
(2.80) (2.68) (2.93) (2.74) (3.36) (2.66)
Health 1.71 1.73 1.69 1.71 1.80 2.08
(0.70) (0.72) (0.69) (0.70) (0.71) (0.86)
Wages 1397.10 1325.93 1485.32 1397.10
(957.28) (797.62) (1118.48) (957.28)
Marriage 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.64 0.31
(0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48)
Minority 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.00)
Disabled 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.28)
Duration 25.99 18.94 34.14 10.45 230.63 336.96
(68.64) (52.18) (83.05) (21.39) (86.11) (232.05)
Hours 57.72 59.15 56.37 57.72
(15.99) (16.21) (14.81) (15.99)
Rent 179.48 188.17 169.42 182.22 141.24 140.75
(145.71) (168.39) (113.22) (150.10) (26.07) (91.55)
Transportation 32.45 30.70 34.49 32.51 32.85 22.85
(27.53) (31.11) (22.55) (28.36) (7.08) (23.64)
Networks 0.54 0.55 0.24 0.77
(0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.44)
Observation 1634 877 757 1525 96 13
1. Hours are working hours per week.
2. Health is a self-report variable which is scaled from 1 to 5. 1 is the best and 5 is the worst.
3. Cause describes reasons to exit the current state: d=1 if immigrants find a job and d=2 if immigrants return to their hometown
4. Wage, rent, transportation are monthly. The unit of duration is day.
5. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
estimates for those without networks.
Usually, male migrants and female migrants have different performances in
the labor market. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 give the statistics summary based on gen-
der. Table 1.4 shows information of male migrants. We can find the age, education
level and marriage ratio are quite similar for unemployed male migrants as com-
pared to employed male migrants. Female unemployed migrants are the oldest,
have the lowest level of education and the highest marriage rate. The returned
migrants, both male and female, have lower education level and fewer networks.
Male migrants without networks have higher wages than those with networks, but
for females, there are not significant differences in wages between the group with
networks and the group without networks.
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Table 1.5: Sample Summary for Female
Female Network Labor Market Outcomes
1 0 Employed Return Unemployed
Age 26.08 26.57 25.43 25.53 30.70 37.09
(9.94) (10.46) (9.18) (9.55) (10.86) (13.24)
Education 9.21 8.93 9.58 9.35 7.97 6.76
(3.23) (3.15) (3.31) (3.21) (2.84) (3.48)
Health 1.81 1.83 1.77 1.80 1.76 2.09
(0.72) (0.74) (0.70) (0.72) (0.64) (0.87)
Wage 1153.57 1133.53 1181.63 1153.57
(521.40) (517.55) (525.93) (521.40)
Marriage 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.35 0.58 0.79
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.41)
Minority 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.00) (0.17)
Disabled 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.17)
Duration 30.15 23.17 39.22 10.01 253.29 310.60
(80.38) (71.96) (89.40) (24.91) (94.35) (151.12)
Hours 57.50 59.25 55.54 57.50
(16.15) (16.47) (14.83) (16.15)
Rent 178.42 183.57 171.73 180.55 150.80 158.14
(145.45) (164.44) (116.05) (147.45) (77.84) (178.19)
Transportation 31.14 28.72 34.29 31.12 34.82 23.42
(25.84) (26.46) (24.68) (26.35) (8.53) (30.39)
Networks 0.56 0.58 0.23 0.62
(0.50) (0.49) (0.42) (0.49)
Observation 1349 826 636 1349 79 34
1. Hours are working hours per week.
2. Health is a self-reported variable which is scaled from 1 to 5. 1 is the best and 5 is the worst.
3. Cause describes reasons to exit the current state: d=1 if immigrants find a job and d=2 if immigrants return to their hometown
4. Wage, rent, transportation are monthly. The unit of duration is day.
5. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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1.5 Estimation Results
In this section, we give the estimation results of structural model and reduced form
competing risk model. The competing risk model is the standard Mixed Proportion
Hazard method. Since in the structural model, I assume the random variables:
wage and the value of return migration are independent, I choose to estimate the
reduced form competing risk model with independent unobserved variables. It will
help us to compare the results.
1.5.1 Reduced Form
Table 1.6 shows the reduced form results which are based on the MPH competing
risk model with Weibull distributions. The factor of age decreases the likelihood of
accepting jobs but it does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of return-
ing. Male are more likely to return migration. However, male migrants does not
get employed faster than female migrants. This finding coincides with the struc-
tural results, which show female migrants have higher job arrival rates. Marriage
decreases both of the likelihoods: married migrants are harder to find a job and
also are not likely to return. As we expected, higher level of education helps mi-
grants to increase the probability of finding jobs. If focusing on the returning,
education does not have a significant effect on the decision of returning. Another
interesting finding is relative to networks, the reduced form results show networks
can significantly improve the probability of the transition from unemployment into
employment. Also Networks can tie migrants to urban cities for a longer spell.
Table 1.6: MPH Competing Risk Model
Employed Returned
Coefficient t value Coefficient t value
Age -0.056 -3.941 0.045 0.891
Age2 0.001 3.012 -0.001 -0.813
Male 0.006 0.351 0.505 3.454
Marriage -0.154 -2.435 -0.089 -0.297
Minority 0.227 1.638 -0.109 -0.108
Education 0.020 2.856 -0.009 -0.240
Disabled 0.042 0.396 -2.089 -3.740
Networks 0.348 9.197 -0.753 -4.199
Constant -0.700 -3.195 -15.949 -16.222
α 0.523 71.986 2.643 19.047
Num of Observation 3096
loglike -11537.689
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1.5.2 Structural Model
The structural estimation results in this paper are calculated based on the dis-
crete distribution of values of return migration. We assume the discrete distribu-
tion with zero mean and evaluate the discrete distribution at three different points
(η1, η2, η3) with probability (p1, p2,and, p3). Heckman and Singer (1984) show this
method will not hurt the consistency results even when we do not know the distri-
bution shape of values of return migration.
Estimation procedure:
Estimation of the model is done by maximum likelihood using a combination of
the Nelder-Meade simplex method and the BFGS algorithm to maximize the like-
lihood.
Table 1.7 presents the estimation results of structural model. Focusing on the
effect of gender, we can find that female migrants receive more job offers than male
migrants. When we calculate the partial effect in term of job arrival rates, male
migrants have less than 0.0846% probability getting offers in one unit time (day).
Although the effect is not big, it is still significant and if we consider in longer du-
rations, it would have a larger effect on male migrants’ job search. Both education
and maturity in age could help migrants to receive more job offers but the effects
are not significant. From the coefficient of disabled dummy variable, we can see
that it is difficult for disabled migrants to receive job offers. They have close to
1% probability of getting a job offer. Looking at results for networks, we find that
networks increase the probability of having more job offers by 0.55% points. The
result shows networks seems to be a useful channel through which migrants can
receive more offers.
Table 1.7 also presents the estimation results for the mean of wage distribution.
Male migrants have higher wages on average. Age is a key variable in the wage
distribution. Older migrants get offered higher wages on average. Higher levels of
education also help migrants to achieve higher wages. Both results are consistent
with standard human capital theory. Minority migrants do not have significant
differences from majority migrants in term of wages on average. We also find the
sign of minority migrants in job arrival rates are positive, although the number is
not significant. The reason could be the migrants’ jobs are homogeneous and there
is no strong selection in terms of ethnicity. As with job arrival rates, we can see
that disabled migrants also have lower wages on average. An interesting finding
about networks is that migrants with networks have higher wages. This result is
different from the unconditional results in Table 1.3. The structural model tells
us the networks still have positive effects on wages. The results may be reflect
the selection, i.e., the individuals who migrate and the individuals who have social
networks. The next chapter deals with these selection problems by allowing for
individuals invest in their social networks and by modelling individuals’ migration
decisions.
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Table 1.7: Structural Estimation Result
Job Arrival Rate Wage Distribution
Male -0.274 Male 0.010
(0.139) (0.006)
Age 0.038 Age 0.015
(0.022) (0.003)
Health 0.002 Age2 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Education 0.862 Education 0.001
(0.522) (0.000)
Minority 0.276 Minority -0.040
(0.686) (0.033)
Disabled -2.841 Disabled -0.078
(0.849) (0.032)
Networks 1.772 Networks 0.014
(0.403) (0.005)
Constant 0.055 Married -0.043
(0.015) (0.016)
Constant -0.968
(0.068)
σ2w 1.107
(0.032)
Return Distribution Search Cost
α1 -2.847 Transportation 0.023
(1.036) (0.011)
α2 0.586 Rent -0.031
(0.050) (0.009)
p1 0.009 dt 0.166
(0.009) (0.051)
p2 0.126 dr -0.264
(0.030) (0.097)
Constant 3.305
(0.140)
Num of Observation 3096
loglike -162822.483
1. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
2. Health is a self-reported variable which is scaled from 1 to 5. 1 is the best and 5 is the worst.
3. Cause describes reasons to exit the current state: d=1 if immigrants find a job and d=2 if immigrants return to their hometown
4. The unit of duration is day.
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1.5.3 Comparison
In this section, I compare the results of the reduced form model with the struc-
tural model. MPH competing risk model can not distinguish the effects from the
job arrival rates and from wage distribution. However, the job search model can
separately identify these effects. For example, the MPH model shows that male do
not have significant differences in terms of being employed in urban cities. How-
ever, the structural model shows that female migrants have higher job arrival rates
but have lower wages on average.
Since the reduced form does not have the support from the specific structural
model, I compare the unconditional density of each competing risk. From the data,
I can construct the actual density of migrants’ transition from unemployment to
employment or return migration. I also can calculate the unconditional densities
based on the parameters from the reduced form and structural model.
Table 1.8 presents a comparison between the reduced formmodel and structural
model. The numbers in column of Day show the fraction of migrants who work or
returned in a given duration. For example, the number of 0.728 in the column of
data means 72.8% of migrants find jobs when they stay at urban cities for 10 days.
Using the parameters of reduced form and structural models, we can calculate the
unconditional densities based on different models. The cumulative distribution
functions of the unconditional density are reported in Table 1.8. We can find the
structural model fixes the data for employment state quite well. For example, the
structural model shows 70.8% of migrants would find jobs when they spend at most
10 days in urban cities. Reduced form presents that 58.4% of migrants can find jobs
in 10 days. The actual data tell us there are 72.8% of migrants who find jobs in 10
days. The reduced form model predicts the unconditional cumulative density func-
tion which is systemically lower than the actual cumulative density of migrants
who exit to employment. But the performance of both models do not have a good
job to fit the moment of returned migration behaviours. Generally speaking, the
structural model has a better performance than the reduced form model.
1.6 Conclusion
The paper examines the job search process of rural migrants in China with the
consideration of the option of return migration. Also, I analyse how social network
affect migrants’ labor market outcomes: job arrival rates and wages. The struc-
tural model in this paper follows the idea of Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006):
I treat the transition from unemployment to return migration as a choice instead
of a stochastic occurrence (i.e., Van den Berg (1990)). The rural migrants have
the permanent option of returning when the value of continue search and expected
value of employment is lower than the value of returning. Since the value of re-
turning is a random variable, the reservation wages here are not constant values
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Table 1.8: Ratio of Durations that end in Employment and Return Migration
within a Given Duration
Work
Day Data Reduced-Form Structural
10 0.728 0.584 0.708
20 0.825 0.686 0.886
30 0.890 0.727 0.944
40 0.897 0.750 0.958
60 0.914 0.764 0.967
90 0.920 0.768 0.969
120 0.924 0.771 0.969
150 0.925 0.772 0.969
180 0.926 0.772 0.969
210 0.926 0.772 0.969
240 0.926 0.772 0.969
270 0.926 0.772 0.969
300 0.926 0.772 0.969
330 0.926 0.772 0.969
360 0.928 0.772 0.969
Return Migration
Day Data Reduced-Form Structural
30 0.000 0.000 0.000
60 0.000 0.000 0.000
90 0.006 0.000 0.000
120 0.009 0.001 0.000
150 0.015 0.001 0.000
180 0.020 0.001 0.000
210 0.022 0.001 0.000
240 0.029 0.001 0.000
270 0.031 0.002 0.000
300 0.045 0.002 0.000
330 0.052 0.002 0.000
360 0.056 0.002 0.000
1. The numbers in the column of data are actual ratios of people who end in the
state of employment or return migration.
2. The numbers in the column 2 is the ratios which are calculated by the param-
eters in reduced form model.
3. Numbers in column 3 are calculated based on the parameters in structural
model.
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even though the model is still in the framework of stationarity.
Since the reservation wage cannot help to characterize the process of the model,
I need to use the value of unemployment to characterize the transition rate and sur-
vival function. Hence, the theorem 1.3.1 shows that I can get the value of unem-
ployment even without the information of reservation wage. The unique solution
of Bellman equation makes it possible to estimate the whole structural model.
I use the new data source (RUMiC), which are national level data covering lo-
cations with more than 50% rural migrants in China. The data make it possible to
capture the main story of rural migrants’ job search process.
From the structural job search model, we can find female migrants can receive
more job offers but have lower wages on average. Age and education have posi-
tive effects on both job arrival rates and the mean of wage distribution. Disabled
migrants receive fewer job offers and also get lower wages on average. Minority
migrants do not have significant differences from majority.
I also analyze how networks affect job arrival rates and wage distributions. As
we expected, networks help rural migrants to receive more wage offers and also
migrants with networks have higher wages on average.
Adding the option of return migration could help to model the selection of mi-
grants who stay in cities. From the comparison of job search process between MPH
competing risk model and the search model, we also can find search model has a
better performance to fit the job search process in the data.
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Chapter 2
Internal Migration with Social
Networks in China
2.1 Introduction
A strong association between social networks and migration decisions has been
consistently documented in numerous empirical studies. In most economic models,
migration decisions are based on potential labor market outcomes. Social networks
are often viewed as an important non-market institution throughwhich individuals
reduce market frictions and affect labor market outcomes. However, there are con-
flicting findings about the quantitative effects of social networks on labor market
outcomes. For example, social networks may provide access to better jobs (Mun-
shi, 2003; Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund, 2003) or to less desirable ones (Borjas,
2000; Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005)). Although some researchers point out that
individuals with social networks in destination places are more likely to migrate
(eg., Munshi (2003)), there are not many papers which formally analyse how social
networks affect individuals’ migration behavior and their labor market outcomes.
In this paper, I construct a dynamic model with return and repeated migration,
unemployment, and social network investment decisions that affect the evolution
of social networks over time. The existing migration literature suggests two alter-
native mechanisms through which social networks may affect migration decisions
and migrants’ labor market outcomes. First, social networks may reduce migra-
tion costs (e.g., Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996); Munshi (2003)),
decreasing individuals’ migration reservation values causing individuals with net-
works to be more likely to migrate. Second, social networks provide information
about labor markets and then increase the probability of getting job offers in the
destinations (e.g., Montgomery (1991); Kono (2006); Goel and Lang (2012); Buchin-
sky, Gotlibovski, and Lifshitz (2012)). Under both of thesemechanisms, individuals
with social networks are more likely to migrate.
Although both of these mechanisms can explain why individuals with networks
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are more likely to migrate, they have different implications about migrants’ earn-
ings. Individuals with social networks have lower migration costs which cause to
have lower reservation earnings. This means that migrants with networks are
more likely to have lower earnings compared to similar individuals without net-
works. However, if social networks reduce search frictions, for example by increas-
ing the job arrival rate, then migrants with networks will have higher earnings
than similar individuals without networks. These different implications for mi-
grants’ earnings may be one reason for why some papers find positive earnings’
effects while others find the opposite. The goal of this paper is to quantify the dif-
ferent roles that social networks may play with regard to labor market outcomes.
One issue concerning social networks is that they are unlikely to arise indepen-
dently of individuals’ labor market prospects. That is, individuals make invest-
ment choices in their social networks by comparing the loss from the payment of
network investment to the benefit from increasing the probability of having a social
network. In the literature, the common approach has been to look for natural or
quasi-natural experiments as an attempt to deal with this problem.1 In contrast, in
this paper, I accounting for this possibility by formally modelling the social network
investment decisions made by individuals. Modelling social networks with network
investment decisions aids in our understanding of how individuals respond to mar-
ket frictions through their social networks. Considering social network investment
decisions also helps to evaluate potential government migration policies. The ef-
fects of government policies on market frictions and migration costs are likely to
result in differential responses by individuals in terms of their social investment
decisions and, ultimately, their migration outcomes. Failure to account for these
feedback effects may lead to inaccurate policy evaluation.
Understanding different channels throughwhich social networks operate is cru-
cial for accurately designing migration policies. For example, the Chinese govern-
ment aims to increase the urbanization rate to 60% by 2020, which means that an
additional 100 million rural people will need migrate to urban areas.2 Whether
social networks are substitutes or complements to government policies aimed to
increase migration may greatly affect their cost effectiveness.3
Besides accounting for the impact of social networks, the model I use in this
paper also contains a number of mechanisms through which individuals’ migra-
tion decisions are affected. First, I allow individuals to accumulate human capital
1 Goel and Lang (2012) use a different-in-different approach to analyse how social networks
affect labor outcomes, but they do not allow individuals to make their own decisions to invest in
social networks.
2The urbanization rate is 53% by the end of 2014.
3The situation in China is obviously more complex than what is assumed in the model. Policies
are implemented at both local and national government levels, and there exist some barriers to
migration that are not formally included in the model. Despite the shortcomings, the model is able
to showcase the importance of non-market institutions in developing countries (i.e., China).
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within a search framework. Individuals’ earnings reflect both their observed char-
acteristics (e.g., education) as well as their location-specific human capital accu-
mulation (i.e., urban and rural).
Second, individuals’ earnings are also affected by frictions in the urban labor
market. Individuals do not automatically have a job if they migrate. Instead, they
need to search for one. Depending on the outcome of the search process, individuals
may choose to stay in urban areas or return to rural areas. This setting incorpo-
rates one of the main features of rural-urban migration in China: most people do
not migrate permanently.4
To study the role of social networks, this paper examines one of the largest
migration episodes of the 20th century: rural to urban migration in China. The
current internal rural-urban migration in China provides an ideal setting to ex-
amine the role of social networks in a labor market with frictions. Hare and Zhao
(2000), Meng (2000) and Zhao (2003) show social networks are strongly correlated
with rural-urban migration in China. Zhang and Zhao (2011) find social networks
also affect migrants’ subsequent labor market outcomes. However, these papers do
not distinguish the social network effects through the two different channels dis-
cussed above.
The panel data I use for this study come from the Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP, 2007-2009). It is well suited to examine the effects of social net-
works on migration decisions and labor market transitions in China. First, the
data cover most provinces of rural-urban migration in China. Second, the data
contain enough information on social networks and labor market outcomes across
different locations to identify the effect of social networks through migration costs
and the job arrival rate. Finally, the data contain information on individuals’ social
network investment.
I estimate the model using the CHIP data. The estimation results show that so-
cial networks both significantly reduce migration costs and increase the job arrival
rate. Individuals with networks have almost twice the job arrival rate compared
to those without. Social networks reduce migration costs by 10% on average. To
analyse the importance of these two channels, I simulate the model and show that
migration decisions are affected more by the impact of social networks on reducing
search frictions than by their impact on reducing migration costs. If I shut down
the effects of social networks on both channels, only 14% of rural people migrate.
Allowing social networks to only affect migration costs leads to 16% of rural people
migrating. If social networks only increase the job arrival rate, 26% of rural people
will migrate, compared to 29% in the data.
The simulation results also illustrate how individuals respond to the impact
4More than 45% rural migrants had the experience of return and repeat migration.
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of social networks through network investment. When social networks affect both
channels, 58% of individuals invest in their social networks. If social networks
only lower migration costs, the fraction of individuals who invest decreases to 7%.
When social networks only affect the job arrival rate, 53% of individuals invest in
their social networks. The results also show that most individuals who invest in
their social networks are the ones living in rural areas and the ones unemployed
in urban areas.
I simulate three different policies to achieve the stated Chinese government’s
goal of a 60% urbanization rate: an unconditional lump sum subsidy for rural in-
dividuals who migrate, the provision of unemployment benefits for rural migrants
in urban areas, and a migration cost subsidy for rural people, but only for those
who have social networks in urban areas. The simulation results show that the
policy of conditional lump-sum transfers for migrants will cost less than the other
two policies. I also compare the effects of the policies to those obtained in a model
estimated under the restriction that individuals do not invest in their social net-
works. I find that the government has to spend substantially more if individuals
can invest in their social networks, as they will have an incentive to reduce their
investment, partially counteracting the effects of the policies. That is, the govern-
ment crowds out social network investment and as a consequence it will have to
spend more, compared to the case of no investment responses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
relevant literature. Section 3 presents background on rural-urban migration in
China, describes the data in detail, and provides a preliminary empirical exami-
nation of the key mechanisms in the model. In Section 4, the model is described,
identification conditions are provided, and I also describe the estimation procedure
including challenges and solutions. Estimation results and counter-factual simu-
lations are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The existing migration literature has two main findings about the role of social
networks. The first one is that individuals with social networks are more likely to
migrate (i.e., Munshi (2003)). Hare and Zhao (2000), Meng (2000) and Zhao (2003)
find social networks are also positively correlated with rural-urban migration in
China. The second finding is that social networks affect migrants’ labor market
outcomes. For example, social networks may provide access to better jobs (Mun-
shi (2003); Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003)) or to less desirable ones (Borjas
(2000); Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005)). Zhang and Zhao (2011) examined the
correlation between social-family networks and rural migrants’ self-employment
in China. They find social-family networks increase migrants’ employment proba-
bility in urban areas.
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Some of the literature on migration studies both out-migration and return mi-
gration, also known as circular migration. This literature is relevant to China,
because most rural individuals engage in temporary migration. For example, my
sample from the Chinese Household Income Project data (2007-2009) shows that
more than 40% of rural individuals who have ever migrated to urban areas and
have experienced return or repeated circular migration behaviours. Most empiri-
cal studies of rural-urban migration in China assume individuals have permanent
migration. When analysing rural-urban migration in China, the prominence of
circularity in behaviour of rural migrants makes this assumption undesirable.
Colussi (2006) also studies the role of social networks on migration behaviour in
developing countries. He develops and estimates an equilibrium model to examine
the impact of migrants’ social networks on illegal Mexican immigration allowing
for repeated circular migration. In his model, he assumes migrants’ networks can
increase the probability to find a job in U.S. In his model, however, social networks
cannot affect migration costs. Individuals cannot invest in their social networks in
his model, since the definition of social networks is the number of Mexicans from
their home village.
Unlike Colussi (2006), Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) con-
sider the role of social networks on migration behaviour through the channel of
migration costs. They build a dynamic model to analyse the phenomena that more
black people migrated from the South to the North during the U.S. Great Migra-
tion period even though they faced a smaller wage gap. They claim that although
the wage gap was larger before the 1930s, black people did not have social net-
works in the Northern part of the U.S. and migration costs were large. They show
that social networks can influence individuals’ migration decisions, since they may
have lower migration costs if they have social networks in the destination place.
However, they do not quantitatively examine how social networks affect migration
costs, and assume that each individual has the same social network. They do not
distinguish search frictions from migration costs in their model either.
Besides the friction of existing migration costs, search frictions in the destina-
tion labor markets will also affect individuals’ migration decisions. Gemici (2011)
compares migration behaviours between married couples and singles in a dynamic
model of household migration with bargaining between family members. In her
model, there exists uncertainty in the labor market and individuals’ migration de-
cisions are influenced by search frictions. She finds that migration of married cou-
ples occurs much more in response to the earnings of men than to the earnings
of women, as women have lower wage offers, and a lower arrival rate of offers.
Buchinsky, Gotlibovski, and Lifshitz (2012) examine the effect of a few alternative
national migration policies on the regional location choices and labor market out-
comes of migrant workers. In their paper, they estimate a dynamic discrete choice
model that incorporates stochastic job offers and job terminations. However, these
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studies do not consider how social networks affect search frictions.
My study is also related to several papers which have analysed why social net-
works are correlated with labor market outcomes. Munshi (2003) follows Carring-
ton, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996)’s idea to examine how social networks af-
fect Mexicanmigrants to the U.S.. Since the size of social networks is endogenously
determined, he uses last period rainfall as the instrument and finds that individu-
als are more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying non-agricultural job
when the size of network is exogenously larger. However, this study assumes that
the probability of being employed in the destination is independent of the individ-
uals’ duration in the destination. This rules out the situation where individuals
can invest in their networks and reduce search frictions.
In the theoretical literature, Kono (2006) shows that workers with social net-
works have fewer information deficiencies because they can use referral channels
to find a job. Therefore, individuals with social networks will have higher wages
than those without. Goel and Lang (2012) examine how social networks affect im-
migrants’ labor market outcomes. In their model, the mechanism is that social
networks can increase the probability to get a job offer. To avoid the endogenous
problem of social networks, they employ the difference-in-difference approach.
Despite numerous empirical studies, it is not clear whether social networks have
a positive effect on individuals’ earnings. For example, social networks may pro-
vide access to better jobs (Munshi (2003); Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003))
or to less desirable ones (Borjas (2000); Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005)). The rea-
son to an ambiguous effect on earnings is that social networks affect individuals’
earnings through different channels: migration costs and search frictions. The net
effect of social networks may vary in different economic environment.
2.3 Background, Data and Key Sample Statistics
2.3.1 Background of Rural-Urban Migration in China
Since 1958, the Chinese central government has restricted the mobility of the pop-
ulation. From 1958 to 1983, the rural people who had job offers in urban areas
or recruitment letters from universities could migrate from rural to urban areas.
Between 1984 and 1988, the central government did not restrict rural-urban mi-
gration. At that time, there is no market for exchanging food. People need to use
food stamps to get food. However, if rural individuals migrated, they had to provide
food stamps for themselves.5 It was still hard for rural individuals to migrate since
it was not easy to have enough food stamps to support themselves. This migration
5At that time, Chinawas a planned economy. The amount of food for each individual was planned
by the government. People needed to use food stamps to exchange food.
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policy was suspended between 1989 and 1991. After 1992, the government began
to encourage rural-urban migration and since 2000, the government started to re-
form the household registration system to encourage more rural individuals to mi-
grate.6 For example, in 2007, 12 provinces in China had cancelled the rural house-
hold registration, whichmeans that rural individuals can have the same household
registration as urban households in these provinces.7 In these provinces, the lo-
cal government does not distinguish between rural and urban residents any longer.
The easing of government restrictions on migration appears to have had a sig-
nificant effect on people’s migration decisions. Table 2.1 gives the inter-provincial
migration in China from 1990 to 2005. There were 9.2 million people whomigrated
inter province between 1990 and 1995 and this number increased to 32 million be-
tween 1995 and 2000 and to 38 million between 2000 and 2005. Figure 2.1 gives
the approximate number of rural migrants since 20008. The number of rural mi-
grants increases from 78 million to 145 million within 10 years.9
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Figure 2.1: The Number of Stock Rural Migrants in China
6Ahousehold registration record officially identifies a person as a resident of an area and includes
identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth.
7These 12 provinces are Chongqing, Fujian, Guangxi, Hebei, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang.
8China Yearbook Rural Household Survey
9All numbers referred to the measure of the migrants’ number is stock value in this paragraph.
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Table 2.1: Interprovincial Migration in China, 1990-2005(In Thousands)
1990-1995 migration 1995-2000 migration 2000-2005 migration
In Out Net Net(%) In Out Net Net(%) In Out Net Net(%)
1 Guangdong 1947 221 1726 16.2 1 Guangdong 11501 438 11063 34.3 1 Guangdong 11996 1715 10281 27
2 Shanghai 726 122 604 5.7 2 Shanghai 2168 163 2005 6.2 2 Zhejiang 5062 1041 4021 10.6
3 Beijing 694 117 577 5.4 3 Zhejiang 2715 970 1745 5.4 3 Shanghai 3025 375 2650 7
4 Jiangsu 969 450 519 4.9 4 Beijing 1890 174 1715 5.3 4 Jiangsu 3290 1328 1963 5.2
5 Xinjiang 566 150 416 3.9 5 Xinjiang 1142 217 925 2.9 5 Beijing 2246 330 1916 5
6 Liaoning 435 197 239 2.2 6 Fujian 1346 625 722 2.2 6 Fujian 1934 802 1132 3
7 Tianjin 223 62 161 1.5 7 Jiangsu 1908 1241 667 2.1 7 Tianjin 908 107 802 2.1
8 Shandong 527 382 145 1.4 8 Tianjin 492 104 388 1.2 8 Xinjiang 577 182 395 1
9 Fujian 344 220 125 1.2 9 Liaoning 755 380 375 1.2 9 Liaoning 674 416 257 0.7
10 Hebei 503 417 87 0.8 10 Yunnan 733 398 335 1 10 Hainan 191 158 33 0.1
11 NeiMongol 275 249 27 0.3 11 Hainan 218 130 88 0.3 11 Ningxia 74 68 7 0
12 Shanxi 158 140 18 0.2 12 Shanxi 383 334 49 0.2 12 Tibet 26 31 -6 0
13 Tibet 38 28 10 0.1 13 Ningxia 129 87 41 0.1 13 Qinghai 74 85 -12 0
14 Hainan 104 102 2 0 14 Tibet 71 35 35 0.1 14 NeiMongol 394 417 -23 -0.1
15 Ningxia 49 54 -6 -0.1 15 Shandong 904 878 26 0.1 15 Yunnan 469 601 -132 -0.3
16 Qinghai 51 77 -25 -0.2 16 Qinghai 77 123 -46 -0.1 16 Shanxi 210 345 -135 -0.4
17 Yunnan 207 242 -35 -0.3 17 Hebei 770 872 -102 -0.3 17 Shandong 924 1123 -199 -0.5
18 Zhejiang 466 514 -49 -0.5 18 NeiMongol 325 441 -116 -0.4 18 Jilin 218 532 -315 -0.8
19 Shaanxi 163 265 -101 -1 19 Jilin 254 529 -275 -0.9 19 Gansu 118 494 -376 -1
20 Hubei 271 382 -111 -1 20 Shaanxi 423 719 -296 -0.9 20 Hebei 612 990 -378 -1
21 Gansu 140 251 -112 -1 21 Gansu 204 561 -357 -1.1 21 Shaanxi 255 827 -572 -1.5
22 Jilin 150 295 -145 -1.4 22 Heilongjiang 301 940 -639 -2 22 Heilongjiang 195 1020 -825 -2.2
23 Guizhou 152 402 -250 -2.3 23 Chongqing 448 1103 -655 -2 23 Chongqing 427 1437 -1010 -2.7
24 Jiangxi 125 514 -389 -3.6 24 Guizhou 261 1232 -970 -3 24 Guizhou 531 1766 -1235 -3.2
25 Heilongjiang 224 614 -389 -3.7 25 Guangxi 287 1838 -1551 -4.8 25 Guangxi 397 2123 -1726 -4.5
26 Guangxi 120 554 -434 -4.1 26 Hubei 606 2210 -1604 -5 26 Jiangxi 499 2476 -1977 -5.2
27 Henan 270 740 -470 -4.4 27 Henan 470 2309 -1839 -5.7 27 Hubei 501 2715 -2214 -5.8
28 Hunan 215 704 -489 -4.6 28 Jiangxi 236 2681 -2445 -7.6 28 Hunan 501 3328 -2827 -7.4
29 Anhui 155 744 -589 -5.5 29 Anhui 313 2893 -2579 -8 29 Henan 280 3433 -3154 -8.3
30 Sichuan* 395 1457 -1062 -10 30 Hunan 363 3261 -2899 -9 30 Anhui 671 3836 -3165 -8.3
31 Sichuan 590 4396 -3806 -11.8 31 Sichuan 763 3941 -3178 -8.4
9189 9189.00 0 32282 32282 0 38042 38042 0
1. Before 2000, Chongqing was part of Sichuan province. The data for Sichuan from 1990 to 1995 includes Chongqing.
2. Source from NPSSO(1997), SC and NBS (2002,2007)
3. Net%=Net migration/Total national migration×100%.
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After 2000, the central and local governments in China also proposed some poli-
cies to improve working and living conditions of rural migrants. For example, in
early 2000, several provinces and cities such as Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai and
Xiamen started to set up social security schemes to cover rural labour migrants. A
document issued by the State Council in May 2001 stated that local governments
should provide nine years of compulsory education to migrant children through
the public school system. Until the end of 2006, only a few local governments have
actually implemented this policy (Liang (2006)). Although the central and local
governments in China tried to change the rural household system and the associ-
ated discrimination, Chan (2012) states that the effects of those policies have not
been large.
The government’s migration policy may affect individuals’ location choices. In
the CHIP data, individuals in different cohorts show different migration patterns.
Figure 2.2 shows that the fraction of individuals who migrate to urban areas from
2007 to 2009 is linearly increasing across different cohorts. Figure 2.3 examines
the average ages at first migration across different cohorts. It shows a clear pattern
that average age at first migration is decreasing linearly with cohorts. 10
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Figure 2.2: Migration Fraction by Cohort
10Both Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that individuals in different cohorts have different migration
patterns. In the structural model, I introduce the cohort effects in the migration cost function to
incorporate the government policies’ differential effects across cohorts experience.
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Figure 2.3: Average Age at the First Time of Migration in Different Cohorts
Next, since the government policies are changing over time, I examine whether a
year effect is also an important factor. The survival analysis is used to see whether
both cohort and the year effects are correlated with average age of individuals’ first
time migration. Table 2.2 gives the estimates assuming a loglogistic distribution.
The coefficient for education shows that individuals with higher level of education
will migrate earlier. The year dummies are the time when the central government
made a large migration policy change. The year dummies (1984-1991) incorpo-
rate the policies for allowing migration but still with the need of food stamps, and
the year dummies (1992-2000) incorporate the period of the transition between
planned economy to market economy. These two year dummies are not significant
at the 5% level. The year dummy (2001-2009) tries to capture the net effect of the
policies made after 2000. The year dummy (2001-2009) is significant. Compared
with cohort effects, year effects do not have a strong impact on individuals’ migra-
tion choices.
2.3.2 Data
This study uses the first three waves (2007-2009) of the China Household Income
Project (CHIP) panel survey.11 This database is planned to be a five-year panel
survey in China with the goal of studying issues such as the effect of rural-urban
migration on income mobility and poverty alleviation, the state of education, and
the health of children in migrating families.
11CHIP data (2007-2009) are part of the data of Rural Urban Migration in China.
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Table 2.2: Survival Analysis of the Age of First Time Migration
Coefficient Standard Error
Education -0.0016 0.0058
Cohort
(1960-1969) -0.5852 0.0364
(1970-1979) -1.4855 0.0387
(1980-1991) -2.4451 0.0350
Year
(1984-1991) 0.1335 0.7340
(1992-2000) 0.1299 0.0842
(2001-2009) -0.1654 0.0348
Constant 4.1304 0.0544
γ 0.5718 0.0077
1. The coefficient column is the estimation results of survival re-
gression with loglogistics distribution.
2. The third column gives standard errors of estimates.
3. The omitted cohort dummy is the cohort (1949-1959).
4. The omitted cohort year dummy is the period before 1984 which
is the period that rural-urban migration are prohibited.
Three representative samples of households were surveyed, including a sample
of 8000 rural households, a sample of 8,000 ruralmigrant households, and a sample
of 5,000 urban households in 9 provinces. The 9 provinces in the survey cover most
provinces of the migration origin and destination in China. Figure 2.5 gives a map
of the 9 provinces, which gives the netmigration flow between 2000 and 2005. Table
2.1 shows that from 2000 to 2005, more than 68% of migrants moved into those 9
provinces while 52% of migrants moved out of those 9 provinces (NBS 2002, 2007).
Figure 2.4: Sample cities in China
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Figure 2.5: Migration flows in China from 2000 to 2005
In the analysis I use the CHIP rural household survey sample. Individuals in the
rural sample are all born in rural areas and have rural household registration.
Using the rural sample data, I can build the full history of the work experience for
three years no matter where the individuals are located. The rural sample data
include all individuals who have rural household registration. Individuals or their
family members provide the information about the members in the household. For
example, they provide the time when they leave their home, when they return and
whether the destination is an urban county. Then, I can construct the monthly
location history for each individual in the rural sample. The definition of migra-
tion is whether the urban residence location is out of his rural hukou (household
registration) county.12
I analyse males in the rural sample for this study. I focus on males to avoid
further expanding the model to take into account joint labor supply and fertility
decisions. The samples contain information on work experience, job search dura-
tions, work locations, earnings, the presence of social network and social network
investment decisions. Using this data, I can construct the location choices, job
search durations, and work statuses for the individuals who are between 16 and
60 years old for the three year periods.
The total number of men for the 8000 households is 33,396 with 16,583 males.
After restricting age between 16 in 2007 and 60 in 2009, the sample size shrinks
to 11,385. In the data, there are 1030 observations missing the information on
12There are two main reasons why I do not use the migration sample. First, the response rate in
the migration data is quite low. The attrition rate is above 70% for the three years of panel data.
Second, I cannot follow the history of migrants’ work experience using the migration samples. For
example, migrants who return to their home towns are not surveyed in the migration sample.
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fertility decisions or marital status. 1099 observations are missing their work ex-
perience information during 2007 to 2009. The sample used for estimation includes
9,256 males in 6400 households. The panel is balanced except for social network
investment choices. Only the first two years’ data contain the information about
social network investment.
Social networks are defined as the presence of friends or relatives who are living
in urban areas and are in contact with households.13 Social network investment
is whether they send monetary gifts to their friends or relatives. In the survey,
people answer whether to give gifts to your friends or relatives and also report the
monetary values of gifts. In the data, the gifts can be given to the friends or rela-
tives who are living in rural areas. At the same time, individuals may build social
networks through other channels (i.e., call each other, take care of friends’ children
or older family members). These two possibilities introduce measurement error
in the social network investment. The estimation section provides details showing
how I deal with this measurement error problem.
Table 2.3 displays selected descriptive statistics of the sample used in estima-
tion. The variable of social networks is the presence of friends or relatives who
living in urban area. More than 30% of individuals who live in households do not
have social networks in urban areas. More than 60% of individuals invested in
their social networks in 2007 and around 77% invested in 2008.
I restrict the sample to men who finished their formal education. The average
years of education is 8.3 years. Since 1989, the central government has imple-
mented the policy of 9 years’ mandatory education in China, which is equivalent
to completing middle school (or finish primary school). About 18% of individuals
have less than 6 years education. Most people (i.e., 63%) complete middle school.
Only 4% of individuals have post-secondary education.
I use the method proposed by Brandt and Holz (2006) to adjust earnings by lo-
cation price index and the CPI price index. The base year is 2000. The average
monthly earnings are around 1200 yuan and the average earnings in rural areas
are less than 200 yuan.14 The earnings in urban areas are six times the earnings
in rural areas.
The definition of migration is whether the urban residence location is out of
his rural hukou (household registration) county. Table 2.4 displays the descrip-
tive statistics between migrants and non-migrants. First, migrants have higher
education levels in general than non-migrants. The education levels are higher
for individuals with networks than those without networks among both migrant
13In the CHIP data, social networks are measured at the household level. Individuals in the same
household share the same social network.
14Yuan is the unit of Chinese currency. The exchange rate between Yuan and U.S. dollar was 8.28
in 2000.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample
Sample observations
Fraction with networks 72.24% 9256
Network invest in 2007 61.26% 8026
(0.49)
Network invest in 2008 77.76% 7564
(0.42)
Education year 8.28 9256
(2.14)
Education level 9256
primary or less 18.34%
middle school 63.49%
high school 14.55%
college or above 3.62%
Urban earnings 1220.23
(1168.82)
Rural earnings 153.09
(477.38)
1. Earnings have been adjusted by location price index and cpi price index.
2. Earnings are in Chinese currency yuan which is closed to 1/8 of 1 U.S.
Dollar in 2000.
3. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
and non-migrant groups. Second, migrants are much younger than non-migrants.
The average age of migrants is 31. The average age of non-migrants is 42. The
individuals with social networks are older than those without networks. Third,
60% of migrants get married whereas the fraction for non-migrants is 85%. Non-
married individuals are more likely to migrate. Fourth, migrants with social net-
works have higher earnings than those without social networks. At the same time,
migrants with networks have a smaller variance of the earnings. Non-migrants’
earnings do not have significant differences between those with and without social
networks. The average job search duration is 2 months. Migrants with networks
have a slightly shorter job search duration than those without.
2.3.3 Preliminary Examination
Before introducing the structural model, I examine several correlations which are
related to the key mechanisms proposed in this paper.15 First, I document that
there exists a strong correlation between social networkswith bothmigration choices
and subsequent labor outcomes.
15The analysis in this section uses the same data as the structural estimation in the next section.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Migrants and Non-migrants
Total Migrants Non-migrants
Education 8.28 8.63 8.01
(2.14) (1.92) (2.25)
With Networks 8.37 8.73 8.14
(2.12) (1.93) (2.22)
Without Networks 8.03 8.38 7.73
(2.16) (1.89) (2.27)
Age 38.86 31.00 42.06
(11.93) (9.16) (11.44)
With Networks 39.01 31.01 42.48
(11.96) (9.12) (11.37)
Without Networks 38.40 30.97 40.90
(11.84) (9.28) (11.55)
Marriage 0.78 0.61 0.85
(0.41) (0.49) (0.35)
With Networks 0.79 0.61 0.86
(0.41) (0.49) (0.35)
Without Networks 0.78 0.61 0.83
(0.42) (0.49) (0.37)
Urban Earnings 1220.23 1220.23
(1168.82) (1168.82)
With Networks 1240.04 1240.04
(1232.21) (1232.21)
Without Networks 1162.12 1162.12
(909.06) (909.06)
Rural Earnings 153.09 153.09
(477.38) (477.38)
With Networks 158.81 158.81
(480.50) (480.50)
Without Networks 139.91 139.91
(468.48) (468.48)
Job Search Duration 2.20 2.20
(3.45) (3.45)
With Networks 2.19 2.19
(4.26) (4.26)
Without Networks 2.20 2.20
(2.99) (2.99)
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
2. Earnings have been adjusted by location price index and cpi price index
3. Job search period unit is monthly
Table 2.5 shows the correlation between social networks and migration choices.
The second column gives the OLS regression results. After controlling for educa-
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Table 2.5: The Relationship between Social Networks and Migration Decisions
Dependent Variable: Living in Urban Areas
OLS Probit
Networks 0.0678 0.0420
(0.0059) (0.0060)
Education Year -0.0045 -0.0026
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Married 0.0261 0.0012
(0.0102) (0.0095)
Number of Children -0.0141 -0.0117
(0.0034) (0.0037)
Age -0.0209 0.0019
(0.0020) (0.0021)
Age2× 100 0.0037 -0.0242
(0.0024) (0.0026)
Constant 1.0771 0.3323
(0.0370) (0.0025)
1. The variable of social networks is the presence
of social networks.
2. Married is the indicator variable for marital
status.
3. The coefficients for the probit models (with
and without instruments) are average marginal
effects.
4. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
tion, marital status, the number of children and age, the coefficient of the presence
of social network is significantly positive. The estimates in the Probit column dis-
play the average marginal effects on the probability of living in urban areas. It
shows that the individuals with social networks are more likely to migrate. Re-
gardless of functional form assumption, the correlation between social networks
and migration choices is significantly positive. This finding is consistent with most
migration literature: social networks are strongly correlated with migration be-
haviour.
Next, I examine the correlation between social networks and social network in-
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Table 2.6: The Relationship between Social Networks and Network Investment
Dependent Variable: The Presence of Social Networks
OLS 2SLS Probit Probit with IV
Investt−1 0.0018 0.0151 0.0020 0.0358
(0.0005) (0.0040) (0.0005) (0.0134)
Education Year 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Networkst−1 0.9732 0.9725 0.1126 0.1841
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0303)
Married 0.0033 0.0029 0.0037 0.0049
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Number of Children -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0019
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Constant 0.0144 0.0061 0.7606 0.7580
(0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0016)
1. The variable of social network investment is whether the individual send gifts to their friends or
relatives at period t − 1.
2. Married is the indicator variable for marital status.
3. In the third and fifth columns, the instruments for the 2SLS regression are the distance between
rural county where the individual lives to Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which are top three
cities in China.
4. The coefficients for the probit models (with and without instruments) are average marginal effects.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
vestment. The second column of Table 2.6 presents the linear probability esti-
mates. The coefficient on network investment is significantly positive even after
controlling for education, last period networks, marital status and the number of
children.16
Table 2.7 displays the results of employment regressions. The dependent vari-
able is a dummy variable for being employed at the time of the survey. The results
indicate that employment probabilities are positively correlated with the presence
of social networks. Employment probabilities are also positively correlated with ed-
ucation. These findings are consistent with those in the literature on rural-urban
migration in China (eg., Zhang and Zhao (2011)).
16The correlation remains even after I try to account for the potential endogeneity of social net-
work investment, by using the distance between rural individuals’ home town andBeijing, Shanghai
and Guangzhou as instruments. The 2SLS column in Table 2.6 shows that this result is similar as
the regressions estimated using a probit model. These results presented in the table 2.6 are not
sensitive to the linear assumption.
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Table 2.7: The Effects of Social Networks on Employment
in Urban Areas
Dependent Variable: Employment
OLS Probit
Networks 0.0279 0.0262
(0.0021) (0.0020)
Education Year 0.0013 0.0014
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Married 0.0116 0.0137
(0.0028) (0.0029)
Number of Children -0.0095 -0.0099
(0.0015) (0.0092)
Age 0.0010 0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Age2×100 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.6916 0.9151
(0.0129) (0.0009)
1. The variable of social networks is the presence of social
networks.
2. Married is the indicator variable for marital status.
3. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
The regression results formigration behaviours and labormarket outcomes sug-
gest that social networks are an important determinant for migration choices and
labor market outcomes. In the next section, I present a model that allows to quan-
tify how important they are, identifying the mechanisms through which they op-
erate, and illustrating how individuals’ investment decisions shape the pattern of
social networks and migration.
2.4 Model
I model individuals’ migration decisions, labor market transitions and social net-
work investment in a finite-horizon framework. To account for uncertainty regard-
ing job offers, the migration decision problem is incorporated into a dynamic dis-
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crete time search framework. The decision period in this paper is taken to be one
month in length. In each period, men receive flow utility associated with their cur-
rent locations, incur moving costs if they decide to change their locations, and pay
a cost if they invest in their social networks.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of How Social Networks Affect Migrants’ Earnings
Individuals’ flow utility comes from their earnings, unemployment benefits, psy-
chic values of living in their home town, and a choice specific shock. The lifetime
utility is given by current utility flow and the discounted stream of expected future
utilities. Uncertainty comes from migration costs, search frictions in the urban
labor market, the transition of earnings, the evolution of social networks and id-
iosyncratic shock to utility.
Before presenting the model, I illustrate why it is important to consider the
impact of social networks through both migration costs and search frictions in a
simple static example. Figure 2.6(a) gives the expected urban earnings’ distribu-
tion for rural individuals. The solid black line is migration cost net rural earn-
ings. The individuals whose urban earnings are larger than the migration cost
would migrate. Figure 2.6(b) illustrates how the problem would look like when
some individuals have social networks and these only affect migration costs. In
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this case, the migrants with networks would have lower migration costs and have
lower reservation earnings. That is, since their migration costs are lower, they are
willing to migrate for lower earnings than those without networks. Therefore, we
would observe that migrants with social networks have lower earnings compared
to migrants without social networks.
Figures 2.6(c,d) illustrate how this problem would look like when social net-
works only affect the job arrival rate. Figure 2.6 shows that individuals with social
networks have a right-shifted expected earnings’ distribution. Since in this case so-
cial networks only affect the job arrival rate, individuals have the same migration
cost. Figure 2.6(d) shows that migrants with social networks have higher earnings
compared with ones without social networks. The reason is that higher job arrival
rates increase the reservation values of taking job offers.
These two mechanisms have opposite predictions about the correlation between
social networks and migrants’ earnings. These opposite predictions are also con-
sistent with empirical findings: Munshi (2003) and Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund
(2003) find individuals with social networks have better labor outcomes; Borjas
(2000) and Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005) support that migrants with networks
have less desirable ones.
2.4.1 Timing of the decisions
Individuals’ choices are made sequentially and also based on their current loca-
tions. Here, before describing the model, I specify the timing of individuals’ deci-
sions in the model is presented in Figure 2.7 and is as follows:
1. Individuals draw the marital and fertility shocks; marital and fertility tran-
sitions are exogenously formed annually.
2. At the beginning of period t, the shock for social networks is realised and
individuals observe their social networks for period t.
3. If individuals are unemployed in urban areas, job arrival (or immediate job
offer) shocks are realised; if individuals are employed in urban areas, separa-
tion shocks are realised.
4. (a) If individuals are in rural areas, both rural and urban earnings’ shocks,
migration cost shocks, and unemployment benefit shocks are drawn.
(b) If individuals are in urban areas, both rural and urban earnings’ shocks,
and unemployment benefit shocks are drawn.
5. Following all of these shocks, location, employment and network investment
choices are made jointly.
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lt is the location at the beginning of period t. κt−1 is employment status at period t − 1. W j(invit)
j ∈ {e, n, r} is the choice specific value given the network investment decision.
Figure 2.7: The Timing of the Model
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Timing based on location
In this paper, individuals make decisions based on their locations. Let W jit(invit) be
the value of state j ∈ {e, r, n} (e: employment in the urban area, r: rural, n: unem-
ployment in the urban area). Let invit be an indicator that takes value 1 if an indi-
vidual invest in his social network, and 0 otherwise. Denote V jit = max{W jit(1),W jit(0)}.
I will describe the decision process separately:
Urban
If the individual is in an urban area, which means he has already migrated, his
choices are based on the following conditions:
1. If he just arrived in an urban area, he may receive an immediate offer.
(a) If he receives a job offer (with probability λpit), he will choose between
two options, i.e. unemployment in the urban area, or accept the job offer
(max{Vnit ,Veit}). The social network investment choice is made at the same
time.
(b) If he does not get a job offer (with probability 1−λpit), he will be unemployed
in the urban area (Vnit). The social network investment choice is made at
the same time.17
2. If he has already stayed for one ormore periods in the urban area, he gets a job
offer with probability λit, which is affected by the presence of social networks
sni,t.
(a) If he gets a job offer, he will choose between three options: unemployment
in the urban area, accept the job offer, or returnmigration (max{Vnit ,Veit,Vrit−
RMit}). RMit represents return migration cost. The social network invest-
ment choice is made at the same time.
(b) If he does not get a job offer (with probability 1 − λit), he will select be-
tween two options: unemployment in the urban area or return migration
(max{Vnit ,Vrit − RMit}). The social network investment choice is made at the
same time.
3. If the individual works in an urban area, the exogenous job separation shock
may hit him.
(a) If he exogenously separates with the current job (with probability δi),
he will choose to search for a job in an urban area or to return migrate
(max{Vnit ,Vrit−RMit}). The social network investment choice is made jointly.
17In the data, there are above 30% of rural migrants whose job search duration is less than two
weeks. Since the model period is one month, I introduce the immediate offer to match the job search
duration in the data.
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(b) If he does not exogenously separate with the current job (with probability
1−δi), he will choose between three options: keeping this job, quitting this
job to unemployment in the urban area, or quitting this job and returning
home. The social network investment choice is made jointly.
Rural
If he is in a rural area, his earnings ωrit are drawn from the distribution G(ωr).
Hence, he knows the value of living in the urban area (Vrit) and the value of migra-
tion (λpit max{Veit,Vnit}+ (1−λpit)Vnit −Mit). Then the migration decision is made based on
equation 2.1:
Migit =
1 if λpit max{Veit,Vnit} + (1 − λpit)Vnit − Mit > Vrit0 else (2.1)
where λpit is the probability of getting an immediate offer. Social network investment
choice is made jointly.
2.4.2 Basic Structure
Earnings
Earnings are functions of education and work experience in rural and urban
areas and location specific idiosyncratic shocks. The earnings of individual i in
location j ∈ {u, r} (u:urban, r:rural) at time t are described as
ω
j
it = β
j
0 + β
j
1Si + β
j
2exprit + β
j
3expuit + β
j
4exprit
2 + β
j
5exp
u
it
2 + ε
j
it (2.2)
where Si is years of education. In this paper, individuals accumulate their hu-
man capital through learning by doing via location-specific work experience (i.e.,
rural expr, urban expu). Here work experience in rural and urban areas are de-
pendent on the history of endogenous decisions {dik}t−1k=1. The decisions include loca-
tion, employment, and network investment choices. Shock terms ε jit are assumed
i.i.d. across individuals, locations, and time, and they are normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2j , j ∈ {u, r} (u:urban, r:rural). Individuals know the
current period transient components (i.e., ε jit ), but they do not know values of fu-
ture transient components. However, they do know the distribution of these future
shocks and use them when taking expectations (i.e., rational expectations).
As specified in equation 2.2, social networks do not directly affect earnings.
However, social networks may affect earnings indirectly through their effect on
reservation earnings. On the one hand, individuals with social networks may have
a higher job arrival rate which will increase their reservation values for accepting
urban job offers. If so, individuals with social networks will have higher accepted
earnings. On the other hand, social networks may reduce migration costs. Hence,
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for the same expected earnings, individuals with social networks are more likely to
migrate because of lower migration costs. This implies that individuals with social
networks may have lower reservation values of taking urban job offers compared
with those without social networks. From the discussion above, the net relation-
ship between social networks and migrants’ earnings is not clear, since the effect
of social networks goes through different channels (i.e., lower migration costs and
higher job arrival rate).
Social Networks
In the model, individuals can invest in their social networks to strengthen con-
nections with their friends (e.g., they may give gifts to their friends or contact with
them by phone or mail). Social networks are formed according to the following dy-
namic probit model:
snit =
1 if βs0 + βs1invit−1 + βs2marit + βs3childit + βs4snit−1 + εsit > 00 else (2.3)
where snit is the indicator of social networks status at period t. It takes value 1 if
the individual has social networks and 0 otherwise. invit−1 is the individual’s social
network investment decision at period t − 1. invit−1 = 1 means that he invested in
his social networks at period t−1, otherwise invit−1 = 0. If the coefficient of βS1 is pos-
itive, he can increase the probability of having social networks by the investment
choice (e.g., giving gifts). marit is marital status at period t and childit is the number
of children at period t. The shock εsit is i.i.d. across individuals and time. Individ-
uals cannot observe future shock terms εsit but they know the distribution of shocks.
In this model, the investment decision is a discrete choice that depends on the
trade-off between the gain from increasing the probability of having social networks
and the cost of investing. The key mechanism of investing in social networks is that
it may increase the probability of having (or keeping) social networks, which may
reduce migration costs and increase the job arrival rate. Individuals do not know
their future shocks so their investment choices are based on their expectations of
future shocks.
Migration and Return Migration Costs
If individuals migrate from rural to urban areas, they have to pay migration
costs. One of the proposed channels through which social networks operate in the
model is that they may affect migration costs directly.18 Migration costs Mit depend
18 Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) build a dynamic macro model to examine the
role of social networks on migration decisions. They also assume social networks reduce migration
costs.
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on the current period’s presence of social networks, marital status, number of chil-
dren, birth cohort and migration cost shock. I assume asymmetric migration costs:
migration costs (Mit) may not be equal to return migration costs (RMit). Migration
and return migration costs in this paper are specified by the equations 2.4-2.5:
Mit = βm0 + βm1 snit + βm2marit + βm3 childit + βm4 cohorti + εmit (2.4)
RMit = βrm0 + βrm1 marit + βrm2 childit + βrm3 cohorti (2.5)
where snit is the indicator of the presence of social networks in urban areas at pe-
riod t.
I also allow different cohorts to have different migration costs. This is to accommo-
date the fact that rural individuals across different cohorts have different migra-
tion patterns. As Table 2.2 shows, younger cohorts more likely to migrate earlier
than older cohorts. the cohort term is an attempt to capture the net effect of the
change of migration polices over four decades in China.19
Job Arrival and Destruction Rates
In the period inwhich peoplemigrate to urban areas, they have to search for jobs
from the unemployment state. Social networks may help individuals reduce search
frictions in urban areas. The probability of getting an immediate offer λpit upon ar-
rival to the urban area, and the job arrival rate λit in urban areas are parametrised
as:
λ
p
it =
exp{βlp0 + βlp1 1snit + βlp2 Si}
1 + exp{βlp0 + βlp1 1snit + βlp2 Si}
(2.6)
λit =
exp{βl0 + βl11snit + βl2Si}
1 + exp{βl0 + βl11snit + βl2Si}
(2.7)
To model exogenous job separation, the job destruction rate is parametrised as:
δit =
exp{βδ0 + βδ1Si}
1 + exp{βδ0 + βδ1Si}
(2.8)
19 I model the cohort effect as linear. Figure 2.3 shows the average age of first migration across
different cohorts. There is a linear relationship between cohort and the average age of first migra-
tion.
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Marriage and Fertility Transition Process
I model annual marriage and fertility transitions with an exogenous process.
The marital transition process is modelled as a continuous duration model with
loglogistic distribution.20 The survival function is:
Suri(t) = (1 + (e−(β
ma
0 +β
ma
1 S i)t)1/γ)−1 (2.9)
Here, Suri(t) is the probability of being single at age t, S i is years of education,
and γ is the parameter of the loglogistic distribution. Then, the conditional proba-
bility of getting married at period t is given by:
Pr(marit = 1|marit−1 = 0) = Suri(t) − Suri(t + 1)Suri(t)
Fertility is determined by the following equation:
Fit =
1 if β f0 + β f1ageit + β f2age2it + β f3childit + β f4child2it + β f5Si + β f6marit + ε fit > 00 else
(2.10)
Equation (2.16) shows that fertility is correlated with age, the number of chil-
dren, marital status and education.
The Flow Value of Living in Rural Areas
The per-period utility in rural areas for individual i, at time t is given by
urit = ω
r
it − νinvit + φit (2.11)
where ωrit is rural earnings for individual i at time t, ν is the cost if he invests in
his social networks at time t and φit is the psychic value of living in the rural area,
which is given by
φit = β
φ
0 + β
φ
1ageit + β
φ
2age2it + β
φ
3marit + β
φ
4childit (2.12)
The reason I introduce a psychic value of living in rural areas is that, as docu-
mented in the migration literature (e.g., Kennan and Walker (2011)) people seem
to place an additional value to their home towns, especially older individuals.
The Flow Value of Living in Urban Areas
Unemployment State
The per-period utility of being unemployed in urban areas for individual i, at
time t is given by
20I assume there is no divorce for this marital transition. The annual divorce rate in rural areas
is lower than 0.1%.
52 Chapter 2. Internal Migration with Social Networks in China
unit = ξit − νinvit (2.13)
where ξit is the per-period utility of being unemployed in urban areas, and ν is the
cost of investing in social network investment. As shows in equation 2.14, the per-
period utility of being unemployed (ξit) is assumed to be a function of individuals’
age, marital status and number of children. This setting allows elder people may
have difficulties assimilating to a new environment so they may have different val-
uations of being unemployed in urban areas. Marital status and the number of
children reflect the net value for an individual of living with his family.
ξit = β
ξ
0 + β
ξ
1ageit + β
ξ
2age2it + β
ξ
3marit + β
ξ
4childit + ε
ξ
it (2.14)
The shock term εξit are assumed i.i.d. across individuals and time.
Employment State
The per-period utility of being employed in urban areas for individual i, at time
t is given by
ueit = ω
u
it − νinvit (2.15)
where ωuit is urban earnings for individual i at time t.
State Space
The vector of state variables for individual i at time t is denoted as Hit. State
variables for a given time t include age, years of education, marital status, number
of children, accumulated work experience in rural and urban areas, the presence
of social network, and social network investment at period t − 1. Control variables
include individuals’ decisions (i.e. migration, employment in urban areas, employ-
ment in rural areas, unemployment in urban areas, return migration, and social
network investment decisions).
I assume that the transition of state variables is Markovian, and denote its
transition probability by Pr(Hit+1|Hit,Dit).
The transition of social networks is given by a dynamic probit model. Work ex-
perience in rural and urban areas is determined by the action history Dit = {{dkit}Tt=1},
where {dkit}Tt=1. k ∈ {1, · · · , 5} (1: migrate, 2: employed in urban, 3: employed in rural,
4: unemployed in urban, and 5: return migrate)21.
21Social network investment choice is made jointly with these choices.
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2.4.3 Value Function
The choice specific Bellman equations for each of the three states are
Wnit(invit;Hit) = unit +
λit
1 + ρ
E(max{Vnit+1(Hit+1),Veit+1(Hit+1),Vrit+1(Hit+1)
−RMit+1}|Hit) + 1 − λit1 + ρ E(max{V
n
it+1(Hit+1),V
r
it+1(Hit+1)
−RMit+1}|Hit)
Weit(invit;Hit) = ueit +
δit
1 + ρ
E(max{Vnit+1(Hit+1),Vrit+1(Hit+1) − RMit+1}|Hit)
+
1 − δit
1 + ρ
E(max{Veit+1(Hit+1),Vrit+1(Hit+1) − RMit+1,Vnit+1(Hit+1)}|Hit)
Writ(invit;Hit) = urit +
1
1 + ρ
E(max{Vrit+1(Hit+1), λpit+1max{Vnit+1(Hit+1),Veit+1(Hit+1)}
+(1 − λpit+1)Vnit+1(Hit+1) − Mit+1(Hit+1)}|Hit)
Based on the choice specific Bellman equation, the value function is stated by the following
equation:
Vit =

λitmax{Vnit ,Veit,Vrit − RMit} + (1 − λit) max{Vnit ,Vrit − RMit} if unemployed in urban
(1 − δi) max{Vnit ,Veit,Vrit − RMit} + δtmax{Vnit ,Vrit − RMit} if employed in urban
max{Vrit, λpit max{Vnit ,Veit} + (1 − λpit)Vnit − Mit} if in rural
(2.16)
where W jit(invit;Hit) is the value of state j ∈ {e, r, n} given the social network in-
vestment decision (e: employment in urban areas, r: rural, n: unemployment in
urban areas). To simplify notations, I denote V jit = max{W jit(1),W jit(0)}, j ∈ {e, r, n}. u jit,
j ∈ {e, r, n} is the flow utility at different states. Mit is migration cost, RMit is return
migration cost. λpit is the probability of taking an immediate offer. λit is the job
arrival rate and δi is the job destruction rate.
2.4.4 Identification
The model is a partial equilibrium model. I assume that the offered earnings’ dis-
tributions are log normal. Based on the log normality assumption, the variance
term of the earnings’ distributions can be identified since I observe the accepted
earnings. The distribution of unemployment value shocks in urban cities is as-
sumed to be normal. The variance term of unemployment value shock σξ can be
identified from the probability of return migration given the variances of earnings’
distributions (i.e., σr, σu).
The job arrival rate λit can be identified by the unemployment durations in ur-
ban areas. The probability of getting an immediate offer λpit can be identified from
the fraction accepting a job offer when they just arrive in urban areas. Since the
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fraction of employed migrants who switch into unemployment can be observed, the
job separation rate δi can be identified from the behaviour of leaving high salary
urban jobs to the unemployment state or back to home locations.
The psychic value φit of living in rural areas and migration costs Mit can be sep-
arately identified, because individuals only pay migration costs when they actually
migrate while individuals receive the utility of psychic value every period. I set the
monthly discount rate ρ = 0.0025 which gives 3% annual rate.
2.4.5 Objective Function and Solution Method
Individuals maximize their present discounted values of lifetime utility from the
year in which they finish their education to a terminal age, t = T . Denote the utility
associated with each choice as ukt . Then individuals make choices to maximise their
objective function Vit(Hit):
Vit(Hit) = max
Dkit
ukit(Hit) +
1
1 + ρ
E(Vit+1(Hit+1)|Hit) (2.17)
The expectations operator E in equation (2.17) is taken with respect to the joint
distribution of stochastic shocks εξt+1, εut+1, εrt+1, εmt+1, εst+1 ,the probability of receiving
a job offer, job separation, getting married, and having a child.
Given the finite horizon, the model is solved numerically through backward
recursion of the Bellman equation. This procedure, however, cannot be applied
directly due to the high dimensionality of the problem. Furthermore, the deci-
sion period in the model is a month which brings an additional computation bur-
den. To reduce the computation burden associated with the high dimensionality
of the problem, I adopt an approximation method similar to the one employed in
Keane and Wolpin (1994). Instead of calculating continuation values at all points
of the state space, I approximate them using a polynomial on the states. This is, at
each t, I calculate the Emax functions (i.e., the continuation values) for a subset of
the state space and estimate a regression function as a polynomial in those state
space elements. I use the predicted values from the regression to approximate the
alternative-specific value functions given by equation (2.17).
2.4.6 Estimation
Likelihood
Themodel is estimated bymaximizing the likelihood function. For each individual,
the data consist of the set of choices and outcomes:
2.4. Model 55
• Choices: location, employment, and social network investment (i.e. {Dkit : k =
1, · · · ,K})
• Outcomes: earnings, presence of social networks
for all t ∈ [t2007, t2009], where t2007 is individuals’ age at the beginning of the year 2007
and t2009 is individuals’ age at the end of the year 2009.
Let c(t) denote the combination of choices (i.e., migration, employment, return
migration and network investment) and outcomes at each period t. Let t0i ∈ [2007, 2009]
denote the first period an individual is observed in the data. Notice that the state
space includes both lagged variables (invit−1) and accumulated rural and urban
work experience (exprit,expuit). These variables, however, are nor observed for all
individuals in the data. Let H¯0i denote the value of the state space when an in-
dividual enters the sample. Then, if the probability of H¯0i = h¯t0i were known, the
contribution to the likelihood for individual i would be:
Pr(c(t0i), · · · , c(tTi)|H¯it) =
∑
H¯0i∈Ω
Π
tTi
t=t0iPr(c(t)|Hit, dit)Pr(H¯t0i)ξ(pm) (2.18)
Equation 2.18 assumes that we know Pr(H¯t0i) and hence we can integrate it out.
This, howerver, is not the case. It further assumes that the measurement of social
network investment in the data corresponds exactly to the one in the model which
is not the case either. In the next two sections, I describe a methodology to deal
with these two problems.
Initial Condition Problem
As I discussed before, to calculate the likelihood for each individual, I need the
state variables in the year they enter the sample. The data provide the whole
marriage and fertility histories for each individual. However, it is missing the in-
formation on work experience in rural and urban areas for some individuals. I use
a simulation method to solve this missing history problem. The basic idea is that,
for the current value of the parameters, I simulate the transient shocks and use the
value functions to simulate individuals’ sequential decisions from an initial period
until the time they enter the sample. I simulate such histories then to calculate the
probability of observing an individual with Ht0i = ht0i to contribute the likelihood.
The specific procedure is :
1. Given the current values of the parameters, the model is solved on grid and
the value functions are saved.
2. Given the value functions, I draw from the distribution of the shocks to simu-
late a history from the time when finish formal education to t0i for individual
i. Let the value of the state at t0i implied by simulation r = 1, · · · ,R denoted by
H¯rt0i.
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3. Repeat step 2 R times22
4. Given {Hrt0i}Rr=1, calculate Pr(Ht0i), which is what is needed to be calculated in
the likelihood equation 2.18
Measurement Errors
As described in the data section, there is likely to exist measurement error for
the social network investment variable. In the data, rural households only report
whether they send gifts to their best 5 friends or relatives. These leads to two types
of measurement errors: theymay send gifts to someone outside of the best 5 friends
or relatives, and(or) the gifts may be given to friends or relatives who are living in
rural areas. In the estimation, I assume probabilities of having each type of mea-
surement errors (pm) are the same. Since I only observe the investment choices in
2007 and in 2008, the likelihood function for individual i is given by :
Pr(c(t0i), · · · , c(t2009)|H¯it) =
∑
H¯2007∈Ω
Pr(H¯2007)Πt2007.12t=t2007.1Pr(c(t)|Hit, dit)
((1 − pm)m07=a07 pm07,a07m )Πt2008.12t=t2008.1Pr(c(t)|Hit, dit) (2.19)
((1 − pm)m08=a08 pm08,a08m )Πt2009.12t=t2009.1Pr(c(t)|Hit, dit)
where m j, j ∈ {2007, 2008} is the model prediction of social network investment at
period j, and a j, j ∈ {2007, 2008} is the data measure of social network investment
at period j.
Estimation Procedure
The estimation algorithm is developed to incorporate both the initial condition
problem, the measurement error problem, and to incorporate the assumed exoge-
nous stochastic processes formarital status and fertility. The procedure is assumed
as following:
1. Estimate the exogenous marital and fertility stochastic process and get the
parameters Θ123
2. GivenΘ1, and the initial guess for the other parametersΘ2, themodel is solved
on grids and the value functions are approximated as described in the section
2.4.5
3. For the individuals missing the value of the state, I draw the shock terms, and
simulate their choices for the missing periods to calculate Pr(Ht0i) as described
in how to solve initial condition problem
22 I simulate 500 times for each individual who miss work experience information.
23Table C.1 gives the estimates of parameter Θ1.
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4. Calculate the likelihood and update the parameters Θ2
5. Repeat from Step 2 to Step 5 until parameters Θ2 converge
2.5 Empirical Application
2.5.1 Estimation
Estimates
The estimated parameters are reported in Tables 2.8. The parameter estimates
are consistent with what one would expect. In particular, the effects of social net-
works on these two channels. First, the effect of social networks on migration costs
is negative and significant. This means that the presence of social network reduces
migration costs (i.e. they help migrants to settle down in urban areas). Second,
social networks significantly increase the job arrival rate. The estimates are con-
sistent with the idea that migrants can get job information from their friends or
relatives in urban areas.
Table 2.9 displays the role of social networks through the two channels. The
model estimates show that the average migration costs for individuals with net-
works are 89.2% of the value for those without networks. From the migration cost
equation, we also find that married and individuals with children have larger mi-
gration costs. Also, the older cohorts have larger migration costs. Social networks
may also affect search frictions. From the estimates of the job arrival rate, we see
that social networks can reduce search frictions significantly. The average arrival
rate for the individuals with networks (λ¯ = 0.14) is almost twice that for those with-
out (λ¯ = 0.07).
The estimates of the earning equations in Table 2.8 show that the large gap
between urban and rural areas does not mainly come from the returns to human
capital. The difference mainly comes from the constant term. The return of edu-
cation in urban areas is very low for rural migrants. In rural areas, the impact of
an additional year of schooling on earnings (2%) is much higher than the one in
urban areas (0.4%). The return of an additional month of urban work experience is
higher than the return to an additional month of rural experience for urban areas.
The opposite is also true. That is, rural experience return in rural areas is higher
than urban experience return in rural areas.
From the unemployment equation, married and individuals with more children
have a higher value on employment than single or childless individuals. At the
same time, the estimates show that older people have a lower flow of utility values
if they are in the unemployment state. The coefficients in the equation of psychic
value of living in rural areas show that older people have higher flow utility of living
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results
Earnings Equation(Urban) Social Network Probit Equation
edu year 0.0037 marriage 0.0690
(0.0000) (0.0141)
expu 0.0038 num of children -0.0279
(0.0000) (0.0057)
expr 0.0036 snt−1 3.2374
(0.0000) (0.0162)
expu2 × 100 -0.0023 invt−1 0.6493
(0.0000) (0.2472)
expr2 × 100 0.0004 constant -1.4204
(0.0000) (0.0127)
constant 6.8385 Psychic Value of Living in Rural Areas
(0.0014) age 0.02638
Earnings Equation(Rural) (0.0000)
age2 × 100 0.0450
edu year 0.0208 (0.0000)
(0.0002) marriage 0.0021
expu 0.0015 (0.0199)
(0.0000) num of children -0.0675
expr 0.0045 (0.0732)
(0.0000) constant -0.0411
expu2 × 100 -0.0062 (0.0192)
(0.0000) Job arrival rate
expr2 × 100 -0.0006 social network 0.7503
(0.0000) (0.0732)
constant 4.3097 edu year 0.0061
(0.0013) (0.0061)
Unemployment value constant -2.6004
(0.0927)
marriage 0.1423 Job Destruction Rate
(0.1051)
num of children 0.7132 edu year 0.0007
(0.0392) (0.0188)
age 0.0004 constant -4.6729
(0.0044) (0.1344)
age2 × 100 -0.0071 Return Migration Cost
(0.0003)
constant 0.0061 marriage 1.1140
(0.1335) (0.6391)
Migration cost num of children 0.1409
(0.1586)
social network -1.3297 cohort -0.01859
(0.0630) (0.1502)
marriage 0.1955 constant 8.0069
(0.5719) (6.6245)
num of children 0.0480 Immediate Offer Probability
(0.1753) social network -0.4516
cohort -0.2795 (0.0524)
(0.1510) edu year 0.0162
constant 18.3926 (0.0092)
(6.6705) constant 1.5522
(0.0926)
1. snit is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the individual has social networks.
2. expu and expr stand for work experience in urban and rural areas respectively. They are both measured in months. Age is measured
in years.
3. Cohort is defined by the birth year-1999.
4. Marriage is an indicator of marital status that takes value 1 if the individual is married.
6. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 2.9: The Impact of Social Networks
Key Estimates and Average Effects
Migration Cost Job Arrival Rate
Social Networks Coefficient -1.33 0.75
(0.06) (0.07)
Average
With Networks 89.19% 0.14
Without Network 100.00% 0.07
1. I normalize the average migration costs for rural migrants without social
networks in the model to 1. Hence, migration costs are presented as relative
to 1, (i.e., 89.19% means that the average migration costs for individuals with
networks is 89.19% for those without social networks.)
2. The first panel in the job arrival rate column presents the point estimate for
social networks in the job arrival rate equation. The second panel shows the
calculated average job arrival rate for rural migrants who are not employed
depending on their network status.
3. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
in rural areas. This finding is consistent with the migration literature (e.g., Ken-
nan and Walker (2011)) and the my data observation that migrants are younger
than the individuals living in rural areas.
Model Fit
In this section, I evaluate the model fit, by using the estimates to simulate individ-
uals’ behaviours and compare the simulated results to the data moments.24 Tables
2.10 and 2.11 give the comparison between the model predictions and data mo-
ments.25 Table 2.10 shows the comparison to the earnings’ moments. The data col-
umn gives the selected data moments for both migrants’ and non-migrants’ earn-
ings including the mean and variance of log earnings. The other column gives the
simulated moments based on the model estimates. Although the simulated stan-
dard deviations of log earnings are slightly larger than those in data, the calculated
moments fit the data quite well. The model can successfully capture that earnings
with networks are higher than the earnings without networks.
Table 2.11 gives the model fit for choices. The simulated moments can fit the
fraction of the individuals with networks quite well. For example, in the data,
24For each individual, I simulate 100 times and the results reported are the mean of simulation
results.
25I simulate the decisions for each individual from the age of finishing formal education to the
age of 60. The moments calculated are based on the simulation results from the year 2007 to 2009.
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Table 2.10: Model Fit: Earnings
Data Model
Migrants:
Log(Earnings) 7.1068 7.1517
sd(log(Earnings)) 0.2681 0.3273
with Networks 7.1229 7.1549
sd(log(Earnings)) 0.2695 0.3232
without Networks 7.0580 7.1435
sd(log(Earnings)) 0.2612 0.3376
Non-migrants:
Log(Earnings) 5.0310 5.0257
sd(log(Earnings)) 0.9683 1.1847
with Networks 5.0677 5.0283
sd(Earnings) 0.9547 1.1867
without Networks 4.9410 5.0190
sd(Earnings) 0.9989 1.1796
1. Migrants include people who currently
work in urban areas.
2. sd(log(earnings)) stands for the stan-
dard deviation of log earnings.
Table 2.11: Model Fits: Choices
Data Model
Fraction of Individuals with Networks 0.7224 0.7317
Fraction of Rural Individuals Living in Urban Areas 0.2892 0.2734
Fraction with Networks 0.2179 0.2078
Fraction without Network 0.0712 0.0656
Fraction of Return Migrants 0.0075 0.0179
Fraction with Networks 0.0054 0.0142
Fraction without Networks 0.0022 0.0037
Fraction of Rural Individuals Migrating in a Given Month 0.0076 0.0142
Fraction with Networks 0.0054 0.0114
Fraction without Networks 0.0022 0.0027
Fraction of Individuals Getting Immediate Offer upon migrating 0.0038 0.0028
Fraction with Networks 0.0027 0.0025
Fraction without Networks 0.0011 0.0003
Average Job Search Duration (months) 2.1972 2.1059
Average Job Search Duration with Network at Initial Period 2.1929 2.0968
Average Job Search Duration without Network at Initial Period 2.1989 2.1458
1. The data column provides the moments calculated based on the observations during 2007-2009.
2. The numbers in the table are averages dividing the 36 months (2007-2009) observed in the data.
2.5. Empirical Application 61
72.2% of individuals have social networks. The simulated moments are 73.2% in
the model.
When examining the composition of the migrants, we find that both the model
can capture rural individuals’ migration choices quiet well. For example, in the
data, 28.9% of rural individuals living in urban areas. When examining the de-
composition of rural individuals living in urban areas, we can find the model also
matches the moments really well. Among the 28.9% of rural individuals who live
in urban areas, that 21.8% have social networks and 7.1% are without social net-
works. The model predicts this decomposition as 20.8% and 6.5%.
From Table 2.11, we can also see that the job search duration can be matched
quite well: in the data, the average job search duration is 2.20 months; the model
predicts the job search duration is 2.11 months. The model also captures the be-
haviours of accepting immediate offers after migrating well. For example, there are
0.3% of rural individuals who get a job immediately after migrating in the data.
The model predicts the same number. As the table shows, the model also fits the
moments related to return and repeat migration reasonably well.
2.5.2 Decomposition Analysis
In this section, I conduct counterfactual simulations to decompose the effects of so-
cial networks through migration costs and the job arrival rate. I then examine how
social networks affect rural individuals’ migration and social network investment
choices.
To assess the effects of social networks on migration costs and labor market
search frictions, I simulate the model under three different restrictions on the pa-
rameters. In the first specification, I turn off the effects of social networks on both
channels, (i.e., βm1 = 0, βl
p
1 = 0, βl1 = 0). In this case, social networks play no role in
the model. In the second specification, I turn off the effects of social networks on
the job arrival rate (i.e., βlp1 = 0, βl1 = 0). That is, social networks are only allowed
to affect migration costs. In the third specification, I turn off the effects of social
networks on migration costs (i.e., βm1 = 0).
Table 2.12 presents the decomposition simulation results for the model in terms
of the role of networks (i.e., neither of two channels, only affect migration costs, or
networks only affect the job arrival rate). The second column presents the unre-
stricted (i.e., allowing social networks to affect both channels) predictions to use as
a baseline case. The third column shows the model prediction if social networks do
not affect either the job arrival rate or migration costs. Without the effect of social
networks, only 14.0% of rural individuals will live in urban areas. The difference is
more than 13% points when compare this to the results when network effects exist
(27.3%). When social networks only affect migration costs (Column 4), 15.5% of
rural individuals will live in urban areas. The job arrival rate column shows that
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Table 2.12: Counterfactual Results: Social Networks
Model Social Networks Only AffectNeither Migration Cost Job Arrival Rate
Fraction of Individuals with Networks 73.17% 71.05% 71.31% 72.43%
Fraction of Migrants 27.34% 13.97% 15.52% 26.63%
with Networks 20.78% 9.73% 11.35% 19.68%
without Networks 6.56% 4.24% 4.17% 6.94%
Fraction of Non-migrants 72.66% 86.03% 84.48% 73.37%
with Networks 52.40% 61.32% 59.96% 52.75%
without Networks 22.26% 24.71% 24.52% 20.62%
Fraction of Unemployed Migrants 4.93% 3.29% 3.90% 4.31%
Fraction of Network Investments 58.41% 0.00% 7.22% 53.10%
1. Migrants include people who were born in rural areas and resided in urban cities who can be em-
ployed or unemployed.
2. The column of model shows the benchmark values simulated by the model estimates.
3. The neither column gives the simulation results when social networks affect neither migration costs
nor the job arrival rate.
4. The column of migration cost gives the counterfactual results if social networks only reduce migra-
tion costs.
5. The column of job arrival rate gives the counterfactual results if social networks only increase the
job arrival rate.
6. The row of equalization monthly tax shows how much individuals would like to pay per month
for their lives on average to achieve the same utility when not allowing them to invest in their social
networks.
if social networks only increase the job arrival rate and have no effect on migration
costs, 26.6% of rural individuals migrate. These simulation results show that the
effect that social networks reduce search frictions is much more larger compared
to reducing migration costs.
Table 2.12 also how individuals’ social network investment choices also respond
to the effect of social networks. For example, without the effects of networks, no
onewill invest in networks. When social networks only affectmigration costs, about
7% of individuals will invest. When networks affect the job arrival rate, since the
impact is even larger than the migration cost channel, more individuals choose to
invest in their social networks.
Table 2.13 gives the decomposition results of the social network investment be-
haviours. The benchmark column provides the simulation results based on the
estimates from the model. Individuals’ investment decisions are affected by their
locations and employment states. For example, when social networks affects both
migration costs and the job arrival rate (i.e., in the benchmark column), 66.5% of
rural individuals invest in their social networks and only 33.9% of employed rural
migrants invest in social networks. The reason is that social networks only affect
the continuation values when individuals are employed in urban areas. Therefore,
employed rural migrants have less incentive to invest in their social networks. Un-
der two restricted specifications, we still can find the pattern that most investors
are still the individuals living in rural areas and the unemployed individuals in
urban areas. The model results present that individuals effectively use and invest
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in social networks to optimize theirmigration decisions and labormarket outcomes.
Table 2.13: The Responses of Social Network Investment
Benchmark Social Networks Only Affect
Migration Costs Job Arrival Rate
In Rural Areas
Individuals who invest 66.53% 7.95% 68.54%
Individuals who do not invest 33.47% 92.05% 31.46%
In Urban Areas
Employed
Individuals who invest 33.93% 2.29% 30.87%
Individuals who do not invest 66.07% 97.71% 69.13%
Unemployed
Individuals who invest 50.06% 6.15% 44.54%
Individuals who do not invest 49.94% 93.85% 55.46%
1. The benchmark uses the estimates from the model which allowing individuals to invest
their social networks.
2. The column of migration cost gives the counterfactual results if social networks only
reduce migration costs.
3. The column of job arrival rate gives the counterfactual results if social networks only
increase the job arrival rate.
2.5.3 Policy Simulations
Since the Chinese government is trying to increase the urbanization rate to 60%
by 2020, I propose three different policies all of which will achieve this aim. The
policies include providing monthly unemployment benefits for rural migrants in
urban areas, two types of lump-sum subsidies for migration costs.
First, I need to calculate the increase in the fraction of rural individuals migrat-
ing to urban areas to achieve the government’s goal. Based on the annual report
of National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), an additional 118 million rural
individuals will need to migrate to urban areas.26 Since I only consider rural male
individuals in my data, this translates to an additional 76 million rural males mi-
grating.27 Therefore, the fraction of total migrants will be about 50%.28 When I
26This number is calculated based on total population in 2011. (i.e. 1347.7 × 0.6 − 690.8 = 117.8)
27This number is calculated by the total additional migrants times the fraction of male migrants
(i.e. 118 × 64.5% = 76). 64.5% is the fraction of male migrants. Since NBSC does not provide the
number of rural migrants, I use the the number of rural men who did not migrate in 2011 divided
by the fraction of rural individuals who reside in rural areas to calculate the number of rural men
with rural registration (i.e. 250.590.71 = 352.95). I then calculate the number of male migrants (age
15-64) by subtracting the number of rural men who do not migrate, (i.e. 352.95 − 250.59 = 102.36
million). China Yearbook Rural Household Survey states that the total rural migrants in 2011 is
158.6 million. The fraction of migrants who are male is 102.36/158.6 = 64.5%.
28 The fraction is the sum of current rural male migrants and the additional rural males
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simulate different policies, I target the fraction 50% of rural men migrate to urban
areas in my data when I simulate the model.
Table 2.14: Policy Simulation Results: Government Budget
With Network Investment Without Network Investment
Policy Government Budget Policy Government Budget
(Yuan) (Billion Yuan) (Yuan) (Billion Yuan)
Unemployment Benefit 424 11.50 403 11.39
Unconditional Migration Cost 639 3.56 569 2.02
Conditional Migration Cost 279 1.10 101 0.49
1. In the model with network investment, individuals allow to invest their networks by send gifts to
their friends or relatives.
2. The themodel without network investment, social networks are formed by a dynamic probit process.
3. This table provides the three different policies’ simulation results, all of which achieve the goal of
urbanization rate (i.e., 60% by 2020)
4. The row of unemployment benefits shows the monthly value of unemployment benefits the govern-
ment provides and the total budget the government pays to achieve the goal.
5. The row of unconditional migration cost gives the value of a lump sum subsidy for migration costs
if rural individuals migrate and the total budget the government pays.
6. The row of conditional migration cost gives the value of a lump sum subsidy for migration costs if
rural individuals with social networks in urban areas migrate and the total budget the government
pays.
Table 2.14 provides the simulation results for the policy counterfactual simula-
tions in three specifications. The first one is that the government provides monthly
unemployment benefits in urban areas for rural migrants. This policy will increase
the value of living in urban areas and decrease the return migration. The second
policy is an unconditional lump sum subsidy for migration costs when rural indi-
viduals migrate to urban areas. The third policy provides a conditional lump sum
subsidy for migration costs if migrants have social networks in urban areas.29
In Table 2.14, the second and third columns give the specifications of three poli-
cies when allowing for individuals’ social network investment. If the government
implements any of these policies, the urbanization goal can be achieved. The value
of 424 means that the government pay 424 yuan of unemployment benefits in ur-
ban areas monthly; The value of 639 in the row of migration cost means the policy
of a lump sum subsidy for migration costs (639 yuan) per person, if rural individ-
uals migrate to urban areas. The value of 279 in the conditional migration costs
row denotes the policy of providing lump-sum subsidy for migrants who have social
networks (279 yuan) per person. Under these three policies, the goal of urbaniza-
tion rate can be achieved. I then can compare these policies in term of government
who will migrate divided by the total number of individuals with rural household registration,
(i.e.(76.0+102.4)/353.0=50.5%).
29There exists similar migration policy in Canada. If the individual has relatives or family mem-
ber in Canada, he will be more easily to pass the immigration requirements from the Canadian
government.
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budgets. The government will spend less to implement the both policies of migra-
tion cost subsidy than the unemployment benefit policy to reach the goal of ur-
banization rate (2.02 (unconditional subsidy), 1.10 (conditional subsidy) v.s. 11.39
(unemployment benefit) billion Yuan). Since the conditional subsidy policy encour-
ages individuals to invest their social networks, the government will spend less
compared to the unconditional migration cost subsidy.30
Table 2.14 also provides the policy simulations for the model without social net-
work investment decisions. Comparing themodels with andwithout social network
investment decisions, we find the government needs to spend more to attract rural
people to migrate in the model with network investment decisions. The reason is
that individuals will invest less in social networks or not at all when the govern-
ment tries to reducemigration costs or search frictions in urban areas. To offset the
impact of less network investment, the government has to spend more (i.e. 11.50
v.s. 11.39 for unemployment benefits; 3.56 v.s. 2.02 for unconditional migration
cost subsides; 1.10 v.s. 0.49 for conditional migration cost subsidies).
Table 2.15 shows the moments of earnings and choices before and after intro-
ducing the government policies. The effects of policies on rural migrants’ earnings
are different. The lump sum subsidy for migration costs decreases the average
migration costs. The individuals who are constrained by high migration costs are
more likely affected by this policy. The average earnings decrease since most new
migrants have lower reservation earnings. Since the policy of unemployment bene-
fit increase migrants’ reservation earnings, as we expected, the average logarithm
earnings are much higher than the average logarithm earnings under the other
two policies.
The unemployment benefit policy increases the value of the unemployment state
and therefore increases their reservation earnings. As a result, the average earn-
ings for rural migrants are higher compared to the average urban earnings under
the other two policies. Also under this policy, the fraction unemployed increases to
49% in urban areas and the job search duration increases to 3.6 months. Almost
half of rural migrants are unemployed causing the government to have to paymuch
more to achieve the urbanization goal.
The column of unconditional migration costs gives the individuals’ choices un-
der the policy of subsidy for migration costs. First, the average migration costs are
significantly reduced by the government lump sum subsidy. After introducing this
policy, average migration costs are only 37.4% of those before this policy. Second,
the policy of providing lump sum subsidy for migration costs does not generate
the large return and repeated migration behaviours. Before this policy, the frac-
tion of the rural individuals who migrate within the observed periods is 1.41% and
this fraction increases to 2.87% after introducing this policy. One of the reasons
30Yuan is Chinese currency, which is equal to about 1/8 U.S. Dollar in 2000.
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to explain this phenomena is that there is no subsidy for return migration costs.
Another reason is that the value of staying in urban areas is large. The fraction of
employed in urban areas shows 78% of rural migrants have jobs which also indi-
cates why ruralmigrants do not havemany return and repeated circularmigration.
The fifth column gives the simulation results if the government provides the
conditional lump sum subsidy for migration costs. Under this policy only the mi-
grants with social networks in urban areas can get the subsidy. This policy encour-
ages rural individuals to invest their social networks. Average migration costs are
35.5% of those without this policy which are even lower than the average migra-
tion costs after introducing the unconditional migration cost subsidy (i.e. 37.4%).
Since more rural migrants have social networks, the job search duration is shorter
and the fraction of employed is larger than the policy of providing an unconditional
migration cost subsidy.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper explores how social networks affect individuals’ migration decisions
and subsequent labor market outcomes. I construct and structurally estimate a
dynamic model of migration choices allowing for return and repeated circular mi-
gration. In any given period, individuals make location, employment, and social
network investment choices. In the model, individuals can accumulate their hu-
man capital through location-specific work experience.
In order to distinguish the effects of social networks through two different chan-
nels, I allow for the presence of social network to have a direct effect on migration
costs, as well as an indirect effect on labor outcomes via an effect on the job arrival
rate. In the model, individuals can invest in their social networks to increase the
probability of creating or sustaining social networks.
I use the Chinese Household Income Projects (2007-2009) panel data and esti-
mate the model by maximum likelihood. The estimation results show that social
networks affect individuals’ migration choices and subsequent labor market out-
comes through both channels: reducing migration costs and search frictions. So-
cial networks reduce about 10% ofmigration costs and almost double the job arrival
rate for rural migrants.
The decomposition exercises show that social networks affect individuals’ mi-
gration behaviourmore through the channel of reducing search frictions than through
the channel of loweringmigration costs. For example, if social networks only reduce
migration costs, 16% of individuals will migrate; if social networks only increase
the job arrival rate, 26% of individuals will migrate.
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The decomposition results also display that individuals effectively use and in-
vest in social networks to optimize their migration decisions and labor market out-
comes. For example, most individuals who invest in their social networks are indi-
viduals in rural areas and unemployed individuals in urban areas.
Next, I also propose three different types of policies all with the goal of meeting
a 60% urbanization rate by 2020. The policy simulations show that a migration
cost subsidy policy will cost less than a policy of providing unemployment benefits
in urban areas. When comparing the two models (with and without social network
investment decisions), I find that if individuals are allowed to invest in their social
networks, they can effectively respond to the status of social networks and try to
invest to increase or keep their social networks. In particular, individuals will in-
vest less when the government tries to reduce migration costs or search frictions
in urban areas. To offset the individuals’ responses, the government has to spend
more to encourage rural people to migrate to urban areas. These results show that
it is important to consider the different roles of social networks when studying mi-
gration decisions and policies intended to affect migration levels.
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Table 2.15: Policy Simulation Results: Choices
Before Policy After Policies
Benchmark Unenployment Benefits Migration Costs Migration Cost(Unconditional) (Conditional)
Urban Log Earnings 7.1517 7.1561 7.0157 7.0461
Rural Log Earnings 5.0257 4.9413 4.9720 4.7675
Fraction of Migrants 0.2734 0.5009 0.5006 0.5005
with Networks 0.2078 0.4062 0.3771 0.3919
without Networks 0.0656 0.0948 0.1235 0.1085
Fraction of Moving Migrants 0.0141 0.0336 0.0287 0.0249
Fraction of Employees in Urban Areas 0.8197 0.5137 0.7815 0.7902
Fraction of Unemployed in Urban Areas 0.1803 0.4863 0.2185 0.2098
Job Search Duration (Month) 2.1059 3.6260 2.0388 1.9990
Average Age of Migrants 34.1179 35.3713 33.3058 35.1877
Average Job Arrival Rate 0.1287 0.1307 0.1269 0.1300
Average Migration Costs 100.00% 107.05% 37.38% 35.54%
1. The column of benchmark shows the values simulated by the model without proposing the government policies.
2. This table provides the three different policies’ simulation results, all of which achieve the same goal of urbanization rate (i.e.
60% by 2020)
3. The column 3-5 give the simulation results when introducing the monthly unemployment benefits, an unconditional lump sum
subsidy for migration costs, and a conditional lump sum subsidy for migration costs.
4. Earnings are the mean log earnings.
5. Migrants include people who were born in rural areas and resided in urban cities who can be employed or unemployed.
6. I normalize the average migration costs for rural migrants in the model to 1 unit. Other average migration costs give the
relative values compared to the unit. (i.e. 37.38% means that the average migration costs after introducing the lump sum subsidy
for migration costs is 37.38% of the unit.)
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Chapter 3
Education Choices, Information
and Borrowing Constraint
3.1 Introduction
Schooling, particularly college, is considered one of the main sources of human cap-
ital for the individual. Consequently, understanding the determinants of schooling
attendance is, and has been for a while, an active area of research. There is, how-
ever, little work analyzing the interaction between the various determinants: abil-
ity, uncertainty, preferences and credit constraints. Different branches of the liter-
ature focus on estimating returns to schooling (e.g.,Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994;
Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998; Card, 2001); ability and returns to education (e.g.,
Cawley, Heckman, Lochner, and Vytlacil, 2000; Taber, 2001; Belzil and Hansen,
2002); the importance of parental income and, more generally, of borrowing con-
straints (e.g., Kane, 1996; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber,
2004; Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri, 2012; Lochner and Alexander, 2011), etc. In
most cases, the literature ignores the role played by the uncertainty facing the
agent and uses ex-post measures (e.g. earnings at age 40) to analyze the agent’s
schooling decision. When they account for uncertainty, they assume that the unob-
served (to the analyst) variability and the uncertainty facing the agent essentially
coincide.1
In this paper, we contribute to the literature modeling multiple determinants
of the schooling decision (e.g., Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Keane and Wolpin,
2001; Cameron and Heckman, 2001). We use economic theory and estimates of a
semiparametrically identified structural model to analyze the role played by un-
1For example, both Keane and Wolpin (2001), Cameron and Heckman (2001) estimate their
dynamic models of schooling assuming what is known by the agent and what is known by the
econometrician at each point in time. While they allow for unobserved heterogeneity, it is essentially
treated as an initial condition. Once the econometrician conditions on the initial heterogeneity, the
evolution of the information set of the agent is given. However, there is no prior reason why one
should assume that the evolution of what is unknown to the analyst and what is unknown to the
agent coincide.
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certainty and its interaction with ability, credit constraints and preferences in ex-
plaining college graduation. We estimate a structural model of schooling choice,
labor supply, and consumption allocation under uncertainty, in which borrowing
constraints arise from repayment constrains using pooled data from NLSY79 and
PSID on white males.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to adapt the insight of Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) to de-
velop and implement amethodology that distinguishes information unknown to the
econometrician but forecastable by the agent and information unknown to both at
each period. The key to measuring uncertainty is to notice that individual choices
reflect all the information known to the agent at a given time.2 Responses of cur-
rent decisions to future outcome innovations can be used to infer how much infor-
mation the agent has. The semiparametric nature of the proposed test allows it to
be used independently of the particular specification of the model as long as one
considers families of models with the same determinants of choice.
The results we obtain do not single out any one particular determinant as the
main reason why some people go to college and some don’t. That this is the case,
i.e., that all aspects of the problem play an important role, should not be surprising
given the nature of the decision.
The key empirical results in the paper are:
1. At the time schooling decisions are made, wages are predictable. In particu-
lar, the estimates of the model imply that 52% of the unexplained variance in
college log wages is predictable by the agent at age 18. This fraction is 56%
for high school. This is similar to the results obtained by Cunha, Heckman,
and Navarro (2005), Guvenen (2007). In fact, while the total unobserved vari-
ance of college log wages is higher than that of high school (i.e the unobserved
variance from the analyst’s perspective), the variance of the uncertain com-
ponents of wages becomes proportionately even larger for college compared to
high school under our estimated information set for the agent.
2. Once credit constraints are properly defined and relaxed, they play a more
important role than previously estimated in the literature. When people are
allowed to smooth consumption perfectly, i.e., when both credit constraints
and uncertainty are completely eliminated, college attendance increases by
9.6%-points. We decompose this effect into the pure uncertainty effect, which
accounts for almost two thirds of the increase, while the rest is due just to
credit constraints. This result is not inconsistent with the evidence presented
in Cameron and Heckman (2001), Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro and
Heckman (2002) and Cameron and Taber (2004) where credit constraints are
found to be relatively unimportant. The analysis in these papers focuses on
2A similar idea motivates the work on the permanent income hypothesis of Flavin (1981) and
Pistaferri (2001).
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the inability of individuals to obtain funds to pay for tuition as the credit
constraint. The relatively large effect of credit constraints may be in part due
to the partial equilibrium nature of the exercise.
3. Agents also have preferences over schooling beyond the consumption value
of earnings which we capture via an additive “psychic” cost function. Ability
is one of the main determinants of costs and, as such, plays a key role in
determining schooling decisions. High ability individuals face very low costs,
while low ability individuals face large costs of attending college. This gives
rise to schooling sorting by ability.
4. Schooling decisions are made by agents before all the relevant information
about future outcomes has been revealed. Individual choices are made in
an environment of uncertainty and agents base their decisions on their ex-
pectations and not on the realized outcomes observed by the econometrician.
Expectations and realizations need not coincide. In particular, we estimate
that eliminating uncertainty entirely – but keeping the credit constraints in
place, 21% of high school graduates would instead choose to be college gradu-
ates and 11% of college graduates would regret their choice under uncertainty
and pick high school instead. As a result, aggregate college attendance rises
from 48.3% under uncertainty, to 54%.
This paper contributes to the literature on schooling choice by explicitly look-
ing at the role played by uncertainty as a determinant of schooling. The idea is
closely related to the work of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005) in which a similar methodology is applied to extract
agent’s information at the schooling date. While Carneiro, Hansen, and Heck-
man (2003) assume no credit markets operate, and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro
(2005) assume an economy with perfect credit markets; we investigate an inter-
mediate economy in which some credit markets operate and borrowing constraints
arise from repayment constraints.3 This allows for a more general setting in which
consumption is not equal to income every period, nor is it necessary to assume that
complete markets operate.
Our work also contributes to the literature on credit constraints and education.4
In our analysis, credit constraints arise as a consequence of repayment restrictions
(i.e., people cannot die in debt) and uncertainty about individuals future income.
Our agents make decisions on schooling, labor supply, and asset holdings. Keane
and Wolpin (2001) also consider marriage, residency with parents and the like.
Our simpler model is, hopefully, more easily interpretable and lets us focus on as-
sumptions about the information structure and identification, topics they do not
consider.5 Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) (among
others) assume that shocks to outcomes are unobservable to the econometrician
3See Laitner (1992), Aiyagari (1994) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
4See Lochner and Alexander (2012), Cameron and Taber (2004), Keane and Wolpin (2001).
5They do allow for variability to be different from uncertainty by allowing for unobserved types.
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and uncertain to the agent. In our analysis, we infer the amount of uncertainty
facing the agent from individual choices.
We also contribute to the literature on the estimation of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. By focusing on longer periods, we essentially eliminate the need
to distinguish between extensive and intensive margins that has been the focus of
the recent literature (see Peterman, 2016). In fact, our estimated Frisch elasticity
of labor supply of 1 is in the middle of the estimates obtained from both the Macro
and Micro literatures.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on consumption inequality and par-
tial insurance. By extending the insight developed by Carneiro, Hansen, and Heck-
man (2003) andCunha, Heckman, andNavarro (2005) and applying it to ourmodel,
we can identify what constitutes uncertainty at any stage in the life cycle.6 A
similar idea lies behind the test of the permanent income hypothesis in Flavin
(1981). She picks a particular assumed ARMA (p, q) time series process for income
and tests whether transitory income predicts consumption. Blundell and Preston
(1998) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2004) use the same idea to test for
“partial insurance”. As they acknowledge, their estimate of partial insurance com-
bines the effects of information known to the agent but unknown to the econome-
trician and insurance. The methodology proposed in this paper can, in principle,
distinguish between these two explanations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a general ver-
sion of the model of consumption allocation and schooling decisions that we use in
the rest of the paper. The methodology used to infer the elements of the agent’s
information set is explained in section 3.3. In passing, we briefly sketch how semi-
parametric identification of the model is achieved. Appendix 1 presents a formal
identification analysis. Section 3.4 describes the data we use and the parametriza-
tion of the model. In section 3.5 we present our analysis of what is in the agent’s
information set, and the empirical results from estimating the model using the
right information. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Decision Process
Let Wi,s,t denote the wage at time t of an individual i who has schooling level s ∈
{hs, col} (hs=high school, col=college), Ai,t denote the assets he saves for the next
This however, does not evolve over time. Conditional on the unobserved type which is given at the
beginning of time, variability=uncertainty.
6Pistaferri (2001) and Kaufmann and Pistaferri (2009) use a similar idea by looking at expected
wages as measured through a survey and measured wages in a consumption analysis.
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period, ni,t ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of the time the individual spends work-
ing, Hi,t = H¯ni,t denote total hours worked (out of a max of H¯ possible hours),
Yi,s,t = Wi,s,tHi,t denote the earnings of the individual i, u
(
Ci,t,Hi,t
) denote individ-
ual utility if the agent consumes Ci,t and works Hi,t, u˜
(
Ai,T
) denote the utility in the
terminal period when an individual reaches the last period with asset level Ai,T ,
and ρ be the discount rate. Let Ii,t be the information available to the agent at
time t,7 which is assumed to include all the past and current realizations of wages,
the (assumed constant) interest rate r, and the asset stock. It may also contain
some information about future wages. Exactly how much is what we try to deter-
mine in this paper.
Individuals live for T + 1 periods and maximize expected lifetime utility in a
world in which all risks arise from labor market risk and are idiosyncratic. At pe-
riod t = 0, for each fixed schooling level s and given the (expected) wage sequence
associated with each s, agents select an optimal intertemporal consumption allo-
cation rule, as well as a rule for the proportion of time spent working. Agents can
save and borrow as much as they want, subject to repayment constraints, via a
single riskless asset A that pays a return r. Agents then make the schooling choice
that maximizes expected utility.
More precisely, given schooling level s, the agent’s problem at period t > 0 is to
select how much of his time to spend working, and, given available resources, how
much to consume (which determines how much to transfer to the next period). The
value function given information set Ii,t is
Vi,s,t
(Ii,t) = maxHi,t ,Ai,tu (Ci,t,Hi,t) + 11 + ρE (Vi,s,t+1 (Ii,t+1) | Ii,t) (3.1)
s.t. Ci,t = Yi,s,t + (1 + r) Ai,t−1 − Ai,t − 11 (t = 1, s = col)Di,t, (3.2)
Ai,T ≥ −YMINi,s,T+1/(1 + r). (3.3)
11 (t = 1, s = c) is an indicator function that takes value one if the individual is in
school, and Di,t is the direct cost of schooling (tuition) for individual i.
If the utility function satisfies standard conditions (i.e., limC→0u′(C,H) = ∞ and
concavity), the restriction that the agent cannot die in debt
(
Ai,T ≥ −YMINi,s,T+1/(1 + r)
)
imposes a borrowing constraint on the individual at every period. In this case, the
minimum value that assets can take at any period t (i.e., the maximum amount the
agent can borrow) is
AMINi,t =
AMINi,t+1 − YMINi,s,t+1
1 + r
, (3.4)
7By information we mean the minimum sigma algebra generated by the random variables in
Ii,t. Since we associate the information set with a particular group of random variables Ii,t, we use
these concepts interchangeably.
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where YMINi,s,t is the minimum certain value that income can take at time t.
From the agent’s perspective (i.e., given his information at time t) the solution
to the maximization problem in equation (3.1) consists of a trio of time-schooling
indexed functions: a policy function that tells him how much to work this period
H∗i,t = Hs,t
(Ii,t) , (3.5)
a policy function that tells him how much to save this period
C∗i,t = Cs,t
(Ii,t) , (3.6)
and the value function
V∗i,t = Vs,t
(Ii,t) (3.7)
that gives the utility of working H∗i,t and consuming C∗i,t this period, and then follow-
ing his optimal rules for τ > t.
Once the agent solves the labor/consumption allocation problem and gets the
value associated with each s at time t = 1, he uses it to select a schooling level. At
period t = 0, the agent selects the schooling level s that maximizes his expected
utility net of “psychic” costs, P. He will attend college if
E
(
Vcol,1
(Ii,1) − Vhs,1 (Ii,1) − Pi | Ii,0) > 0. (3.8)
3.2.2 Specification of the Model
Wages for individual i at time t at schooling level s are written as8
lnWi,s,t = µs,t
(
Xi,t
)
+ Ui,s,t, (3.9)
where Xi,t represents variables that the econometrician observes and Ui,s,t variables
he cannot observe. We assume that the agent knows all of the variables in X at all
times and that Ui,s,t is revealed to him at period t. He may also know all or part of
each (Ui,s,τ, τ = t + 1, ...,T ) at time t. Uncertainty is thus associated with {Ui,s,τ}Tτ=t+1.
Ui,s,t may also include measurement error in earnings. If this is the case, our esti-
mates of uncertainty will be an upper bound since a fraction of the variance in Ui,s,t
will be due to the measurement error.
We write psychic costs in the schooling choice equation (3.8) as a function of
variables Z that are observed by both the analyst and the agent. ζ represents vari-
ables not observed by the econometrician andmay be (partially) known to the agent
at t = 0. The net cost of schooling is
Pi = φ (Zi) + ζi. (3.10)
8Although not pursued in this paper, the separability assumption is not essential and can be
relaxed using the analysis of Matzkin (2003) to analyze functions of the form lnWi,s,t = µs,t
(
Xi,t,Ui,s,t
).
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The utility function is of the CRRA form
u (C,H) =
C1−ψ
1 − ψ − h
n1+
1
ϕ
1 + 1
ϕ
, (3.11)
where n = H/H¯, ψ ≥ 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, h > 0 weights the
utility of leisure, and ϕ ≥ 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Since we do not
model retirement explicitly, we assume that in the terminal period (i.e., the period
after age 65) the utility function is given by
u˜
(
Ai,T
)
= b
(
YMINi,s,T+1 + (1 + r) Ai,T
)1−χ
1 − χ , (3.12)
where b weights the utility in the terminal period, and we let the function have a
different curvature parameter χ.
Finally, we assume that the data on both hours and consumption contain mea-
surement error. For the case of labor supply we have
ln Ĥi,t = lnHi,t + δHKHi,t + ξ
H
i,t, (3.13)
while for the case of consumption we have
ln Ĉi,t = lnCi,t + δCKCi,t + ξ
C
i,t. (3.14)
Here Hi,t,Ci,t are “true” hours and consumption, Ĥi,t, Ĉi,t are measured hours and
consumption, and measurement error that depends on observable variables Ki,t
and unobservable variables ξi,t. We allow for measurement error to depend on ob-
servables as we combine different datasets, and, for the case of consumption it is a
natural assumption in this context since consumptions is measured at the house-
hold level, and from there they are imputed to the individual.9 Ki,t includes vari-
ables that control for the household structure as well as dataset of origin. ξi,t is an
unobserved term assumed to capture the rest.
3.3 Inferring the Agent’s Information Set
The econometrician must know Ii,t in order to solve the model and develop esti-
mating equations. Any conclusion extracted from the model relies crucially on the
assumptions made about what constitutes the uncertainty facing the agent. It is
thus important to develop a procedure to allow the analyst to separate the compo-
nents of the agent’s information set from what is unknown to him. We now turn
our attention to this topic, sketching identification of the model in the process. Ap-
pendix D provides formal proof of identification.
9Imputation is done by dividing total consumption over the square root of the total number of
members in the household.
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3.3.1 Testing for Information Misspecification
We cast the problem of determining agent information sets as a testing problem.10
We develop a simple test of misspecification for a proposed information set that
does not depend on the details of the particular model being used. In this section
we deal with the test of whether a candidate information set is correctly specified
in a general setting.11
For any arbitrarily proposed (by the analyst) information set, I˜i,t, it follows that
ln Ĥi,t = lnHs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δHKHi,t + ξ
H
i,t, and similarly for consumption. That is, measured
hours should equal those predicted by the model via the policy function,Hs,t, plus
measurement error. Notice, however, that this holds true for a whole class of mod-
els (i.e., entire families of policy functions) besides the ones arising from the par-
ticular model we proposed in Section 3.2.
For a pair of nonparametric functions
(
G Hs,t ,G
C
s,t
)
of the proposed information set,
it is true that
ln Ĥi,t = G Hs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δHKHi,t + ξ
H
i,t, (3.15)
ln Ĉi,t = G Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δCKCi,t + ξ
C
i,t. (3.16)
The prediction that hours and consumption will be a function of the state variables
of the model (i.e., the information set) is independent, for example, of the particular
form of the utility function or of the wage equations.12 It is in this sense that we
can work with a nonparametric function of I˜i,t, with the benefit that the solution of
the dynamic program does not need to be computed, and that the test will still be
valid for a general class of models predicting that hours and consumption can be
written as in equations (3.15) and (3.16).
The test is simple: we want to estimate the model (either solving the dynamic
problem forH ,C in equations (3.5) and (3.6), or by using nonparametric functions
- polynomials on the elements of I˜i,t for example) using a candidate information set
I˜i,t. Equations (3.15) and (3.16) are part of the contribution of individual i, who
selects schooling level s, to the likelihood. Alternatively, they could be used to form
moments to compare against the data in a GMM setting for example.
Let piHτ,t and piCτ,t be a set of auxiliary parameters. To define the proposed test,
10See Cunha, Heckman, andNavarro, 2005where a version of this test for a perfect credit markets
model of schooling choice is proposed.
11The particular implementation of the test used in this paper is shown in section 3.3.3.
12The idea that we do not necessarily need to solve the whole dynamic program to estimate some
functions is not new. See Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and Carranza
(2007) for recent examples.
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instead of basing the likelihood on equations (3.15) and (3.16), we use
ln Ĥi,t = G Hs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δHKHi,t + ξ
H
i,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
[
Yi,s,τ − E
(
Yi,s,τ|I˜i,t
)]
piHτ,t,
ln Ĉi,t = G Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δCKCi,t + ξ
C
i,t +
T∑
τ=t+1
[
Yi,s,τ − E
(
Yi,s,τ|I˜i,t
)]
piCτ,t.
By assumption, the predicted hours and consumption
(
G Hs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
,G Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
))
will not
depend on the earnings innovations included in the last term on the right hand
side of each equation since the agent integrates them out. The actual decisions,
however, will be a function of the true agent’s information set at t which may con-
tain elements of
{
Yi,s,τ − E
(
Yi,s,τ|I˜i,t
)}
T
τ=t+1. A test of which of the auxiliary parame-
ters multiplying the earnings innovations
{
piHτ,t, pi
C
τ,t
}
T
τ=t+1 equal zero is then a test of
whether the proposed agent’s information set at time t is correctly specified.13 No-
tice that, as done in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005, the schooling choice (or
any other choice) may also be used when testing.
Given the many ways one can propose information sets I˜i,t, specially the ele-
ments of the set unobserved to the econometrician, the test may to be of limited
practical value. The next sections present assumptions to make the test opera-
tional. The main intuition, that under a correct specification of the information set
the information innovations should not predict current choices, remains regardless
of the implementation.
3.3.2 The Factor Structure and the Arrival of Information
In order to separate unobserved (to the econometrician) variability from the uncer-
tainty facing agents, it is useful to assume that the unobservables for agent i can
be factor analyzed in the following way:
Ui,s,t = θiαs,t + εi,s,t
ζi = θiλ + ωi
(3.17)
where θi is a vector of mean zero mutually independent “factors”, εi,s,t and ωi are
also mean zero random variables called “uniquenesses”. Uniquenesses, factors and
measurement errors,
(
ξHi,t, ξ
C
i,t
)
, are all assumed mutually independent of each other
for all schooling levels s and time periods t. The factor structure assumption is a
natural starting point in analyses like the one in this paper. The wage equation can
be interpreted as a pricing equation. Elements of the vector θi represent missing
variables (i.e., variables unobserved by the econometrician) that affect outcomes
and the factor loadings their prices.
13And it can in fact be considered as a form of Sims’ test of causality (Sims (1972)).
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The equations in (3.17) are only a statistical decomposition and, by themselves,
are not informative about what is known to the agent at period t. We interpret ele-
ments of θi as permanent shocks that hit and influence earnings at different points
in time. They provide a useful device for extracting components of uncertainty from
future outcomes.
For identification purposes, we assume that the factor structure is such that
wages in the first period are affected only by the first element of θi (so the loadings
αs,t,l for l > 1 and t > 1 would all be zero). Earnings in period 2 are affected by the
first two elements of θi, the next period by the first three and so on. These elements
of θi would then be revealed to the agent through their effect on wages . However,
the agent might be able to forecast elements of θi that affect future wages but do
not affect past and currently observed outcomes. Let θi (t) =
(
θi,1, ..., θi,t
) denote those
elements of θi that affect wages at or before t, and let θi (t) =
(
θi,t+1, ..., θi,T
) denote
those elements of θi that affect wages after t. We further separate θi (t) into two
components,
(
θ¯ki (t) , θ¯
u
i (t)
)
where θ¯ki (t) is known by the agent at time t so it is in Ii,t
and θ¯ui (t) is unknown by the agent at time t so it is not in Ii,t.
The following assumptions are made about the arrival of information
(I-1) The information revelation process of the agent is such that he either
knows element l of θi, θi,l (l = 1, . . . L), or he does not. Revelation of information
when it happens, is instantaneous.
(I-2) At period t, the agent observes his outcomes for the period and so he knows
{εi,s,τ}tτ=1 and the elements of θi (t), that is those elements of θi that affect outcomes
in that period (or in any previous periods). If θi,l affects outcomes at τ ≤ t, then it is
known by the agent at time t.
(I-3) Agents have rational expectations so that the expectations they take and
the mathematical expectation operator with respect to the actual distributions in
the model coincide.
The rest of the information structure of the model is assumed to be such that
the agent has knowledge of the parameters of the model (e.g., ρ, ψ, µ (X)) as well as
knowledge of the observables Xi,Ki,Zi,14 and the uniqueness in the cost function ωi.
The econometrician never observes θi. By assumption,
{
εi,s,τ
}T
τ=t+1 is not part of the
agent’s information set Ii,t.
14This assumption can be relaxed by modeling the stochastic process that generates these vari-
ables. For example, Keane and Wolpin (1997) have one X, experience in each sector, the accumula-
tion of which they model.
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3.3.3 Determining the InformationSetUnder theFactor Struc-
ture
In this section we cast the problem of determining agent information sets of sec-
tion (3.3.1) in terms of the factor structure. Using the assumptions just made,15
We redefine the test of section (3.3.1) to test whether a candidate information set
defined in terms of of θ¯ki (t) and θ¯ui (t) is correctly specified.
The test proposed in Section 3.3.1 consists of including the income innovations
relative to a proposed information set I˜i,t and test whether they affect current
choices. Given the factor structure and information assumptions (I-1) - (I-3), the
only source of wages innovations “knowable” to the agent is given by θ¯i (t) (i.e., the
factors that affect wages only in periods after t). Armed with this intuition it is
possible then to design a simplified version of the test that does not require re-
specifying the information set many times.
Start by assuming that the agents do not know the different elements of θi until
they learn them when they hit wages. That is, the model is estimated using the
candidate information set I˜i,t that contains no elements of θi (t) before time t. To
define the proposed test, instead of basing the likelihood on equations (3.15) and
(3.16) we use
ln Ĥi,t = G Hs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δHKHi,t + ξ
H
i,t + θi (t) pi
H
t ,
ln Ĉi,t = G Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ δCKCi,t + ξ
C
i,t + θi (t) pi
C
t .
By assumption, the predicted hours and asset
(
G Hs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
,G Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
))
will not depend
on θi (t) since the agent integrates them out. The actual decisions, however, will be
a function of the true agent’s information set at t which may contain elements of
θi (t). In this case, the different elements of θi (t).
A test of whether those elements of
(
piHt , pi
C
t
)
associated with coordinate l of θi (t)
equal zero is then a test of whether element l of θi (t) belongs in the agent’s infor-
mation set at time t. That is, if the lth element of θi (t) is actually part of the agent’s
information set it will affect the hours and consumption decisions, and, as a conse-
quence, the elements of piCt associated with it will be estimated to be different from
zero. Since we assume that the agent’s do not know θi (t) at t, the first time element
l appears to affect choices is when it becomes known to the agent. For example, if
factor 4 shows up as affecting consumption decisions at time 2 (i.e., its associated
piC2 is estimated to be different from zero) we conclude that the agent knows factor
4 at time 2, even though it does not affect wages until 2 periods later.
There is nothing special about the hours and consumption decisions. Any other
decision variable that depends on future outcomes can also be used. The basic idea
15The assumption that θ is independent of X,Z is also imposed.
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is that if element l of θi (t) belongs in the information set of the agent at time t and
the agent acts on it, it will affect the choices he makes at t. In particular it will
affect the hours and consumption decisions and we can test for it. The same idea
can be applied to agent schooling choices. Hence, estimating the schooling choice
part of the model under I˜i,0 (with no elements of θi contained in it) and using16
E
(
Vcol,1
(Ii,1) − Vhs,1 (Ii,1) − Pi | Ii,0) + θipi0 > 0
as the college choice rule allows us to test for pi0 = 0 as a test for misspecification.
3.3.4 Identification of the Model
Formal semiparametric identification analysis of the factor model of equations (3.1)
- (3.17) is established in Appendix 1. This section provides an intuitive sketch of
the identification arguments used in the Appendix for the factor structure of log
wages,17 as well as establishing identification of the preference parameters. In this
paper identification theory is used to understand what in principle can be recov-
ered nonparametrically from the data. We then use flexible parametric forms to
obtain estimates of our high dimensional econometric model. The question of iden-
tifiability is a separate issue and should be judged independently of the choice of
parametric forms for estimation purposes.18
Wages are identified by adapting a version of the arguments in Carneiro, Hansen,
andHeckman (2003) andCooley Fruehwirth, Navarro, and Takahashi (2016) which
we now sketch for the case in which θi is a scalar. We assume that the prob-
lem of selection (i.e., that we only observe college wages for college graduates and
high school wages for high school graduates) is solved using the arguments in Ap-
pendix 1 which involve using variation in the Zi to achieve limit sets. Without
loss of generality, take the system of log-wage equations for high school lnWi,hs,t =
µhs,t
(
Xi,hs,t
)
+ θiαhs,t + εi,hs,t, t ≥ 1.
First, notice that the factor θi has no natural scale, i.e., θiα=κθi ακ for any constant
κ, so it needs to be set by a normalization as does the sign of the factor loading.
Normalizing one loading takes care of both problems. Suppose that we normalize
the loading in the first period so that αhs,1 = 1. Next, assuming that X is independent
of the error terms {Ui,hs,t}Tt=1, form cross moments of high school log wages from the
data over time. Solving the system of equations that comes from equating the data
(left hand side) to the theoretical moments predicted by the factor structure, we
16Notice that, same as before, we can use a nonparametric function of I˜i,1 instead of the actual
solution to the dynamic problem.
17Identification of the parameters of the “psychic” cost function is also established in Appendix 1.
See also Heckman and Navarro (2007).
18See Roehrig (1988), Heckman (2005) for more on this distinction
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obtain the factor loadings on the factor from
E
((
lnWi,hs,t − µh,t (Xi,h,t)) (lnWi,hs,t′ − µhs,t′ (Xi,hs,t′))k′ | X)
E
((
lnWi,hs,1 − µh,1 (Xi,h,1)) (lnWi,hs,t′ − µhs,t′ (Xi,hs,t′))k′ | X) =
αhs,tα
k
hs,t′E
(
θk+1
)
αkhs,t′E
(
θk+1
) = αhs,t, t , t′.
Given the loadings for all time periods, using Theorem D.0.2 in Appendix 1, the
distributions of both θi and
{
εi,hs,t
}T
t=1 can be nonparametrically identified. Notice
that, while we can form moments for high school wages over time, we can never
form moments of log wages across schooling levels since wages are not observed on
both schooling levels for anyone.
Given the normalizations we just made to the high school system of wages, mak-
ing a similar set of normalizations to the college system would amount to setting
the sign (and magnitude) of the unobserved covariance between college and high
school log wages. To see this, notice that the unobserved covariance of log wages
in high school and college in period 1 is cov (lnWi,hs,1, lnWi,col,1 | X) = αc,1σ2θ, so setting
αcol,1 = 1 would impose a strong restriction that the covariance is positive and fixed
by the variance determined in the high school system. Theorem D.0.3 and Corol-
lary D.0.4 in Appendix 1 show that restrictions of this nature do not need to be
imposed.
Preferences, the discount factor, andmeasurement error in hours and consump-
tion can be identified from the usual first order condition and Euler equation ar-
guments. From the first order condition for labor supply we have
C−ψi,t wi,tH1+
1
ϕ = hH
1
ϕ
i,t.
Replacing for consumption and labor by their measured (with error) counterparts
and taking logs we have
ln Ĥi,t = ϕ
[(
1 +
1
ϕ
)
lnH − ln h
]
−ψϕ ln Ĉi,t+ϕ lnwi,t+δHKHi,t+ψϕδCKCi,t+
(
ξHi,t + ψϕξ
C
i,t
)
. (3.18)
ln Ĉi,t in equation (3.18) is correlatedwith the residual via ξCi,t. Under the assumption
that measurement error is uncorrelated we can instrument for ln Ĉi,t with lagged
ln Ĉi,t−τ for τ > 0. With an instrument in hand, equation (3.18) identifies ϕ, ψ, h, the
unique elements of δH and δC, (δH + ψϕδC) for the common elements of Ki,t, as well
as the convolution ξHi,t + ψϕξCi,t.
While the risk aversion parameter ψ is identified from the argument above, it
can also be identified (along with the discount factors and the measurement er-
ror in consumption) using relatively standard Euler equation arguments.19 Since
the arguments are well known, what follows is a simple sketch of how this is done
19See Hansen and Singleton (1983), Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Attanasio and Low (2004).
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assuming that KCi,t,KCi,t+1 are contained in Ii,t. Using the first order condition of equa-
tion (3.7) and using equations (3.11) and (3.14) it follows that
E
1 + r1 + ρ
 Ĉi,t+1eKCi,tδC+ξCi,t
Ĉi,teK
C
i,t+1δC+ξ
C
i,t+1
−ψ − 1 | Ii,t
 = 0. (3.19)
which is a standard consumption Euler equation except that it contains measure-
ment error and so the standard argument of Hansen and Singleton (1983) cannot
be applied directly. Instead, as noted by Chioda (2004),20 one can take differences
of two adjacent Euler equations to form a valid moment condition and identify ψ.
With ψ in hand rewrite equation (3.19) as
1 + r
1 + ρ
 Ĉi,t+1eKCi,tδC+ξCi,t
Ĉi,teK
C
i,t+1δC+ξ
C
i,t+1
−ψ = ηi,t + 1
where ηi,t is expectational error which is a function (among other things) of the
elements of θi not contained in Ii,t. Taking logs and a linear approximation of ηi,t +1
around ηi,t = 0 we obtain
ln
Ĉi,t+1
Ĉi,t
=
1
ψ
ln
(
1 + r
1 + ρ
)
+
(
KCi,t+1 − KCi,t
)
δC +
(
ξCi,t+1 − ξCi,t −
ηi,t
ψ
)
(3.20)
From the fact that the interest rate r is given, it follows that we can identify the
discount factor ρ and the observable effect of measurement error δC for those ele-
ments of KCi,t that change over time.
We next proceed to look at the Euler equation in the terminal period
−
(
Ĉi,Te−δCK
C
i,t−ξCi,t
)−ψ
+
b (1 + r)
1 + ρ
(
ET+1 + (1 + r) Ai,T
)−χ
= 0 (3.21)
where there is no expectation with respect to AT since it is known at time T . For
identification purposes it is helpful to rewrite equation (3.21) as
ln Ĉi,T = − 1
ψ
ln
(
b (1 + r)
1 + ρ
)
+
χ
ψ
ln
(
ET+1 + (1 + r) Ai,T
)
− KCi,TδC − ξCi,T . (3.22)
Since ψ, and ρ are known from the argument above, b, χ, the remaining elements
of δC as well as the distribution of ξCi,T are identified.
Once identification of the preference parameters is secured, all the elements re-
quired to solve the consumption allocation and the labor supply problem of equation
(3.1) are in place. To show that the distributions of the unobserved part of measure-
ment error are identified remember that the assumption that ξHi,t, ξCi,t are indepen-
dent of θi and of Ki,t is imposed. Since the left hand side of ln Ĉi,t−KCi,tδC = lnCt
(Ii,t)+ξCi,t
is known and so is the distribution of lnCt (Ii,t) we can recover the distribution of ξCi,t
by deconvolution. By either following a similar argument, or noticing that ξHi,t+ψϕξCi,t
is identified from equation (3.18), it is easy to show that ξHi,t is identified.
20See also Ventura (1994) for the parametric case.
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3.4 Data and Parametrization of the Model
The model in this paper is estimated on a sample of white males who either grad-
uated high school (and only high school) or are college graduates. Since the PSID
data does not contain enough observations with measurements for ability, and the
NLSY79 does not contain the full lifecycle for any individual, the sample used con-
tains individuals from both the NLSY79 and PSID datasets pooled together. The
sample consists of a total of 1,642 white males born between 1923 and 1964, who
either took the ASVAB battery of tests (NLSY) or the IQ Word Test (PSID). Of
these, 1,263 come from NLSY79 and 379 from PSID.
Individual working life cycles are simplified to eight 6-year-long periods.21 This
simplifying assumption is used to keep the computational complexity of the model
manageable.22 For each period, hours worked is simply the sum of total hours
worked during the six years. Log-earnings in the period are calculated as the log
of the present value of earnings for the period discounted at r = 3%. Wages for the
period are then calculated as the ratio of earnings to hours worked in the period.
Earnings and hours for individuals who are missing are imputed only in the years
in which there was no survey using an average of the earnings in the years im-
mediately adjacent (i.e., the year before and the year after) to the missing year. If
earnings are not available in either of these years they are left as missing. Miss-
ings are treated as random events.23
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the pooled dataset used to estimate themodel.24
In general, college graduates get higher wages, consume more and have more as-
sets than high school graduates. They also have higher test scores, come from
better family backgrounds, have fewer siblings and are more likely to live in a lo-
cation where college tuition is lower.
For each schooling level s = {hs, col} and for each period of wages t = {1, ..., 8} we
model lnWi,s,t as being generated by a factor model:
21Period 1 covers ages 18 to 23, period 2 ages 24 to 29, period 3 ages 30 to 35, period 4 ages 36 to
41, period 5 ages 42 to 47, period 6 ages 48 to 53, period 7 ages 54 to 59 and period 8 ages 60 to 65.
There is an additional terminal period in the model which includes whatever happens after age 65.
Utility in this terminal period is modeled as depending only on assets carried to that period and a
minimum income (e.g., social security income), so no additional data for the period is required.
22Estimation of the model requires the solution of the dynamic programming problem every time
a different parameter vector is tried. Furthermore, the evaluation of the likelihood itself requires
calculating a multidimensional integral (7 factors plus initial assets) for each individual in the
sample.
23See Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) for evidence that observed people in PSID have
similar characteristics as those in the CPS so attrition is roughly random. See MaCurdy, Mroz, and
Gritz (1998) for evidence that attrition is roughly random in the NLSY79.
24A more complete description of the dataset is presented in Appendix D.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: White Male High School and College Graduates
Full Sample High School College Graduates
Variable Name Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Log Wages 5,813 -6.44 0.64 -10.01 -3.70 2,893 -6.64 0.53 -9.86 -4.09 2,920 -6.24 0.68 -10.01 -3.70
PSID 13,136 0.23 0.42 0 1 6,768 0.21 0.40 0 1 6,368 0.26 0.44 0 1
Mother’s education 13,136 4.22 1.60 0 8 6,768 3.73 1.29 0 8 6,368 4.73 1.72 0 8
Year of Birth 13,136 1955.73 10.16 1923 1964 6,768 1956.20 9.91 1923 1964 6,368 1955.24 10.40 1923 1964
Number of Siblings 13,136 2.85 2.00 0 18 6,768 3.22 2.17 0 18 6,368 2.45 1.71 0 12
PV of Local Tuition at age 18 13,136 0.72 0.27 0.00 2.01 6,768 0.74 0.28 0 1.80 6,368 0.69 0.26 0.15 2.01
Local Unemp at age 17: High School 13,136 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.54 6,768 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.54 6,368 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.22
Local Unemp at age 17: College 13,136 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.35 6,768 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.35 6,368 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.16
College 13,136 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 6,768 0 0 0 0 6,368 1 1 1 1
ASVAB
Arithmetic Reasoning 10,104 0.53 0.30 0.03 1 5,376 0.38 0.25 0.03 1 4,728 0.70 0.26 0.03 1
Word Knowledge 10,104 0.53 0.31 0.03 1 5,376 0.38 0.27 0.03 1 4,728 0.71 0.25 0.03 1
Paragraph Composition 10,104 0.56 0.31 0.03 1 5,376 0.41 0.29 0.03 1 4,728 0.74 0.25 0.03 1
Coding Speed 10,104 0.51 0.29 0.03 1 5,376 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.98 4,728 0.63 0.27 0.03 1
Math Knowledge 10,104 0.53 0.30 0.03 1 5,376 0.35 0.22 0.03 1 4,728 0.74 0.24 0.03 1
IQ Word Test 3,032 0.58 0.29 0.01 1 1,392 0.48 0.28 0.01 1 1,640 0.67 0.27 0.03 1
Grade Completed at Test Date 13,136 12.07 2.40 7 21 6,768 11.08 1.27 7 14 6,368 13.11 2.83 8 21
Enrolled at Test Date 13,136 0.45 0.50 0 1 6,768 0.26 0.44 0 1 6,368 0.66 0.48 0 1
Age at Test Date 13,136 22.42 7.26 16 49 6,768 22.16 7.11 16 49 6,368 22.70 7.40 16 49
Ability 13,136 0.00 0.24 -0.82 0.52 6,768 -0.08 0.22 -0.52 0.52 6,368 0.08 0.23 -0.82 0.52
Consumption 2,835 25.71 29.80 0.18 365.85 1,416 19.14 21.55 0.18 358.57 1,419 32 35.00 0.45 365.85
Assets 18-65 5,903 12.52 29.79 -24.84 476.90 3,002 7.31 18.12 -24.84 427.40 2,901 17.90 37.55 -21.63 476.90
Hours 6,623 12517.57 4156.55 35.00 23952.00 3,330 12555.71 3948.28 40.00 23952.00 3,293 12479.00 4357.30 35.00 23940.00
Married 9,267 0.63 0.45 0 1 4,709 0.62 0.45 0 1 4,558 0.65 0.45 0 1
Number of Children 9,326 0.87 1.10 0 8.67 4,730 0.86 1.08 0 7 4,596 0.87 1.12 0.00 8.67
1. x 10,000. Measured in year 2000 US dollars.
2. Both ASVAB tests and IQ Word tests are measured in percentiles of their respective distributions.
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lnWi,s,t = Xi,tβs,t +
min{t,7}∑
j=1
θi, jαs,t, j + εi,s,t.
To pin down the scale of each θ j, we normalize the loading of the high school wage
equation to be one for that factor in the same period. That is, for factor ` = 1, ..., 7
we normalize αh,`,` = 1. The psychic cost function is also allowed to (in principle,
since only factors in the agent’s information set at the schooling decision age affect
it) be a function of all factors:
Pi = Ziγ +
7∑
j=1
θi, jλ j + ωi.
The Zi include variables that only affect the schooling decision like family back-
ground, and local unemployment.
In order to account for ability in a consistent way across both datasets, an addi-
tional one factor model that utilizes a system of external measurements on ability
is used. For the case of NLSY79 data, five components from the ASVAB battery
of tests, measured as percentile ranks in the population are used. For PSID, the
1972 IQ test (also measured as percentile ranks) is included.25 Each test, Mi, j, is
modeled as a function of individual ability, Qi:
Mi, j = XMi β
M
j + Qiα
M
j + ε
M
i, j. (3.23)
To pin down the scale and sign of ability, the loading on the arithmetic reason-
ing test
(
αM1
)
is normalized to 1. This normalization associates higher levels of the
factor with higher test scores, purged of the effect of XM, so we interpret Qi as abil-
ity. In this interpretation, tests are assumed to be noisy proxies for ability which
is given by Qi. Identification of the loadings and non-parametric distributions of
Qi, εMi, j follows from the same arguments used in Theorem D.0.3. Table 3.2 shows
the full set of covariates used for ability measures, log wages, costs, and measure-
ment error in hours and consumption.
Each of the factors θi,` is allowed to follow a mixture of normals distribution.26
In all cases mixtures with 2 elements are found to be adequate. The distribution
of ability follows a mixture of three normals: Qi ∼ ∑3j=1 piQ, j f (Qi; µQ, j, σ2Q, j). The re-
maining distributions in the model (e.g., measurement error, uniquenesses) are all
assumed to be normal.
In order to allow for levels of borrowing that are roughly consistent with the
ones observed in the data, we assume that individuals have access to some guar-
anteed income (e.g., social security income) when retired, YMINi,S ,T+1. We set the levels
25See also Hansen, Heckman, andMullen (2004) for an analysis of ASVAB tests and their relation
to ability.
26θi,` ∼ ∑J`j=1 pi`, j f (θi,`; 0, σ2`, j), where f (x; µ, σ2) is a normal density with mean µ and variance σ2
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Table 3.2: List of Covariates
Wages Test System Cost Function Measurement Error
Hours Consumption
Age Yes No No Yes Yes
Age squared Yes No No No No
Ability Yes Yes Yes No No
NLSY Dummy Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Married No No No No Yes
Number of Children No No No No Yes
Age at Test Date No Yes No No No
Grade Completed at Test Date No Yes No No No
Enrolled at Test Date No Yes No No No
Local Unemp at age 17: High School No No Yes No No
Local Unemp at age 17: College No No Yes No No
Number of Siblings No No Yes No No
Mother’s education No No Yes No No
of YMINi,s,T+1 to be roughly consistent with the 18 additional years of life expectancy at
age 65 observed in the data, as well as with the average levels of social security
income retiree’s got in 2016: 1,341 yearly for high school graduates (974 in 2000
dollars), and 2,000 yearly for college graduates (1,453 in 2000 dollars). With these
numbers in place, in any given period, the maximum level of borrowing sustained
in the model, AMINi,s,t , is automatically determined by equation (3.4).
In our estimation, we set the maximum number of hours one can work,H¯, to
24000 hours per-period for all periods except one. We only allow people who are
in college in period 1 to work half time, and hence set H¯=12000 in this case. We
also approximate the (unobserved) distribution of initial assets (i.e., assets in pe-
riod 0) with the distribution of assets in the first three periods multiplied times 0.5.
The model is estimated in two stages. In the first stage we estimate the model
in equation (3.23) by maximum likelihood.27 Given the estimates, we predict Qi for
all individuals and include it as part of the X and Z variables for the rest of the
model.
Estimation of the rest of the model is done by maximum likelihood using a com-
bination of accelerated random search, the Nelder-Meade simplex method and the
BFGS algorithm to maximize the likelihood. The contribution of individual i who
chooses schooling S i = s
27The contribution to this likelihood for individual i is
∫
Q
J∏
j=1
fεMi, j
(
Mi, j − XMi βMj − QiαMj |Qi, XMi, j
)
dF (Q) .
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∫
A0,Θ

∏8
t=1 fεi,s,t
(
lnWi,s,t − Xi,tβs,t − θiαs,t|θi, Xi,s,t)∏8
t=1 fξHi,t
(
ln Ĥi,t − lnHs,t (Ii,t) − KHi,tδH |θi, Xi,s,t,Zi,KHi,t)∏8
t=2 fξCi,t
(
ln Ĉi,t − lnCs,t (Ii,t) − KCi,tδC |θi, Xi,s,t,Zi,KCi,t)
Pr
(
S i = s|θi, Xi,s,t,Zi)
 dF (A0, θ) .
Evaluation of the likelihood requires that the econometrician solve the dynamic
program (for a given proposed Ii,t) in order to evaluate the schooling selection prob-
ability, the choice of hours worked, and the consumption policy function Cs,t. Since
the econometrician never observes any element of θi or assets in period 0, he has to
integrate against their distribution when evaluating the likelihood. In the model
we estimate, the value function given by the solution to the hours and consump-
tion allocation problem is approximated numerically using a second order complete
polynomial approximate.
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Let M denote ability measurements and Q ability such that M=XβM+QαM+εM. The graph plots the density f(Q).
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Predicted Ability
3.5.1 Ability
We begin by estimating the model for ability of equation (3.23). We use five com-
ponents of the ASVAB battery of tests contained in the NLSY-79: Arithmetic Rea-
soning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Composition, Coding Speed and Math Knowl-
edge; as well as the 1972 IQWord Test for PSID. Tables A3-1 and A3-2 in Appendix
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Table 3.3: Test for Information Set Misspecification
Auxiliary Parameters θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7
Schooling Choice −0.970+ −0.512+ -0.095 -0.160 -0.126 0.064 0.388+
(0.091) (0.144) (0.120) (0.146) (0.105) (0.180) (0.154)
Log Hours
Age 18-24 0.303+ 0.015 -0.007 0.065 0.269+ −0.128+
(0.067) (0.038) (0.057) (0.045) (0.055) (0.062)
Age 25-30 0.009 0.112+ -0.027 0.132+ −0.175+
(0.023) (0.033) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 31-36 0.081+ −0.038+ 0.102+ −0.186+
(0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Age 37-42 −0.044+ 0.110+ −0.126+
(0.014) (0.020) (0.015)
Age 43-48 0.140+ −0.101+
(0.037) (0.031)
Age 49-54 −0.265+
(0.103)
Log Consumption
Age 25-30 0.117 0.059 -0.096 -0.055 -0.103
(0.064) (0.097) (0.066) (0.080) (0.078)
Age 31-36 0.130+ -0.023 0.003 −0.277+
(0.061) (0.036) (0.049) (0.051)
Age 37-42 -0.045 0.133 -0.048
(0.061) (0.074) (0.068)
Age 43-48 0.075 -0.093
(0.074) (0.076)
Age 49-54 0.165
(0.183)
1. Let g(I) be the predicted choice as a function of the information set I. The factor not included
in I, are added to the choice’s contribution to the likelihood, and we test whether their associated
parameters are different from zero.
2. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
3. + Significantly different from zero, at levels of 5% or less.
3 contain the parameter estimates for this model. As expected, ability is associ-
ated with higher test scores. With the estimates in hand, we then use Bayes rule
to predict ability for each individual. Figure 3.1 plots the distribution of predicted
ability that we obtain using this procedure. As can be seen from the graph, the
distribution is highly non-normal, hence it is important to allow for more general
distributions like the mixture distribution we use.
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Table 3.4: Model Fit: Average Outcomes
Log Hours Log Consumption Log Wages
Data Predicted Data Predicted Data Predicted
Age 18-23 8.656 8.673 -7.307 -7.290
[8.434, 8.788] [-7.360, -7.244]
Age 24-29 9.395 9.408 2.825 2.819 -6.725 -6.762
[9.286, 9.528] [2.722, 2.923] [-6.817, -6.720]
Age 30-36 9.512 9.473 2.857 2.860 -6.489 -6.502
[9.418, 9.529] [2.778, 2.945] [-6.548, -6.458]
Age 36-41 9.546 9.519 2.898 2.870 -6.286 -6.323
[9.458, 9.577] [2.760, 2.982] [-6.374, -6.277]
Age 42-47 9.493 9.521 3.102 3.107 -6.227 -6.243
[9.439, 9.597] [2.978, 3.222] [-6.299, -6.193]
Age 48-53 9.456 9.450 3.338 3.339 -6.163 -6.200
[9.260, 9.682] [3.125, 3.630] [-6.280, -6.130]
Age 54-59 9.372 9.352 3.267 3.248 -6.185 -6.218
[9.146, 9.536] [2.866, 3.608] [-6.356, -6.098]
Age 60-65 8.863 8.872 3.436 3.434 -6.318 -6.348
[8.589, 9.152] [2.50, 4.128] [-6.526, -6.194]
1. 95% Confidence interval in brackets.
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3.5.2 Test of Misspecification
Table 3.3 presents the results of the proposed test of misspecification of the agent’s
information set using the auxiliary parameters, pi, defined in Section 3.3.3 for the
elements of θ¯i (t). We estimate all of the policy functions using a sieve for each func-
tion. In terms of the empirical model described above, this entails testing whether
θi,` affects the agent’s choices before period ` (when it hits wages).
In summary, the results of the test show that ability, θ1, θ2 and θ7 are known
at the time schooling choices are made; that θ6 becomes known in period 1; addi-
tionally θ4 becomes known in period 2; finally all factors are known at period 3. As
a consequence, all of the results presented in the next sections are based on esti-
mates of the structural model using this information set.
Tables A3-3 to A3-7 in Appendix E present the parameter estimates for the
model estimated under this information structure. In total the model has 144 pa-
rameters.28 The estimated parameters are all within reasonable ranges. In partic-
ular, we estimate a coefficient of risk aversion for consumption of 0.49 (on the low
side), a Frisch elasticity of labor of 1.00 and a discount factor of 0.94, which implies
a yearly discount rate of around 1%.
3.5.3 Model Fit to the Data
To validate themodel estimates obtained under the information set chosen as a con-
sequence of the test in the previous section, a variety of checks of fit of predictions
of the model versus their data counterparts are performed. First, the proportion
of people who attend college in the data and the one predicted by the model are
compared.29 Whereas 48.5% of the people in the sample are college graduates, the
model predicts roughly 48.3% slightly below the actual number. The 95 confidence
interval for this predicted proportion is (44.7, 54.1), hence the null hypothesis of
equality of predicted and actual proportions cannot be rejected.
Table 3.4 presents the (per-period) mean for the logs of wages, hours worked,
and consumption both in the data as well as predicted from the model. Overall the
model does a remarkably good job of matching the moments in the data. When we
perform formal tests of equality between data and model means in Table 3.4, we
cannot reject equality in any case. As we show in Tables A3-8 and A3-9 in Appendix
3, the model fits the data on consumption and wages by schooling level equally well,
but has a much harder time reproducing the pattern of hours by schooling level.
As a final check on the predictions of the model we estimate a treatment-on-the-
treated parameter using a semi-parametric control function approach as described
28The interest rate r is set at 3% annually.
29All of our predicted results are based on simulating (i.e., sampling the unobservables) 50 times
for each individual in the data.
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in Navarro (2008) on both the data and on data simulated from the model. We per-
form this comparison since the control function approach does not impose a factor
structure on the errors, but the simulated data is generated under this assump-
tion. In the first stage we predict the probability of going to college with a probit of
schooling on local unemployment, tuition, number of siblings, mothers education,
and ability for both the data and the simulated data. We then run a regression
of log wages on age, age-squared, ability, an indicator for NLSY and a 2nd degree
polynomial on the (log) probability of schooling, first for high school graduates and
then for college graduates. These gives us unbiased estimate of the schooling spe-
cific wage regressions (which are actually very similar to the parameters we esti-
mate from the full model, as they should be). Finally, we use these estimates to
correct for selection bias and calculate the wage gain of going to college for college
goers both in the data and as predicted by the model. We estimate a percentage
gain of 72% in the data, and of 75% in the simulated data, and the difference is not
significant. We take this as evidence that our factor model assumptions produce
similar results than less parametric approaches like the control function.
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Log of present value of earnings discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Let PVhs denote potential earnings in high school. Let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice.
The graph plots f(log(PVhs)|S=hs) and f(log(PVhs)|S=col).
Figure 3.2: Log Present Value of High School Earnings Conditional on Schooling
Choices
3.5.4 Counterfactual Analysis, Variability and Uncertainty
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 compare fitted and counterfactual distributions of log earnings
for each schooling level. The figures show that people who actually stop at high
school make more money as high school graduates than college graduates would
have had they stopped at high school. In a similar manner, college graduates have
higher college earnings than high school graduates would have had they graduated
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Log of present value of earnings discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Let PVcol denote potential earnings in high school. Let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice.
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Figure 3.3: Log Present Value of College Earnings Conditional on Schooling
Choices
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Log of present value of earnings discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Let PVhs,PVcol  denote potential earnings in high school and college respectively. Let S denote the agent's actual
schooling choice. The graph plots f(log(PVcol)-log(PVhs)|S=hs) and f(log(PVcol)-log(PVhs)|S=col).
Figure 3.4: Realized Monetary Gains to College Conditional on Schooling Choice
college. So, at least in terms of earnings, people seem to be sorting in the right di-
rection. In Figure 3.4 we plot the difference in log lifetime earnings, i.e., the ex-post
realized gain of attending college, implied by the previous figures. Consistent with
the sorting shown in the previous figures, the average annual return to college for
high school graduates (i.e., treatment-on-the-untreated) is -1.6%, while the annual
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return for college graduates is 20.5%.30 This, however, is not the whole story. Two
additional features are worth noting. First, a large proportion of high school grad-
uates would have obtained positive gains if they had gone to college; and second, a
considerable fraction of college graduates get an ex-post negative gain.
If people based their decisions only onmonetary gains, and observed (as opposed
to expected) gains were the appropriate number to look at when explaining school-
ing decisions, one may be able to explain the proportion of high school graduates
who would have obtained positive returns with, for example, credit constraints.
One would be hard pressed to find an explanation to the significant proportion of
people attending college who actually obtain a negative ex-post monetary gain. A
major advantage of writing a general model of schooling decision under uncertainty
is that it allows us to distinguish between expected (by the agent) and observed (by
the econometrician) outcomes.
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High School Log Wage Residuals Under Different Information Sets
Let Ui,hs,t=lnWi,hs,t-Xi,tβhs,t-Σθ∈{I 0}θαhs,t denote the high school log wage residual that represents what is unknown to the agent at the time his schooling choice is made under some
assumed information set I0. The graph plots the densities f(Ui,hs,t|I0,S=hs) and f(Ui,hs,t|I0,S=col) under different assumptions about which factors are known to the agent at time 0.
Figure 3.5: High School Log Wage Residuals Under Different Information Sets
In order to get an idea of the difference between variability and uncertainty,
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present the distributions of log wages under three different
assumed information sets for the agent at the time the schooling decision is made.
Even though there is a lot of dispersion, not all of it is truly uncertain to the agent.
The variability in college wages is larger than that in college, and it is reduced
by about the same proportion as we go from a state in which the agent knows no
factor to one in which he knows (θi,1, θi,2, θi,7) – the correctly specified information
set. Figure 3.7 shows that wage gains to college are also predictable and that the
30All annual figures are calculated assuming it takes 4.5 years to get a college degree.
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College Log Wage Residuals Under Different Information Sets
Let Ui,col,t=lnWi,col,t-Xi,tβcol,t-Σθ∈{I 0}θαcol,t denote the high school log wage residual that represents what is unknown to the agent at the time his schooling choice is made under some
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Figure 3.6: College Log Wage Residuals Under Different Information Sets
0
.5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
-4 -2 0 2 4
Log Wage Differences
 I0 ⊃ {θ1,...,θ7}
 I0 ∩ {θ3,θ4,θ5,θ6}=∅
 I0 ∩ {θ1,...,θ7}=∅
Log Wage Gain to College Under Different Information Sets
Let Ui,k,t=lnWi,k,t-Xi,tβk,t-Σθ∈{I 0}θαk,t denote the log wage residual for potential state k=(hs,col), that represents what is unknown to the agent at the time his schooling choice is made under some
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Figure 3.7: Log Wage Gain to College Under Different Information Sets
variability is reduced more than the levels are.
This pattern is more explicitly analyzed in Table 3.5. In particular, under the
estimated information set at time 0 (i.e., including θi,1, θi,2 and θi,7) roughly 56% –
52%– of what would otherwise be considered uncertainty in high school –college–
wages is predictable by the agent at the time his schooling decision is made. In the
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Table 3.5: Agent’s Forecast of the Variance of the Log Wages Under Different
Information Sets at Schooling Choice Date
Var(lnWcol) Var(lnWhs) Var(lnWcol − lnWhs)
IE0 ∩ {θ1, · · · , θ7} = ∅ Variance 0.5756 0.4754 1.5152
(no information)
I0 ∩ {θ3, · · · , θ6} = ∅ Variance 0.2767 0.2092 0.4952
(estimated information set) Fraction of Variance2 with IE0 51.92% 56.00% 67.32%explained by I0
I0 ⊃ {θ1, · · · , θ7} Variance 0.0741 0.0480 0.1221
("full" information) Fraction of Variance3 with IE0 87.12% 89.90% 91.94%explained by I0
1. Variance of the unpredictable component of log wages as predicted at age 18.
2. The variance of the unpredictable component of high school log wages with I0 as given by is (1-
0.5192)*0.5756=0.2767..
3. The variance of the unpredictable component of high school log wages with I0 ⊃ {θ1, · · · , θ7} is (1-
0.8712)*0.5756=0.0741.
Table 3.6: Proportion of People who, when Guaranteed their Expected Wages
(Keeping Credit Constraints in Place), Regret their Choice
Choice Under Guaranteed Wage
Choice Under Uncertainty High School College
Choose HS: 51.69% Choose Col: 48.38%
High School
Choose HS: 51.69% 92.78% 7.22%
College
Choose Col: 48.31% 7.58% 92.42%
1. For example, of the 51.69% of people who originally chose high school,
92.78% still do, while 7.22% now choose college. This leads to a total of
51.69% choosing high school under guaranteed wages.
same manner, the variance of the wage gains to college when the information set
contains θi,1, θi,2 and θi,7 is only 33% of the one we would obtain if we assumed the
unobservables for the agent and the analyst coincide. That is, of the total observed
variability in high school log wages, only 44% (i.e., 0.2092/0.4754) constitutes true
uncertainty for the individual, i.e., variability not explained by his information.
Similarly for college where 48% is left unexplained, 33% for wage gains.
Establishing this difference is clearly important for interpretation of the results.
In order to study the importance of uncertainty for schooling decisions we perform
the following experiment. In Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we allow people to either insure
against or eliminate uncertainty in wages, keeping the credit constraints in effect.
In order to do so, we either assume that agents can get insurance that guarantees
them their expected wage given the information set at period 0 (Table 3.6),31 or that
31The assumption being that the insurer gets the difference between the expected wage and the
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Table 3.7: Proportion of People who, after Observing their Realized Wages
(Keeping Credit Constraints in Place), Regret their Choice
Choice Under Certainty
Choice Under Uncertainty High School College
Choose HS: 46.03% Choose Col: 53.97%
High School
Choose HS: 51.69% 78.84% 21.16%
College
Choose Col: 48.31% 10.92% 89.08%
1. For example, of the 51.69% of people who originally chose high school,
78.84% still do, while 21.16% now choose college. This leads to a total of
46.03% choosing high school under certainty.
they get perfect certainty about what their wages will be in the future (Table 3.7).
We keep the constraints at the original level in order to get a picture of the impor-
tance of uncertainty alone, even though the interpretation of themodel implies that
credit constraints arise as a consequence of uncertainty. Section 3.5.7 relaxes both.
Table 3.6 shows the importance of looking at micro evidence when accounting
for uncertainty in schooling decisions. If we look only at aggregate numbers when
we allow agents to insure against wage uncertainty the simulation shows essen-
tially no effect of allowing agents to insure (keeping credit constraints in place) on
college graduation. However, when we look at the micro evidence it becomes evi-
dent that the effect is much larger. Roughly 7.2% of the individuals who choose to
stop at high school under uncertainty would choose to graduate college and roughly
7.6% of college graduates would regret their choice under uncertainty and would
have stopped at high school.
A similar, but more significant, pattern shows up in Table 3.7 when we allow
individuals to make decisions under complete certainty about wages. In the ag-
gregate, college attendance increases by 5.7%-points, from 48.3% to 54.0%. At the
individual level, we can see there is a lot of ex-post regret. Roughly 21% of the
individuals who choose to stop at high school under uncertainty would choose to
graduate college instead, and roughly 11% of college graduates would regret their
choice under uncertainty and would have stopped at high school under complete
certainty. Notice that, for both tables, the micro findings match the patterns of
Figure 3.7: a proportion of high school graduates would have earned positive ex-
post gains had they gone to college, and a fraction of college graduates would get
negative ex-post gains and so may regret their decision ex-post. Since there is lit-
tle action for the insurance case compared to the case of certainty, from now on we
focus on the second one.
realized one.
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Table 3.8: Average Annual Ex-post Gains and Equivalent Variations with and
without Uncertainty1 (Keeping Credit Constraints in Place)
Choice Under Uncertainty Choice Under Certainty
High School College High School College
Ex-post Gain1 -1.57% 20.56% -7.04% 21.01%
Equivalent Variation2 -10.27% 30.61% -10.64% 33.26%
1. Certainty is defined as allowing agents to observe and choose based on their realized ex-
post wages.
2. Let PVcol be the present value of earnings in college and PVhs for high school. The lifetime
ex-post gain to college is defined as G = logPVcol − logPVhs. The annual ex-post gain is given
by ((1 +G)(1/4.5)) − 1, under the assumption that it takes 4.5 years to obtain a college degree.
3. The lifetime equivalent variation, EV, is defined by the proportion of consumption (in each
period) in the high school state that an agent is willing to give up (or needs to be compensated
by) in order to be indifferent between choosing high school or college. The annual equivalent
variation is given by (1+ EV)(1/4.5)− 1, under the assumption that it takes 4.5 years to obtain
a college degree.
As one would expect, there is increased sorting in terms of ex-post gains. As
shown in Table 3.8, whereas the average ex-post annual gain to college for a col-
lege graduate whomakes his decision using his expectations about future outcomes
(i.e., integrating out the unknown {θi,k}6k=3 , {εi,hs,t, εi,col,t}8t=1) is 20.56%, it would in-
crease to 21.01% if he were allowed to choose based on actual realized earnings.
The same experiment shows that the average ex-post gains for high school gradu-
ates would decrease from -1.57% to -7.04%. Hence, the “best” high school graduates
stop at high school, and similarly for college.
3.5.5 Sorting on Ability and Factors
In Figures 3.8(a-d) graph the densities of ability and factors 1, 2 and 7 conditioning
on schooling choice. Since the remaining factors are estimated to not be known by
the agent at the time the schooling decision is made, there is no selection based
on them so the distribution does not change by schooling. There is strong evidence
of selection in terms of ability, θ1, and θ7. The distribution of ability for college
graduates is to the right of that for high school graduates. Individuals strongly
sort in terms of ability, even after controlling for family background and individ-
ual characteristics at test date. People with higher ability graduate college more
than people with lower ability. The average ability for high school graduates is
0.63 of a standard deviation lower than that of college graduates. Numerically, the
difference is 0.14. A reverse pattern holds true for θ1, θ2 and θ7.
Since the factors are not tied to an external set of measurements (like ability is),
it is hard to provide an interpretation for them. In order to aid in interpretation, in
Table 3.9 we present the correlation of ability, θ1, θ2,θ7, and wages, hours, earnings
and schooling choices. Ability is positively correlated with college wages, hours
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Let f(θ1) denote the density of factor 1, and let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice. The graph plots f(θ1|S=hs) and f(θ1|S=col).
(b) Densities of θ1 Conditional on Schooling
Choice
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Let f(θ2) denote the density of factor 2, and let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice. The graph plots f(θ2|S=hs) and f(θ2|S=col).
(c) Densities of θ2 Conditional on Schooling
Choice
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Let f(θ7) denote the density of factor 7, and let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice. The graph plots f(θ7|S=hs) and f(θ7|S=col).
(d) Densities of θ7 Conditional on Schooling
Choice
Figure 3.8: Density of Ability and Factors Conditional on Schooling Choice
and earnings, as well as with college attendance, but uncorrelated with their high
school counterparts. θ1, on the other hand, is positively correlated with high school
wages, hours and earnings but negatively correlated with their college counter-
parts as well as with college attendance. θ2 is also positively correlated with high
school outcomes and negatively with college outcomes (to a lesser degree for both),
but it is very weakly correlated with schooling. θ7, on the other hand, is very weakly
correlated with outcomes but highly correlated with schooling. In summary, θ2 de-
termines outcomes but not schooling, θ7 determines schooling but not outcomes,
while θ1 and ability determine both.
As a consequence, only ability and θ1 are important for explaining the difference
in Figure 3.7 between high school and college graduates. That is, the difference is
in big part due the different composition in terms of ability and θ1 of the selected
population via their effect on preference for schooling, and on their effects on the
value of consumption for each schooling level via their effects on outcomes.
3.5.
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Table 3.9: Correlation Matrix
Ability θ1 θ2 θ7 Log Wage Log Hours Log Present Value Earnings
High School College High School College High School College
θ1 -0.002
θ2 0.007 -0.010
θ7 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004
HS Log Wage -0.001 0.427 0.318 0.038
College Log Wage 0.072 -0.404 -0.121 0.049 -0.148
HS Log Hours 0.000 0.346 0.268 0.036 0.672 -0.116
College Log Hours 0.055 -0.253 -0.087 0.040 -0.040 0.566 0.056
HS Log PV Earnings -0.002 0.770 0.436 0.034 0.629 -0.335 0.503 -0.224
College Log PV Earnings 0.145 -0.733 -0.118 0.055 -0.334 0.556 -0.305 0.305 -0.562
Schooling 0.228 -0.525 -0.035 -0.457 -0.239 0.230 -0.206 0.134 -0.435 0.411
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3.5.6 The Importance of Preferences
From the evidence presented so far, one thing should be clear: high school gradu-
ates and college graduates are not the same. There is a great deal of heterogene-
ity among people. Finding high returns to college for people who actually attend
college (what is commonly called “treatment on the treated” in the evaluation lit-
erature) is not necessarily informative about how much people who choose not to
attend college would make if they were to attend college.
Furthermore, not all of this variability is uncertain to the agent at the time
he is making his decisions. He can actually forecast a considerable proportion of
it. Even though this goes a long way to explain why individuals go to college, we
are still facing the question of why some people would not take advantage of the
average positive gain they would get if they attended college.
So far the fact that individual decisions are based on utility maximization and
not on income comparisons has been ignored. The estimated risk aversion coeffi-
cient in the model is 0.5. While this number is on the low end of the numbers re-
ported by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999), agents are in fact risk averse
and do not care only about monetary returns.
A number that better summarizes the gain that individuals obtain from their
schooling decisions, the “equivalent variation”, is presented in the second line of
Table 3.8. This number is calculated by solving for the fraction by which high
school consumption needs to be changed every period for an individual to be in-
different between choosing high school or college. The equivalent variation is the
consumption value that an individual places on his schooling decision accounting
for preferences and, depending on the case, uncertainty. As shown in the table,
on average, high school graduates would need their consumption to be reduced by
10.3% every period for them to be indifferent. That is, even though high school
graduates on average face a very small monetary loss of going to college, once we
account for the effect of preferences and uncertainty this is loss is much larger. In
the same manner, the seemingly large 20.5% ex-post gain college graduates obtain
on average is increased to 30.6% once preferences for consumption and leisure are
accounted for.
In Figure 3.9 we plot the difference in the value function of attending college vs
not attending, gross of the psychic cost, as perceived by the agent at the time the
schooling decision is made. It is immediately apparent that, even though people
who choose to go to college have a higher gross utility return to college than high
school graduates, this is not enough to account for differences in college attendance.
That is, we still find people who choose college with negative gross differences in
the value of consumption and labor, and people who choose high school with posi-
tive differences.
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Let f(X) denote the density of X, and let S denote the agent's actual schooling choice. Further, let Vs denote the value an individual would obtain at period 1 if he were to choose
schooling level s. The graph plots f(E(Vcol - Vhs|I0,S=hs) and f(E(Vcol - Vhs|I0,S=col).
Figure 3.9: E(Vcol −Vhs|I0) by Schooling Choice
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Let f(P) denote the density of Psychic costs, and let S denote the individuals schooling choice. The graph plots f(P|S=hs) and f(P|S=col).
Figure 3.10: Psychic Cost of College Conditional on Schooling Choice
As shown in Figure 3.10, the remaining part is captured by the difference in
preferences for schooling (the “psychic” cost function). People with low psychic costs
(i.e., people who have a preference for school) are more likely to finish college. This
preference is mostly driven by ability (since people with higher ability tend to have
lower psychic costs) and by θi,1, and to a lesser extent by θi,7.
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Table 3.10: Percentage of People Who Choose College Under Different Scenarios
Original Economy 48.31%
Zero Tuition Economy 48.63%
Guaranteed Expected Wages with Credit Constraints 48.38%
Certainty with Credit Constraints 53.97%
Certainty without Credit Constraints 57.87%
3.5.7 Credit constraints, risk aversion and uncertainty
The final step in our analysis of schooling decisions is to account for credit con-
straints. For this purpose, we perform two different simulations. First, we follow
the literature on the effect of borrowing constraints on schooling and look at the
inability of people to pay for tuition. Our first simulation consists on setting tu-
ition to zero for everyone. The results are shown in the second line of Table 3.10.
Making college free for everyone effectively relaxes the credit constraint since it al-
lows people to increase their consumption by the amount of money that they would
otherwise dedicate to tuition. It also captures the effect of reducing the price of
schooling. As a consequence, the result of this exercise is an upper bound on the
effect on relaxing the constraint via the tuition subsidy. There is a increase of
0.3%-points in college attendance. The result is consistent, although even smaller,
with the findings of Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman
(2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2006) where a similar experiment is
performed and they all find a small effect. In the second simulation, borrowing
constraints are eliminated by allowing people to select using their realized earn-
ings. The effects of eliminating the credit constraints and uncertainty with them
are significantly different from the ones obtained from just eliminating tuition.
For completeness, in the third and fourth lines of table 3.10 we repeat the exer-
cise of reducing uncertainty while keeping the credit constraints in place. We can
see that college attendance increases very little when agents are allowed to insure
against wage risk, while the increase is larger (5.7%-points) when uncertainty is
eliminated completely. In the fifth line we eliminate both uncertainty and the bor-
rowing constraints. In this case, we are back to a standard permanent income
model. Notice that people are able to smooth consumption much more effectively
under this setting. For this case, the increase in college attendance is much more
substantial (almost 10%-points), to roughly 57.8% when consumption smoothing
is allowed. Combining this with the fourth line in the table, we conclude that the
“pure” effect of eliminating the credit constraint is to increase college attendance
by 3.9%-points. As compared to the case in which only uncertainty is eliminated,
by letting people smooth consumption by eliminating the borrowing constraints,
their consumption at young ages (while in college) need not decrease as much.
Although these numbers clearly point to both uncertainty and credit constraints
playing an important role, they should be interpreted with some caution. At least
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two of the assumptions we make contribute to these results. First, we are assum-
ing that all risks are idiosyncratic. If some risks were aggregate (or in general
not all risks were insurable) clearly, people would not be able to perfectly smooth
consumption and the result would be less dramatic. The tuition subsidy example
shows that this is the case by relaxing credit constraints but not completely elim-
inating them as would be the case of aggregate shock. Finally, as opposed to the
case in which credit constraints are slightly relaxed via tuition, we now completely
change the way the economy operates. General equilibrium effects would certainly
dampen this response.32 Even with the caveats just mentioned, the effect of credit
constraints seems large enough to play an important role. If one were to cut the
effect in half so that now college graduation only increases from 48.3% to 53.1% it
is still much larger than the effect obtained by setting tuition to zero.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role played by ability, uncertainty, preferences and credit
constraints in explaining schooling choices. The conclusion of the paper is that
there is no clear candidate for “the” explanation as to why some people got to college
and some don’t. This may not be surprising result given the nature of the decision,
but it is by no means obvious a priori. As the results in this paper show, the college
attendance decision is composed of many parts and all of them help explain the
patterns in the data. Ability, preferences and uncertainty all play important roles.
Once borrowing constraints are clearly defined and people are allowed to smooth
consumption, as opposed to simply relaxing the constraint, credit constraints play
a more important role than previously found.
To the extent that simpler models are easier to interpret and require weaker
assumptions they are preferable. However, they cannot always answer the ques-
tions one maybe interested in. In very complex models, however, the relationship
between results, assumptions and data is hard to visualize. In an effort to show
that the results in this paper are not simply a consequence of functional forms or
distributional assumptions, we prove that the model we use is semiparametrically
identified.
We build on the work Carneiro, Hansen, andHeckman (2003) and Cunha, Heck-
man, and Navarro (2005) that identifies the uncertainty facing the agent. We find
that agents can predict a considerable proportion of the variance of their future
earnings as well as their gains at the time schooling decisions are made. The
remaining uncertainty helps explain why some people do not go to college even
though they would obtain positive returns and why some individuals attend college
when their observed ex-post return is negative. Individuals make their decisions
32See Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a,b, 1999) for evidence on how important this general
equilibrium effects can be.
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before all relevant information is revealed.
Ability is an important determinant of schooling choice. Individual ability helps
explain college attendance mostly through the individual preference for school.
High ability individuals have lower psychic costs of attending college and it is
mainly through this channel that ability affects college attendance.
We find little evidence of liquidity constraints when these are defined as in-
dividuals not being able to afford college. Moving to an economy with zero tu-
ition increases college attendance by roughly 0.3%-points. When both borrowing
constraints and uncertainty are eliminated on the other hand, the effect is much
larger and now college attendance increases by almost 10%-points. Once credit
constraints are defined in terms of consumption smoothing, instead of liquidity
constraints at a point in time, they play a stronger role than previously found. Our
simulation of a feasible uncertainty reducing policy that guarantees agents their
expected earnings, however, shows very little impact.
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Appendix for Chapter 1: Theorem
A.1 The proof of Theorem 1.3.1
Bellman Equation is:
Vu = c +
λ
1 + r
Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} + 1 − λ1 + r Eηmax{Vu,Vr} (A.1)
The term of Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} can be extended into four terms:
Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} = Ew,η(Ve(1{Ve > Vu > Vr} + 1{Ve > Vr > Vu}) + Vu(1{Vu > Ve > Vr}
+1{Vu > Vr > Ve}) + Vr(1{Vr > Ve > Vu} + 1{Vr > Vu > Ve}))
if Vu > 0
V1 = Ew,η((Ve − Vr)1{Ve − Vr > Vu − Vr > 0})
= Ew,η((
w
r
− η
r
)1w
r − ηr >Vu− ηr >0)
=
∫ rVu
−∞
∫ ∞
rVu
(
w − η
r
) f (w)dwg(η)dη
=
∫ rVu
−∞
[Vu(1 − F(rVu)) +
∫ ∞
rVu
1
r
(1 − F(w))dw − η
r
(1 − F(rVu))]g(η)dη
= [Vu(1 − F(rVu)) +
∫ ∞
rVu
1
r
(1 − F(w))dw]G(rVu) − 1 − F(rVu)r
∫ rVu
−∞
ηg(η)dη
V2 = Ew,η((Ve − Vr)1{Ve − Vr > 0 > Vu − Vr})
= Ew,η((
w
r
− η
r
)1 w
r − ηr >0>Vu− ηr )
=
∫ ∞
rVu
[
1
r
∫ ∞
η
(1 − F(w))dw]g(η)dη
=
∫ ∞
rVu
[(Vu − wr )G(rVu) +
1
r
∫ w
rVu
G(η)dη] f (w)dw
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V3 = Ew,η((Vu − Vr)1{Vu − Vr > 0 > Ve − Vr})
=
∫ rVu
0
∫ rVu
w
(Vu − ηr )g(η)dη f (w)dw
=
∫ rVu
0
(Vu(G(rVu) −G(w)) − 1r
∫ rVu
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ηg(η)dη) f (w)dw
=
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∫ η
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(Vu − ηr ) f (w)dwg(η)dη
V4 = Ew,η((Vu − Vr)1{Vu − Vr > Ve − Vr} > 0)
= Ew,η((Vu − ηr )1Vu− ηr >w−ηr >0)
=
∫ rVu
0
∫ w
−∞
(Vu − ηr )g(η)dη f (w)dw
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∫ rVu
0
[VuG(w) −
∫ w
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η
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g(η)dη] f (w)dw
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(Vu − ηr ) f (w)dwg(η)dη
= VuF(rVu)G(rVu) +
∫ rVu
−∞
[
η
r
(F(η) − F(rVu)) − VuF(η)]g(η)dη
The third term of Bellman Equation is:
Eηmax{Vu,Vn} =
∫ ∞
rVu
(
η
r
g(η))dη +
∫ Vu
−∞
Vug(η)dη
=
∫ ∞
rVu
(
η
r
g(η))dη + VuG(rVu)
The main idea of proof is to show the function φ(Vu) is monotonic. If the function
φ(Vu) is strictly monotonic, then the function will have at most one solution. Then
we will talk about the condition to make sure the unique solution exists.
dV1
dVu
= rg(rVu)[Vu(1 − F(rVu))] − r f (rVu)VuG(rVu) + f (rVu)
∫ rVu
−∞
ηg(η)dη
+(
∫ ∞
rVu
(1 − F(w))dw)g(rVu)
dV2
dV1
= −(
∫ ∞
rVu
(1 − F(w))dw)g(rVu)
dV3
dVu
=
∫ rVu
0
F(η)g(η)dη
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dV4
dVu
=
∫ rVu
0
G(w) f (w)dw + VuG(rVu) f (rVu) − (
∫ rVu
−∞
ηg(η)dη) f (rVu)
V1 + V2 + V3 + V4
dVu
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G(rVu) − 1
=
λ(F(rVu) − 1)(G(rVu) − rVug(rVu)) +G(rVu) − (1 + r)
1 + r
We can prove the function G(x) − xg(x) > 0 if G(x) is CDF and g(x) is density of
standard normal distribution, so dφ(Vu)dVu < 0. when Vu > 0, the function:
φ(Vu) = c +
λ
1 + r
Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} + 1 − λ1 + r Eηmax{Vu,Vn} − Vu
is monotonic decreasing.
if Vu ≤ 0
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Above proof shows φ(Vu) is strictly monotonic function. Denote h(Vu) as:
h(Vu) =
λ
1 + r
Ew,ηmax{Ve,Vu,Vr} + 1 − λ1 + r Eηmax{Vu,Vr} − Vu
∵ Emax is an increasing operator so h(Vu) ≥ 0;
∵ h(Vu) = φ(Vu) − c and φ(Vu) is strictly decreasing function of Vu,
∴ h(Vu) is strictly decreasing function of Vu.
The value space of h(Vu) = [0,∞) and limVu→−∞ h(Vu) = ∞;
limVu→∞ h(Vu) = 0.
∴ For ∀ c, s.t. c < 0 ∃! Vu s.t.
h(Vu) = −c
∵ h(Vu) = φ(Vu) − c,
∴ φ(Vu) = 0 and ∃! Vu s.t φ(Vu) = 0 
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Appendix for Chapter 1:
Likelihood
B.1 Likelihood Function
Pr 1 = Pr(Ve > max{Vu,Vr})
= Pr(Ve > Vu > Vr) + Pr(Ve > Vr > Vu)
= 1Vu≥0(
∫ rVu
−∞
∫ ∞
rVu
f (w)dwg(η)dη +
∫ ∞
rVu
∫ w
rVu
g(η)dη f (w)dw)
+1Vu<0(
∫ rVu
−∞
∫ ∞
0
f (w)dwg(η)dη +
∫ ∞
0
∫ w
rVu
g(η)dη f (w)dw)
Pr 2 = Pr(Vn > max{Ve,Vr})
= Pr(Vr > Ve > Vu) + Pr(Vr > Vu > Ve)
= 1Vu≥0(
∫ ∞
rVu
∫ η
rVu
f (w)dwg(η)dη +
∫ ∞
rVu
∫ rVu
0
f (w)dwg(η)dη)
+1Vu<0(
∫ ∞
0
∫ η
0
f (w)dwg(η)dη)
Pr 3 = Pr(Vr > Vu) = Pr(η > rVu) =
∫ ∞
rVu
g(η)dη
Likelihood for i, Employed:
λPr 1 · exp(−(λPr 1 + λPr 2 + (1 − λ) Pr 3)t)
Likelihood for i, Returned:
(λPr 2 + (1 − λ) Pr 3) exp(−(λPr 1 + λPr 2 + (1 − λ) Pr 3)t)
Likelihood for i, Unemployed:
exp(−(λPr 1 + λPr 2 + (1 − λ) Pr 3)t)
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Appendix C
Estimation and Simulation Results
C.1 Estimates for Marriage and Fertility Process
Table C.1: The Estimates of Marriage and Fertility Transition Process
Marriage Fertility
Education (βma1 ) 0.0027 Education (β
f
5) -0.0062
(0.0007) (0.0029)
Constant (βma0 ) 3.1671 Age (β
f
1) 0.2709
(0.0062) (0.0098)
lnγ -2.4694 Age2 (β f2) -0.0050
(0.0096) (0.0002)
Num of Childrent−1 (β f3) -1.1181
(0.0200)
Num of Children2t−1 (β
f
4) 0.197
(0.0068)
Married (β f6) 1.9646
(0.0248)
Constant (β f0) -6.0428
(0.1435)
1. The variable of education is education year.
2. Married is the indicator variable for marital status.
3. The first two columns give the estimates of the survival analysis of marital transition.
4. Column 4 give the estimates of fertility transition which is formed by a dynamic probit
model.
5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table C.2: Estimation Results for the Model without Network Investment
Decision
Earning Equation(Urban) Social Network Probit Equation
edu year 0.0143 marriage 0.0883
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expu 0.0040 num of children -0.0364
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expr 0.0035 snt−1 4.2777
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expu2 × 100 -0.0018 constant -1.9191
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expr2 × 100 0.0001 Psychic value
constant 6.4450 age 0.0369
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Earning Equation(Rural) age2 × 100 -0.0018
(0.0001)
edu year 0.0087 marriage 0.0013
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expu 0.0018 num of children -0.0870
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expr 0.0057 constant 0.0854
(0.0001) (0.0001)
expu2 × 100 -0.0037 Job arrival rate
(0.0001)
expr2 × 100 -0.0005 social network 0.7409
(0.0001) (0.0001)
constant 4.1083 edu year 0.0028
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment value constant -2.2334
(0.0001)
marriage 0.1068 Job separation rate
(0.0001)
num of children 0.7443 edu year 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001)
age 0.0014 constant -3.9982
(0.0001) (0.0001)
age2 × 100 -0.0354 Return Migration Cost
(0.0001)
constant 0.0276 marriage 0.8663
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Migration cost num of children 0.0798
(0.0001)
social network -1.6364 cohort -0.0034
(0.0001) (0.0001)
marriage 0.1534 constant 8.7035
(0.0001) (0.0001)
num of children 0.0395
(0.0001)
cohort -0.1378
(0.0001)
constant 15.5154
(0.0001)
1. snit is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the individual has social networks.
2. expu and expr stand for work experience in urban and rural areas respectively. They are both measured in months. Age
is measured in years.
3. Cohort is defined by the birth year-1999.
4. Marriage is an indicator of marital status that takes value 1 if the individual is married.
6. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table C.3: The Impact of Social Networks: Based on the Model without Network
Investment Decision
Migration Cost Job Arrival Rate
Social networks coefficient -1.64 0.74
Average
With Networks 91.64% 0.19
Without Network 100% 0.10
1. I normalize the average migration costs for rural migrants with-
out social networks in the model to 1. Hence, migration costs are
presented as relative to 1, (i.e., 89.19% means that the average mi-
gration costs for individuals with networks is 89.19% for those with-
out social networks.)
2. The first panel in the job arrival rate column presents the point
estimate for social networks in the job arrival rate equation. The
second panel shows the calculated average job arrival rate for rural
migrants who are not employed depending on their network status.
C.2 Estimation and Simulation Results
Table C.4: Model Fit: Earnings (Based on the Model without Network Investment
Decision)
Data Model
migrants
log(earnings) 7.1068 7.1447
sd(log(earnings)) 0.2681 0.2504
with networks 7.1229 7.1467
sd(log(earnings)) 0.2695 0.2497
without networks 7.0580 7.1365
sd(log(earnings)) 0.2612 0.2528
non-migrants
log(earning) 5.0310 5.0205
sd(log(earnings)) 1.6292 1.6303
with networks 5.0677 5.0334
sd(earnings) 1.5418 1.6279
without networks 4.9410 4.9908
sd(earnings) 1.8318 1.6346
1. Migrants include people who cur-
rently work in urban areas.
2. sd(log(earnings)) stands for the stan-
dard deviation of log earnings.
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Table C.5: Model Fits: Choices (Based on the Model without Network Investment
Decision)
Data Without Investment Choice
social networks 72.30% 72.38%
migrants∗ 29.00% 27.12%
with networks 21.86% 21.56%
without networks 7.14% 5.56%
return migrants 0.67% 1.06%
with networks 0.45% 0.80%
without networks 0.22% 0.26%
moving (rural to urban) 0.76% 1.18%
with networks 0.54% 0.97%
without networks 0.22% 0.22%
job search duration 1.91 2.34
1. The data column provides the moments calculated based on the
observations during 2007-2009.
2. The numbers in the table are averages dividing the 36 months
(2007-2009) observed in the data.
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Table C.6: Counterfactual Results (Based on the Model without Network
Investment Choice)
Social Networks Only Affect
Model Neither Migration Cost Job Arrival Rate
social networks 72.38% 72.38% 72.38% 72.38%
migrants 27.12% 17.22% 19.37% 26.82%
with networks 21.56% 12.06% 14.29% 20.76%
without networks 5.56% 5.16% 5.08% 6.06%
non-migrants 72.88% 82.78% 80.63% 73.18%
with networks 49.27% 60.31% 58.08% 51.61%
without networks 23.61% 22.47% 22.55% 21.43%
job search duration 2.34 2.68 2.55 2.51
1. Migrants include people who were born in rural areas and resided in urban
cities who can be employed or unemployed.
2. The column of model shows the benchmark values simulated by the model esti-
mates.
3. The neither column gives the simulation results when social networks affect
neither migration costs nor the job arrival rate.
4. The column of migration cost gives the counterfactual results if social networks
only reduce migration costs.
5. The column of job arrival rate gives the counterfactual results if social networks
only increase the job arrival rate.
6. The row of equalization monthly tax shows how much individuals would like
to pay per month for their lives on average to achieve the same utility when not
allowing them to invest in their social networks.
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Semiparametric Identification
The following assumptions are used throughout this section in order to prove semi-
parametric identification of all the elements of the model. For simplicity, delete the
i subscript. Let Us =
(
Us,1, ...,Us,T
)
, U = (Uhs,Ucol) , ξH =
(
ξH1 , ..., ξ
H
T
)
, ξC =
(
ξC1 , ..., ξ
C
T
)
,
ξ =
(
ξH, ξC
)
.
(A-1) U, ζ and ξ have distributions that are absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure with support S upport (U) × S upport (ζ) × S upport (ξ) that may be
bounded or infinite. Variances are assumed to be finite. The cumulative distribution
function of ζ is assumed to be strictly increasing over its full support.1
(A-2) (X,K,Z) ⊥ (U, ζ, ξ) (Independence)
Semiparametric Identification of Log-wages with and with-
out a Factor Structure
Identification of the log-wage equations is proved in theoremD.0.1. Only the case in
which the measurements are continuous is considered, but, as shown in Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003), the measurements could also be discrete or mixed
discrete-continuous.2
Theorem D.0.1 Let µs (X) =
(
µs,1 (X) , ..., µs,T (X)
). Assume that the relevant elements
of (A-1) and (A-2) (i.e., the joint conditions on X,Z,U, ζ) hold and that the following
variation free condition holds:
(A-3) S upport(φ (Z) , µs (X)) = S upport (φ (Z)) × S upport (µs (X)). (Variation free)
Assume that S upport(φ (Z)) ⊇ S upport (ζ) and S upport (µs (X))⊇ S upport (Us) .Then,
the mean functions µs,t (X) are identified on the support of X. Also, the joint distri-
bution of Us is nonparametrically identified for t = 1, ...,T for each s = hs, col.
1This assumption can easily be relaxed and is only made for convenience.
2In all cases, with additional assumptions, we can relax additive separability and identify func-
tions of the form y = µ (X,U) by using the analysis in Matzkin (2003).
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Proof Under the conditions of the theorem, we can find limit setsZ−and aZ+such
that
Pr (S = col | Z ∈ Z−) = 0 and Pr (S = col | Z ∈ Z+) = 1where we can still freely change
the µs (X). Identification of the mean functions over their support is trivial since
we observe lnWs for each X and can recover the marginal distribution of Us. The
intercepts are recovered from assumed zero mean of Us. The joint follows imme-
diately since Pr (lnWs < w | X) = FUs (w − µs (X)) by assumption (A-2). Then, from
(A-3) we can find an X = x where µs (x) = k and k is a T dimensional vector. Let
m = k − µs (x) so Pr (lnWs < w | X = x) = F (k) . Since the point w is arbitrary, we can
vary it to identify the full joint distribution.
When the unobservables are represented in terms of equations (3.17), the next the-
orems show that we can nonparametrically identify the distributions of the factors
and the uniquenesses as well as the factor loadings. We first state a theorem that
will be useful for this purpose.
Theorem D.0.2 Let Q1 and Q2 be two random variables that satisfy
Q1 = θ + R1
Q2 = θ + R2
where θ,R1and R2 are mutually independent with E (θ) < ∞, E (R1) = 0, E (R2) = 0, the
conditions of Fubini’s theorem are satisfied for each random variable and they have
non-vanishing (a.e.) characteristic functions. Then, the marginal densities of θ,R1
and R2 are identified.
Proof See Kotlarski (1967), Prakasa Rao (1992).
Consider using only the information wages in each schooling state. For a given
schooling level s we have a system of equations
lnWs,1 = µs,1
(
Xs,1
)
+ θαs,1 + εs,1
...
lnWs,T = µs,T
(
Xs,T
)
+ θαs,T + εs,T
(D.1)
The total number of equations is given by T , while the total number of factors is
given by T − 1 (an additional factor per-period up to T − 1). Such an arrangement
would be motivated by the assumptions about the arrival of information made in
the text. If we rearrange the equations in (D.1) and put the factor loadings in a
matrix, it would have the triangular form
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Time Loadings for factor
θ1 θ2 θ3 ... θT−3 θT−2 θT−1
1 αs,1,1 0 0 ... 0 0 0
2 αs,2,1 αs,2,2 0 ... 0 0 0
3 αs,3,1 αs,3,2 αs,3,3 ... 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
T − 2 αs,T−2,1 αs,T−2,2 αs,T−2,3 ... αs,T−2,T−3 αs,T−2,T−2 0
T − 1 αs,T−1,1 αs,T−1,2 αs,T−1,3 ... αs,T−1,T−3 αs,T−1,T−2 αs,T−1,T−1
T αs,T,1 αs,T,2 αs,T,3 ... αs,T,T−3 αs,T,T−2 αs,T,T−1
.
We first illustrate identification of the high school wages system of equations.
For simplicity we illustrate it for the case in which the distribution of the factors is
non-symmetric, but a (more elaborate) proof can be given for the case of symmetric
distributions.
Theorem D.0.3 From the analysis in Theorem D.0.1 we have data on F (Uhs | X).
Assume that Uhs has a factor structure representation as in (3.17) and that
(A-4) E
(
θk``
)
, 0 for ` = 1, ...,T − 1 and k` an odd integer.
Then, the loadings {αhs,t}Tt=1 are identified up to one normalization for each factor.
The marginal distributions of
{
θ j
}T−1
j=1
and {εhs,t}Tt=1 are nonparametrically identified
as well.
Proof Notice that, since the factors have no natural scale, we need to set it (that
is δθ = κδ θ
κ
for any constant κ). We also need to normalize the sign of the effect of
the factor since, for example, having more of factor ` and αhs,t,` > 0 is equivalent to
having less of the factor and αhs,t,` < 0. To pin down sign and scale, we normalize
one loading to one for each factor.
Start by taking the first equation and an arbitrarily chosen `th equation. With-
out loss of generality, we normalize αhs,1,1 = 1. Since we know the joint distribution
of the unobservables in these equations we can identify the loadings on the first
factor for the `th equation by forming
E
(
Uhs,1U
k1
hs,`
)
E
(
U2hs,1U
k1−1
hs,`
) = αh,`,1.
Since the choice of the `th equation is arbitrary we can identify all of the loadings
for factor one. With the loadings on hand, we can the take equation 1 and the `th
equation and form
Uhs,1 = θ1 + εh,1,
Uhs,`
αhs,`,1
= θ1 +
min{`,T−1}∑
j=2
θ j
αhs,`, j
αhs,`,1
+
εhs,`
αhs,`,1
.
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Using Theorem D.0.2 we can nonparametrically identify the distributions of θ1, εhs,1
and ∑min{`,T−1}j=2 θ j αhs,`, jαhs,`,1 + εhs,`αhs,`,1 .
We now take equation 2 and some arbitrary equation ` > 2.Normalizing αhs,2,2 =
1, we can identify the loadings on factor 2 on the remaining equations by forming
E
((
Uhs,2 − θ1αhs,2,1) (Uhs,` − θ1αhs,`,1)k2)
E
((
Uhs,2 − θ1αhs,2,1)2 (Uhs,` − θ1αhs,`,1)k2−1) = αhs,`,2.
Since the choice of ` is arbitrary, we can identify all of the loadings on factor 2. By
applying Theorem D.0.2 as before, we can identify the distributions of θ2, εhs,2 and∑min{`,T−1}
j=3 θ j
αhs,`, j
αhs,`,2
+
εhs,`
αhs,`,2
nonparametrically.
By proceeding sequentially we can identify all of the loadings and nonparamet-
ric distributions of wages for schooling s = hs.
From Theorem D.0.3, we now have knowledge of the nonparametric distribution of
the factors and uniquenesses as well as the loadings for wages for s = h. We next
turn our attention to identification to the analogous system of equations in (D.1)
for college (s = col).
Corollary D.0.4 Under the assumptions of Theorem D.0.3, both the loadings αcol,t
and the nonparametric distribution of εcol,t, t = 1, ...T , are identified without further
normalizations.
Proof To see why, take Ucol,1 and an arbitrarily chosen period `. Now form
E
(
U2col,1Ucol,`
)
E
(
Ucol,1Ucol,`
) = αcol,1,1E
(
θ31
)
E
(
θ21
) .
Since we know the distribution of θ1 from Theorem D.0.3, we know
E(θ31)
E(θ21)
and hence
we can recover αcol,1,1. Now, by forming
cov
(
Ucol,1Ucol,`
)
= αcol,1,1αcol,`,1E
(
θ21
)
we can recover αcol,`,1. Since ` was chosen arbitrarily, we can recover the loadings
for factor 1 for all periods. The nonparametric distribution of εcol,1 can be recovered
from Ucol,1
αcol,1,1
= θ1 +
εcol,1
αcol,1,1
by deconvolution. Proceeding sequentially the loadings on
the remaining factors as well as the nonparametric distributions of the remaining
uniquenesses can also be recovered.
Identification of the Cost Function
Write the college attendance condition (3.8) as E(Vcol,1 (I1)−Vhs,1 (I1)− φ (Z)− θλ−ω
| I0) > 0. Let θ0 denote the elements of θ included in the agent’s information set
at the time the schooling decision is made, and let λ0 denote the sub-vector of λ
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associated with them. Define E
(
V ∗col,1 (I1) − V ∗hs,1 (I1) | I0
)
= µV (X) + τ
(
X, θ0
)
which
is known since all of the elements are known from our previous analysis. The
econometrician has data on the left hand side of
Pr (S = col|X,Z) = Pr
(
τ
(
X, θ0
)
− θ0λ0 − ω > φ (Z) − µV (X)
)
.
Theorem D.0.5 Assume that the relevant elements of (A-1) hold. Change (A-2) so
that the independence of Z and the error terms holds conditional on X. Let Ze be
the elements of Z that are not a part of X (excluded from wages) and further assume
that we can define φ (ze, x) for all pairs (ze, x) in the support of Z. As with all discrete
choice problems the scale needs to be set. Assume that
(A-5) var
(
τ
(
x˜, θ0
)
− θ0λ0 − ω
)
= 1 for X = x˜.
Then, if φ (Z) satisfies the is part of the Matzkin class of functions ((Matzkin,
1992; Heckman and Navarro, 2007), λ0 and the nonparametric distribution of ω are
identified up to normalization.
Proof Define Υ
(
X, θ0
)
= τ
(
X, θ0
)
− θ0λ0 − ω and fix X = x˜. The observed prob-
ability that the agent chooses college (conditional on X = x˜ and using A-3) is
Pr
(
Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
> φ (Ze, x˜) − µV (x˜)
)
where µV (x˜) is a known constant (conditional on X =
x˜). Using the (conditional on X) independence of θ0λ0 + ω and Ze we can then use
the analysis of Matzkin (1992) to identify φ (Ze, x˜) and the distribution of Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
,
all of this conditional on X = x˜, up to a normalization.
Next, still conditional on X = x˜, we can form the joint distribution of log wages
and the choice index since we know the left hand side of
Pr (Us ≤ lnWs − µs (x˜) | X = x˜, S = s,Ze = ze)Pr (S = s | Ze = ze)
=
∫ lnWs−µs(x˜)
−∞
∫ ∞
φ(ze,x˜)−µV (x˜)
f
(
Us,Υ
(
x˜, θ0
))
dΥ
(
x˜, θ0
)
dUs.
We can trace this integral by varying lnWs, zE, so we can identify the joint distribu-
tion of Us,Υ
(
X, θ0
)
. With the joint distribution in hand, we can follow the reasoning
of theorem D.0.1 to identify λ0. To see how, take the covariance between the choice
index and the first equation for high school :
cov
(
Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
,Uh,1
)
= cov
(
τ
(
x˜, θ0
)
, θ1
)
+ λ01σ
2
θ1
where everything but λ01 is known so we can solve for it. Proceeding recursively we
identify all of the elements of λ0.
With λ0 known, we can take Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
and deconvolve the distribution of ω since
it is independent of X, θ by A-2 and the factor structure assumptions. Finally, by
changing the value of ze, x˜ we can trace φ (Ze, X) coordinate by coordinate since, for
any value of X, the scale var
(
τ
(
X, θ0
)
− θ0λ0 − ω
)
is a function of known elements.
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Data
We use data on white males from NLSY79 and pool it with data for white males
that are household heads from PSID. In the original NLSY79 sample there are
2439 white males. Out of this, 1334 have either a high school degree (and high
school only) or a college degree. We then try to recover earnings for as many indi-
viduals as possible. First, individual earnings are formed by taking total income
fromwages and salary in the past calendar year directly from the NLSY deflated to
year 2000 prices using the Consumer Price Index reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Then, because the NLSY survey was not administered on even years
starting in 1995, earnings for any individual in these years are not observed. We
impute earnings in these years by taking the average of the earnings in the imme-
diately adjacent years if available. Unemployed individuals have zero earnings on
those years and are flagged as having missing earnings otherwise.
The PSID sample is a little more problematic since attrition is more common in
that survey than in the NLSY79.1 While this reduces the PSID sample size avail-
able to us, it allows us to analyze people of all ages, something that cannot be done
with the NLSY79. Earnings in the PSID sample are obtained by using the annual
labor earnings variable. As with NLSY79, we impute earnings for the years in
which there was no survey using an average of the two immediately adjacent years
if possible.
The individual life (ages 18 to 65) is then simplified into 10 periods: t = 0 (school-
ing choice decision, right before 18), t = 1 (18-23), t = 2 (24-29), t = 3 (30-35), t = 4
(36-41), t = 5 (42-47), t = 6 (48-53), t = 7 (54-59), t = 8 (60-65) and t = 9 for age above
65. Earnings for each period are defined as the present value of earnings for the
ages included in the period discounted using an interest rate of 3%. If the present
value of earnings cannot be formed then the individual is flagged as having miss-
1But see Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) for evidence that observed people in PSID
have similar characteristics as those in the CPS so attrition is roughly random.
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ing present value of earnings for the period. Total working hours are then formed
by adding total hours worked during the period. Finally, we form “wages” for the
period by dividing present value of earnings over hours worked.
The procedure to get consumption data in both samples is fairly similar in prin-
ciple. Household consumption at time period t is defined as the difference between
available resources -household income plus assets available at the beginning of the
period- minus the discounted assets available the next period.2 In order to recover
more consumption observations, if assets are not observed at the beginning of the
period as required, we use assets either one year before or after it (discounted ap-
propriately). Imputing household consumption for the PSID sample is done in the
same way as with NLSY79, although questions about assets are not asked as fre-
quently for this sample. To impute individual consumption we divide household
consumption by the square root of the number of members in the household. We
try to correct for the measurement error introduced by this procedure in the esti-
mation as explained in the text.
Tuition between 1972 and 2000 is defined as the average in state tuition in
colleges in the county of residence. If there is no college in the county then aver-
age tuition in the state is taken instead. For years prior to 1972, national tuition
trends are used to project county tuition backwards keeping the average observed
structure of the period 1972-1977. That is, a regression of the difference between
national tuition and county tuition between 1972 and 1977 against county dum-
mies is run. The predicted value is the average difference between national and
county tuition which can then be added to the national tuition observed in the
years previous to 1972.
Ability specific variables
In 1980, NLSY respondents were administered a battery of ten achievement tests
referred to as the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) (See Cawley,
Conneely, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1997) for a complete description). The math
and verbal components of the ASVAB can be aggregated into the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) scores.3 Many studies have used the overall AFQT score
as a control variable, arguing that this is a measure of scholastic ability. In this
paper, the interpretation that AFQT is an imperfect proxy for scholastic ability is
taken and the factor structure is used to capture this. Potential aggregation bias is
avoided by using each of the components of the ASVAB score as a separatemeasure.
PSID participants do not take the ASVAB battery of tests that NLSY participants
do. Instead, we use the IQ Word test that was administered in 1972 and assume
2See Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003) for evidence that, at least for the case of Denmark
where very detailed data on consumption is available, this procedure works well.
3Implemented in 1950, the AFQT score is used by the U.S. Army to screen draftees.
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that this test (measured in percentiles) is comparable to the ASVAB tests (also in
percentiles).
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Mixture Component 1 2 3
Mean 0.144 -0.171 -0.219
(0.014) (0.026) -(0.024)
Variance 0.034 0.042 0.038
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Weights 0.575 0.210 0.215
(0.350) (0.210) (0.440)
Table A3-2
Distribution of Ability
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
, ,
M M M
i j i j i ji ijM Qj X Qβ α ε+ += ,where  follows a 
mixture of normals dist
2. Measurement  
ribution with 3 
is given
compone
 by 
nts.
Ability Age Age2 NLSY Constant
0.080 0.357 -0.004 -1.069 -40.600
(0.144) (0.002) (0.000) (0.117) (0.110)
Factor Loadings: θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7   σ2ε,hs,t
Age 18-23 1.000 1.923
- (0.248)
Age 24-29 1.867 1.000 1.874
(0.086) - (0.166)
Age 30-36 1.916 1.576 1.000 0.666
(0.081) (0.165) - (0.126)
Age 36-41 1.807 1.450 1.019 1.000 1.208
(0.084) (0.170) (0.143) - (0.118)
Age 42-47 1.714 1.980 0.477 2.016 1.000 1.701
(0.111) (0.157) (0.174) (0.148) - (0.132)
Age 48-53 1.854 2.322 -0.333 2.059 1.439 1.000 1.771
(0.112) (0.222) (0.203) (0.232) (0.157) - (0.209)
Age 54-59 1.436 2.140 -1.178 2.922 2.002 1.924 1.000 0.091
(0.095) (0.137) (0.101) (0.106) (0.072) (0.102) - (0.028)
Age 60-65 1.531 4.178 -2.045 0.119 1.273 3.352 0.596 0.364
(0.156) (0.215) (0.226) (0.126) (0.084) (0.146) (0.246) (0.065)
Ability Age Age2 NLSY Constant
1.917 0.838 -0.010 -0.737 -48.520
(0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.051)
Factor Loadings: θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7   σ2ε,col,t
Age 18-23 -0.268 3.526
(0.188) (0.341)
Age 24-29 -1.833 0.957 1.294
(0.056) (0.148) (0.111)
Age 30-36 -1.470 1.057 1.425 1.063
(0.064) (0.132) (0.086) (0.119)
Age 36-41 -1.472 0.003 2.686 -0.107 0.832
(0.065) (0.136) (0.016) (0.120) (0.048)
Age 42-47 -1.563 -0.782 3.010 0.709 0.110 2.306
(0.080) (0.059) (0.043) (0.152) (0.086) (0.189)
Age 48-53 -1.645 -1.466 2.582 1.789 -0.190 0.267 3.939
(0.054) (0.012) (0.030) (0.007) (0.026) (0.015) (0.078)
Age 54-59 -2.519 -2.205 2.556 2.681 -1.268 -0.243 1.405 0.371
(0.010) (0.027) (0.016) (0.028) (0.030) (0.007) (0.034) (0.009)
Age 60-65 -3.482 -3.199 0.079 2.081 -2.810 -1.027 1.112 1.480
(0.010) (0.027) (0.016) (0.028) (0.030) (0.007) (0.034) (0.081)
2. Logwages in schooling s  at time t  are given by  lnWi,s,t=Xi,tβs+θiαs,t+εi,s,t, where each factor θi,j is distributed as a mixture of normals with 2 components.
High School Graduates
College Graduates
Log Wages Coefficients
Table A3-3
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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Mixture Component
Mean Weights Mean Weights
θ1 -1.114 0.454 0.927 0.546
(0.003) (0.001) - -
θ2 0.225 0.394 -0.146 0.606
(0.001) (0.005) - -
θ3 -0.371 0.590 0.535 0.410
(0.007) (0.003) - -
θ4 -0.029 0.849 0.164 0.151
(0.000) (0.001) - -
θ5 -0.683 0.558 0.863 0.442
(0.006) (0.002) - -
θ6 0.352 0.159 -0.066 0.841
(0.007) (0.010) - -
θ7 -0.270 0.418 0.194 0.582
(0.013) (0.010) - -
1 2
Factor Distribution
Table A3-4
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
2. Logwages in schooling s  at time t  are given by  lnWi,s,t=Xi,tβs+θiαs,t+εi,s,t, where each factor θi,j is distributed as a 
mixture of normals with 2 components, where the variance of each component is normalized to 0.5.
Relative Risk Aversion Coefficient (ψ ) 0.491 Discount Factor (1/(1+ ρ )) 0.941
(0.000) (0.000)
Terminal Period Labor
     Curvature Coefficient (χ ) 0.088      Frisch Elasticity (ϕ ) 0.996
(0.000) (0.004)
     Weight (b ) 0.196     Weight (h ) 16.719
(0.000) (0.016)
Preference Parameters
Table A3-5
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
( )1mi
11
n
1 (1 )
11 1 1
TY r AC nh b
χψ ϕ
ψ ϕ χ
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2. Preferences are given by , and by    in the terminal period.
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Consumption Labor Supply
Age 0.031 -0.056
(0.003) (0.004)
Married 0.129
(0.043)
Number of Children -0.609
(0.014)
NLSY 1.633 -2.778
(0.083) (0.187)
Age x NLSY 0.047
(0.004)
Constant -1.858 3.068
(0.163) (0.178)
Variance
Age 18-23 0.538
(0.035)
Age 24-29 0.490 1.568
(0.018) (0.031)
Age30-35 0.583 0.178
(0.027) (0.010)
Age36-41 0.819 0.248
(0.051) (0.016)
Age 42-47 0.904 0.393
(0.058) (0.022)
Age 48-53 1.006 2.598
(0.148) (0.064)
Age 54-59 0.524 0.552
(0.121) (0.053)
Age 60-65 0.625 1.405
(0.186) (0.118)
Measurement errors 
Table A3-6
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
Ability -10.320 NLSY 5.817
(3.720) (1.785)
Local Unemployment Rate for College Drop 4.673 Constant 12.477
(27.150) (3.924)
Local Unemployment Rate for College Grad 8.667
(40.476)
Number of Siblings 2.146 θ1 -7.131
(0.430) (2.165)
Mother's Education Year 0.111 θ2 -12.154
(1.563) (1.329)
Mother's Education Year2 -0.581 θ7 22.007
(0.185) (3.145)
College Education Psyhic Cost Coefficients
Table A3-7
1. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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Data Predicted Data Predicted Data Predicted Data Predicted
Age 18-23 8.912 9.216 8.416 8.102
[9.023, 9.350] [7.848, 8.277]
Age 24-29 9.440 9.383 2.627 2.642 9.347 9.434 3.031 3.006
[9.213, 9.532] [2.532, 2.774] [9.268, 9.599] [2.855, 3.130]
Age 30-36 9.496 9.395 2.653 2.631 9.531 9.558 3.072 3.108
[9.311, 9.461] [2.516, 2.746] [9.493, 9.619] [2.966, 3.220]
Age 36-41 9.523 9.379 2.676 2.635 9.571 9.671 3.105 3.120
[9.313, 9.458] [2.481, 2.775] [9.580, 9.734] [2.971, 3.294]
Age 42-47 9.461 9.365 2.820 2.868 9.524 9.680 3.376 3.350
[9.271, 9.447] [2.687, 3.033] [9.578, 9.770] [3.163, 3.543]
Age 48-53 9.425 9.313 3.081 3.083 9.480 9.587 3.540 3.606
[9.033, 9.646] [2.700, 3.459] [9.279, 9.901] [3.312, 4.073]
Age 54-59 9.354 9.229 3.167 3.168 9.388 9.484 3.386 3.335
[8.979,9.474] [2.561, 3.645] [9.188, 9.734] [2.805, 3.961]
Age 60-65 8.771 8.755 2.997 3.347 8.948 8.995 3.612 3.527
[8.398, 9.137] [2.236, 4.333] [8.612, 9.371] [2.492, 4.510]
1. 95% Confidence interval in brackets.
Table A3-8
High School Graduates College Graduates
Log Hours Log Consumption Log Hours Log Consumption
Model Fit: Average Outcomes Conditional on Schooling Choice
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Data Predicted Data Predicted
Age 18-23 -7.250 -7.205 -7.361 -7.380
[-7.280, -7.144] [-7.471, -7.310]
Age 24-29 -6.819 -6.851 -6.624 -6.667
[-6.916, -6.795] [-6.749, -6.607]
Age 30-36 -6.653 -6.673 -6.322 -6.319
[-6.738, -6.620] [-6.393, -6.263]
Age 36-41 -6.532 -6.574 -6.042 -6.058
[-6.637, -6.521] [-6.145, -5.989]
Age 42-47 -6.529 -6.541 -5.931 -5.931
[-6.609, -6.478] [-6.025, -5.858]
Age 48-53 -6.432 -6.482 -5.923 -5.909
[-6.579, -6.387] [-6.041, -5.815]
Age 54-59 -6.444 -6.463 -5.957 -5.954
[-6.618, -6.321] [-6.183, -5.760]
Age 60-65 -6.626 -6.601 -6.049 -6.081
[-6.810, -6.394] [-6.372, -5.828]
Model Fit: Average Log Wages conditional on Schooling Choice
High School Graduates College Graduates
Table A3-9
1. 95% Confidence interval in brackets.
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